

THE
PHILOSOPHY OF SANSKRIT GRAMMA



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उत्सर्गः

जमीलत्पतिभासधाकरकारैटिंड्मग्डलं मण्डयन् ग्रिष्टानां स्ट्यानि साधु कुमुदानीव प्रवीधं नयन् । देशेषु प्रवयन् यिवं व्रतमत्ते सारखतं गायतम् किं नासोः सुद्धद् आशुतीष ! सुविरं विद्यायिनां भारते १

प्राप्तीयण्डमरीचिरज्ञिततमोदर्गानको दुर्दमः काचि गन्ततमान्द्रनिर्मलयगःगोर्यूपवर्षी गगी। विद्यासभृतगौरवैकनिचरी चोविष्वविद्यानये गान्तोया तव कौत्तिरङ्गः। संतरामद्याप्यदी नृभते॥

कि देध भवतः स्रृतिरत्तुगुणं निःस्तम्य भे वर्त्तते यत्र सेइविजोत्तदृष्टिरनघा संग्रज्जता स्तर्भणः । यादेगप्रतिपालनाय भवतो नो दर्गमोद्दान्यतो यः गव्दार्थनिवन्य एप रचितः स प्रोतये जायताम् ।

> लदुत्साइपयःचिकसमेधिततरोरिदम्। गन्दगास्तार्थविज्ञानं फलं तुभ्यं समुर्धते।

चलारि वाक्परिमिता पदानि तानि विदुर्बोद्धाणा ये मनौषिण:।

हपभो रोरवीति मही देवी मर्त्या त्राविवेश। Rk-Veda.

यस्त प्रयुद्ते कुमलो विभिषे मध्दान् यथावद्वावहारकाली । सीऽनन्तमाद्वीति जयं परत्न वाग्योगविद्ययति चापमध्दैः॥

मुखं व्यांकरणं कृतम्।


Sikṣā.

श्रनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतन्तं यदचरम् । विवर्त्ततेऽर्धभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः॥

त्रासर्त्रं ब्रह्मणस्तस्य तपसासुत्तमं तपः । प्रथमं छन्दसामङ्गं प्राहुव्यीकरणं वुधाः ॥

तहारमयवर्गस्य वाझलानां चिकित्सितम्। प्रवितं सर्वविद्यामामधिविद्यं प्रकाशते ॥

Vākyapadīya,



- The following pages present substantially my Doctorate Thesis suhmitted in 1924. and emhody the results of my long-continued efforts to bring together in a concise form the speculations of the Hindu grammarians determining the scope, the function, the definitions of grammatical concepts and the value of grammar as a distinct hranch of Sanskrit learning. The systematic study of the purely philosophical aspect of Sanskrit grammar as attempted in this book is, I believe, a long-felt want.' The idea of preparing a comprehensive account of these speculations, hased on different treatises on grammar, specially on the Mahahhāsya and the Vākyapadīya, was first suggested to me by the late lamented Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, and I can well imagine how pleased he would have been had he been alive to-day to see in print the work inspired by him. It may be stated here that I have endeavoured to the best of my powers to represent the grammatical speculations of the Hindus in their true significanco without unnecessarily amplifying them. I hope that the speculations contained in this book will serve to show that grammar in Sanskrit literature was not a mere by-product of scholarship; on the contrary, it was elevated to the dignity of Smrti and Agama and considered a system by itself broadbased on philosophical principles.

I take this opportunity of acknowledging my gratefulness to Sir Devaprasad Sarvadhikari, for the encouragement I have all along received from him from the very inception of this work.

I am much indebted to my esteemed friend and colleague Mr. Sailendranath Mitra, who has read the book in proof and has helped me from time to time with his valuable suggestions. I have also profited by discussing with Mr. Kshitish Chandra Chatterjee, Lecturer in Sanskrit and Comparative Philology, some of the points treated in the book.

The index is entirely the work of my pupil Mr. Chintaharan Chakrabarti, Kāvyatīrtha, M.A., Lecturer Bethune College, Calcutta, who is a keen student of ancient Indian history and culture.

My thanks are due to Mr. Jogesh Chandra Chakravorti, M.A., Assistant Registrar, for his uniform kindness and courtesy.

Mr. Atul Chandra Ghatak, M.A., Superintendent, Calcutta University Press, has helped me in all possible ways in seeing the book through the press, and to him I am much indebted for the keen interest he always took in the progress of the work.

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY,
The 15th January, 1930. P. C. CHAKRAVARTI.

ग्रधानं च षट्खङ्गेषु व्याकरणिमति।

दुष्टान् ग्रब्दान् मा प्रयुक्ताहीत्यध्येयं व्याकरणम्।

सीऽयमचरसमान्त्रायी वाक्समान्त्रायः पुष्पितः 🕹

फलितसन्द्रतारकायत् प्रतिमण्डिती वेदितव्यी ब्रह्मराणि:।

सर्वेवेदपारिषदं होदं शास्त्रम्।

व्याकरणं नामियसुत्तरा विद्या । Mahabhasya.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

Evolution of Sanskrit Grammar—Grammatical speculations—Aucient grammarians—Yāska, Vyādi, Vājapyāyana, Pānini, etc.

The history of the origin of Sanskrit Grammar affords a difficult field of study. It is not possible to say anything definitely either about the period when speculations of a grammatical nature had really come into existence, or about the ancient teacher who might be credited with having for the first time assimilated the principle of a regular system of grammar. An attempt is, however, made here to discuss some of the most plausible views on the evolution of Sanskrit Grammar.

Sanskrit Language, though no longer a spoken tongue, has got such a vast stock of words, and contributed so largely to the real knowledge of the intellectual world by its monumental productions, that it can defy any language ever known to the philological world. The refinement of thought, the melody of

intonation and the unsurpassably high order of spiritual and religious speculations that breathe through this "Divine tongue," reveal to us not only the intellectual capacity of the Indo-Aryans who made wonderful progress in civilization, but also serve to show the extent of perfection to which the Indian mind had developed in those primitive days. Let us begin with the first intellectual unfolding of the Indian mindthe Vedas, which are regarded either as a symbol of eternity, or as revelations of eternal truth finding audible expression through the utterances of ancient seers. The Vedas never represent, as some Western scholars have opined, a huge collection of "pastoral songs." But what is true is that they are a sublime embodiment of wisdom. It may be stated without hesitation that the four Vedas with all their subsidiary literature are in reality an encyclopædia of human knowledge. Through centuries they continued to the sacred storehouse of knowledge, and their authority, in matters both religious and secular, was so great with the ancient Hindus that any idea running counter to the Vedic injunctions was liable to be rejected. In the creative period of the Vedic literature we find, among other things of purely sacrificial and religious interest, the brilliant dawns of many speculations which were popularised and co-ordinated into a coherent system of thought by later thinkers. It can consequently be maintained that the Vedic literature, revealing as

it does, in a crude form, the intollectual herizon of our ancient ferefathers, provided ample room for the subsequent development of different branches of science and art. There was a time in ancient India when by 'learning' people used to understand only the Vedie learning ('वेदविद्या'),1 and a man's education was not complete until be had acquired a therough knowledge of the Vedas. The time has much changed since then and the ordinance of Manu 2 is but little honoured in these days.

The reason why we have dilated upon the originality and authoritativeness of the Vedas and their influence on the history of Indian thought is that the eigin of Grammar is organically and most intimately connected with the study of the Vedas The six Vedaugas, as is well-known, mainly owe their origin to a vigorous attempt at facilitating the Vedic studies, and, among these, Grammar seems to have been the most important subsidiary. That an earnest student of the Vedas can hardly ignore the studies of these Vedangas (Grammar, Phonetics, Etymology, etc.) is made sufficiently clear by the Sruti 3 which emphatically declares

भे हे विद्यो देदितच्यो इति व्य बहुझविदो बदन्ति परा भौवापरा च। ऋग्वेदी यञ्जेद: सामवेदीऽयर्ञ्वेदर: यिचा कस्यो व्याकरण निरुत्त' क्रून्टी ज्योतिपनिति। चय परा यथा सटचरमधिगस्यते ॥

Mundaka Upamahad योऽनधील दिनो देदाननात कुद्ती असन्। स लीवजीव सहल्लाम् गच्छति

सान्वरा. ॥ Manu Samhita, 2.

[े] ब्राष्ट्राणिन निष्कारको धर्मा: बडड़ी बेरोऽन्ये सी को स्था:

that the unconditional duty on the part of a Brahmin is to make a thorough study of the Vedas along with these popular 'Angas.' The injunction " स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः" does not only insist upon a regular study of the Vedas, but presupposes a knowledge of grammar sufficient for the understanding of the Vedic texts. Patanjali refers to the ancient custom when Brahmin students, as a rule, used to take up grammar for their study, as an indispensable step towards the study of the Vedas. Grammar was, therefore, studied not only for its own sake in ancient India, but as a helping guide for penetrating into the structure of the Vedic texts. While enumerating the motives that are practically served by the study of grammar, Patañjali has first mentioned "Preservation of the Vedas "as the primary reason why the science of grammar should be studied with particular attention. How useful and indispensable the study of grammar is, so far as the understanding of the Vedic texts is concerned, is best shown by such descriptive epithets of grammar as "वेहानां वेदः," 2 व्याकरणं स्नृतम्, " 8 etc.

When we enquire into the origin of Sanskrit Grammar from a historical standpoint, we find

¹ पुराकत्य एतदासीत्, संस्कारीत्तरकालं त्राह्मणाः व्याकरणं साधीयते। तैथ्यस्त स्थानकरणानुप्रदानज्ञेभ्यो वैदिकाः शन्दा उपदिश्यन्ते। Mahabhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 6.

² Chāndogya Upanişad, 7.1.

³ Pāṇinīya Sikṣā, 42.

that there were three prominent causes in operation which brought the speculations on grammar into existence. First, certain principles of spontaneous growth, followed consciously or unconsciously in the utterance of significant sentence, provided the very basis of grammatical generalisation. In combining one word with another so as to make a significant unit of speech, people undoubtedly made use of certain laws or order regulating the mode of their verbal expression. The question of priority of language to grammar is too well known to require any explanation. The way in which mon learn almost instinctively their mother tongue without having any knowledge of grammar is, an evidence of how we become familiar with the vocabularies as well as with the method of constructing sentences before we actually come in touch with grammar as such. Long before any regular system of grammar was written and studied, people with whom Sanskrit was a spoken tongue could, for example, use such a verbal form as 'सवति,' without having any idea of the grammatical operations whereby the root 'भू' might be changed to 'भो' and 'भव' in obedience to the technical process of 'guna' and 'sundhi.' Similarly, forms like 'गच्छित 'and 'यक्षोति' had obtained currency in a certain grammarless period when the grammatical conception of 'प्रकृति 'and 'प्रत्यय 'were unknown, and when

the conjugational difference of the root 'गम्' from ' भ्क,' could not be explained as peculiarities of two well-marked classes of roots, namely, 'भादि' and 'खादि.' The rule 'श्रवा : सवर्णे दीर्घ:' presupposes a phonological principle according to which two 'ञ्र' or 'ञा' sounds having close proximity in their utterance usually and invariably show the natural tendency of being amalgamated into one lengthened 'आ' sound. To such principles underlying the physical structure of language may be ascribed the rudiments of grammatical speculations. The fundamental basis of grammar is not purely artificial but appears to be more or less natural. A careful study of the Paribhāsās (generalisations of grammar) and of the rules of euphonic combinations makes it abundantly clear that the principles of grammar have close affinity with popular axioms and laws of nature. The extent to which grammar is related to popular usage is best shown by Patañjali in his elaborate exposition of the rules of grammar.1 The method in which Patanjali 2 has analysed words or, more properly, a group of similar words, in order to distinguish the stems and formative elements of words, is an indication that grammar has a scientific stamp so far as its basic principles are concerned. The science of grammar does not, however, attempt

[ं] नैवेश्वर श्राज्ञापयित, नापि धर्मम् वताराः पटनि—श्रपवादेशत्सर्गा वाध्यनामिति। किं तिर्धे ? लीकिकोऽयं दृष्टानः ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 115.

² सिद्धं लन्यव्यतिरेकाध्याम् ।—Mahābhāṣya, ibid, p. 219.

to coin new words and expressions for use, but takes them in the very forms in which they are popularly used.

Secondly, the most important factor in tho evolution of grammar, as a scientific and indispensable branch of study, was the necessity, more religious than academic, of devising some practical means ensuring a successful study of the Vedas; and the result was the evolution of gramniar. By Sabdanusasana or governance of words, the author of the Mahābhāṣya has, as Kaiyata maintains, in clear terms expressed the immediate or supreme end of grammar as such, - and by the expression 'रचीहागमलघुसन्देहा: प्रयोजनम' he has shown the indirect purposes that are usually served by grammar or Sabdanusasana, as he calls it. "Preservation of the Vedic text" seems to have been the sole purpose that made the study of grammar so useful and indispensable at the same time. It is, however, difficult to say definitely when such a necessity was actually felt for the study of grammar. It is in all probability in the transitional period 2 between the poetical activity of the oldest Sambitas, and the prosaic exegesis of the Brāhmaņas with greater tendency towards classical forms, that we may try to find out the crude beginning of grammatical speculations. The trend of human thought does not always

¹ रचार्थ वेदानामध्येयं न्याक्रर्यम्-Mahābhāṇya, p 1.

Systems of Skt. Orammar., Belvalkar, pp. 2-3.

flow along the same level, but it changes its course as time rolls on. The palmy days of beautiful poetry that witnessed the appearance of the Samhitas were followed by a period of intellectual decadence, if we are allowed to say To be more clear, the period of outstanding originality was followed by one of interpretation and elaboration. The ancient seers or Rsis are said to have been born with such a spiritual vision as to possess all knowledge intuitively, and it was possibly through their medium that the sacred hymns came to light. The etymological meaning of the term "ऋषि" 1 corroborates this view. Next to these Rsis came a comparatively inferior class of seers, better known as "Srutarsi" who were not gifted with intuitive knowledge from their very birth, but rose to the eminence of 'seer-ship' by receiving instructions on the Vedas from their teachers. These sages,2 out of compassion for the people of future generations, on account of their shorter span of existence and intellectual dwarfishness, are said to have composed the Vedāngas with the avowed intention of making the Vedic study less arduous. There is reason to believe that the exact meaning of the oldest hymns had already begun to be forgotten in the second stage spoken of above; and it was undoubtedly to preserve the

¹ ऋषिर्दर्शनात्-Nirukta.

² विवाग्रहणायेमं ग्रन्यं समामासिषुवेंदं च वेदाङ्गानि च—Nirukta, p. 143 (Bom. ed.)

Samhita texts intact and to save them from misinterpretation that particular attention was directed towards grammar and the Nirukta. Yaska 1 frankly admits that the study of the Nirukta derives its importance from the fact that the meaning of the Vedic texts are not otherwise comprehensible. As a matter of fact, the Vedic hymns had ceased to be intelligible to a great extent even at so early a period, and, what is still more surprising, some teachers of respectable antiquity even pronounced in clear terms their verdict about the meaninglessness of the hymns. An ancient teacher like Yaska has recorded the contention of Kautsa against the Vedas. The hymns, he contends, are meaningless and as such not worthy of commanding respect. When an acknowledged teacher of such remote antiquity could have assailed the trustworthiness of the Vedas on grounds, hardly justifiable, it is not at all surprising that later teachers belonging to the atheist school of Sugata and Carvaka would come forward to demolish the glorious edifice of the Vedas. In the face of such undignified attack threatening to undermine the very basis of religion, the Mimāmsakas were confronted with a problem of great seriousness; they consequently tried

प्रयापीदमलरिय मन्त्रेष्वर्षप्रव्ययो न विद्यते—Nirokts, p. 115.

यदि सलाध्राव्ययायामधेकं सक्तीति कीलोऽनधंका हि सला:—Nirokta, p. 115

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their level best to set aside all antagonistic views regarding the eternality and the trustworthiness of the Vedas. Both Nairuktas and Vaiyākaraņas seriously engaged themselves in the arduous task of preserving the Vedic texts intact by advocating the eternality of Sabda, on the one hand, and by analysing the entire structure of the Vedic words, on the other. The etymologists sought to bring out the meaning by suggesting derivation of words, while the grammarians took upon themselves the task of supporting the Vedic forms by an analytical process: and these methods, supplementing each other, proved to be of much importance in preserving the sacred texts in their pristine glory. Patañjali seems to have been conscious of this paramount function of grammar, as is clear from his statement 'रचार्थं वेदानामध्येयं व्यानरगाम्.' In the estimation of Patanjali grammar is pre-eminently the greatest of all Vedāngas; its greatness obviously due to the fact that grammar is indispensable to an understanding of the Vedic hymns. The epithet "Vedānām Vedam," as applied to grammar by the seers of the Upanisads, is really suggestive of the importance and dignity in which Vyākaraņa was held in those days.

In the third place, the growing popularity of different forms of Prākṛta served almost like an incentive to the rise of so many systems of grammar in Sanskrit. Sanskrit, even when it was a spoken tongue, had been confined to the area of the cultured community. The Sistas or the Sanskrit-speaking people had, however, to come frequently in touch with the untutored masses, and this was calculated to destroy the purity of the "Divine tougno" to n certain extent. As a result of this intercourse, many Prakrta forms crept into Sanskrit and became almost naturalised in course of time. That Sanskrit had suffered mutilation and distortion of forms at the hands of those who failed to pronounce the correct Sanskrit words, either on account of wrong imitation or their natural inaptitude, is testined by the so-called Apabhramsas which represent Sanskrit only in a distorted form. The space nt our disposal will however, pormit .us to discuss the much vexed quostion as to whether Prakrta-Apabhranisas are directly descended from Sanskrit under oiroumstances stated above, or originated from an altogother different source. Wo only repeat what we have pointed out observiere Hindu grammarians, hocause of their unbounded regard for Sanskrit as the most original of all tongues, or for the striking similarity of the so-called तद्वव forms Prakrta with Sanskrit, hold Prakrta to be an off-shoot of Sanskrit. To look upon both Sanskrit and Prakṛta as two sister tongues, descended from a common source, is a view that is little favoured by the Hindu grammarians. As the number of Sanskritspeaking people gradually diminished, and Prākṛta dialects, on the other hand, began to

obtain greater popularity till they spread all over the country, the orthodox Hindu teachers were almost compelled to notice the linguistic peculiarities of Sanskrit and draw hard and fast rules regulating them, their sole motive the preservation of their tradi-'tionally sacred tongue from corruption. The expression ग्रन्दानुशासन, as significantly used by Patañjali instead of the more popular term व्याञ्चरण, serves to indicate that the main function of grammar is as much to support the correct forms in conformity with the fixed rules, as to show indirectly how words of pure Sanskrit origin differ from Apabhramsas which represent the linguistic corruption caused by wrong imitation and inability to pronounce the correct Sanskrit words. In the Mahābhaṣya we find it explicitly stated that 'governance of the correct words' 1 forms the main function of grammar, and by the discrimination of correct forms as gault, the corrupt ones as $g\bar{a}v\bar{\imath}$, $gon\bar{\imath}$, $got\bar{a}$, etc., are indirectly pointed out.2 Sanskrit grammar thus draws a line of demarcation the correct and corrupt forms, the former being conformable to the rules laid down in grammar, and the latter lying entirely outside the scope of Sanskrit grammar. The spread of Buddhism, as it was accompanied by the popularity of Prākṛta, is supposed to have given a

¹ साध्वतुशासनेऽस्मिन् शास्त्रे, etc., Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 104.

² गौरित्येतिमानुपदिष्टे गस्यत एतहाव्यादयोऽपशब्दा इति ।—Vol. I, p. 5.

stronger impetus to an intensive study of Sanskrit grammar. It must be, however, remembered that the Hindu grammarians, in spite of all their attempts, as is evinced in their formulation of rules, could not entirely evade the possibility of their sacred tongue being mixed up, though to a small extent, with the corrupt Apabhramsas. Kumarila speaks of the naturalisation of certain Dravidian forms into Sanskrit.

Thus, there grew up different systems, of grammar in Sanskrit: commentators after commentators came to elahorate and supplement them in the light of new facts. At this stage of our knowledge, we cannot exactly determine the number of grammatical systems that once existed in ancient India. We generally hear of eight prominent systems each founded by a renowned Sābdika or grammarian.1 Astadhvaví mentions the names of many grammarians whose works have, unfortunately, not come down to us. In the Mahabhasya mention is made of two eminent grammarians, namely, Vyādi and Vājapyāyana, the former is supposed to have written a huge treatise on grammar called Samgraha, which is so authoritatively spoken of by Patanjali.2 Yaska has

^{ः &}quot;ऐन्द्र चन्द्र' कार्यकत्स्य कीमार प्राकटायनम्। कारस्तरं चापिशलं प्राक्तलं पाणिनायकम्।"

[°] संग्रह एसत् प्राधारीन परीचितं निल्लो वास्त्रात कार्यो विति।—Vol 1, p 6

recorded a controversy between two grammarians—Sākatāyana and Gārgya—each of whom had undoubtedly a system of grammar to his credit. The old treatises on grammar are almost irrecoverably lost; but those that remain are sufficient to constitute a vast literature of which there is no parallel in any language of the world. In no other land except India was the science of grammar studied with so much zeal and deliberation.

This is, in short, the history of the evolution of Sanskrit grammar. It is, however, difficult to ascertain the period to which the real foundation of the science of grammar might be traced. The analytical method upon which is based the fundamental principle of Vyākaraņa is first seen, though in a crude form, in the Pada-Pāṭha arrangement of the Samhitā texts, which is popularly attributed to the authorship of Sākalya. It is in this method of decomposition that we meet with the beginning of disjoining Sandhi and Samāsa, and the addition of Upasarga with the verbal forms. While the Pada-Pāṭha order thus represents the first step towards grammar, the elaborate logical speculations of the Prātiśākhyas may be said to have shown grammar in the making. Some problems of real grammatical interest are also to be found in the Prātiśākhyas. The oldest specimens, however, of the Pratisakhyas, which are so akin to grammar, are not accessible, and most of the extant treatises are of comparatively

medern origin, some of them boing even posterior lo Panini Thore is ample evidence le indicate that different schools of grammar had already been in existence when Yaska wrote his famous commenlary on the Nighantu. That Yaska was preceded by a good many grammarinas is clear from his slatement वैयाकरणानां चेके and tho grammatical centrevorsy ho has reforred to Yasha mado ample uso of llieso carlier systems of grammar current in his time. The definition Sandhi, पर: मुद्रिकर्ष: मंहिता, quoted by Yāska, and incorporated into his Astādhvāvī by Pānini, is supposed to have been takea from some elder syslems of grammar. Morcover, Yaska's fourfold classification of Padas as noun. verh, propesition and parlicle, also seems lo bo a reproduction from a cortain grammar which has not left any trace bohind. The use of such lechnical terms as mifen, etc., does not really indicate erigiaality oa lho part ef Yaska, but what is plausible is that they were undoubtedly borrowed from semo earlier systems of grammar no longer extant. The less sustained by grammatical literature is enermous; we find numerous references to several grammarians both in Yaska's Nirukta and Panini's Astādhyāyī, but it is regrettable that very little of their works has come down to us. Just as

[े] न सर्वोगीत गार्थी वैद्याकरणाना चेके-Nirokis, p 99

Pan . I 1v 109

among the huge Nirukta literature, the work of Yāska only is available in a complete form, even so it is the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini alone that has fortunately survived the numerous systems of grammar, such as those of Sākalya, Sākaṭāyana, Gārgya, Gālava, Senaka, Sphoṭāyana, Bhāradvāja, Āpiśali, Kāśakṛtsna, Vyāḍi, and Vājapyāyana.

The identity of the first grammarian is also a difficult point of enquiry in the history of grammatical speculations. Having discussed circumstances that paved the path for evolution of such a scientific branch of study as grammar, we now turn our attention, though without any avail, to the question of determining the first author of a system of grammar. peculiarities of language, specially when older forms became obsolete and were sequently replaced by new words of spontaneous growth, provided the basis upon which was built the scientific structure of grammar. There are certain fixed laws underlying the use of words; they are more or less natural and simple. the real difficulty comes when we proceed to determine that clever being who first assimilated such principles and developed them into a system of grammar. The Taittirīya Saṃhitā 1 contains a narration according to which Indra may be styled the first grammarian. In an

¹ वार्षे पराच्याक्ततावदत्ते देवा इन्द्रमत्त्ववित्रमां नी वार्षे व्याक्तिविति स्थाति वार्षे व्याक्ति वामिन्द्रो मध्यतीऽवक्रम्य व्याक्तरीत्तकादिशं व्याक्तता वागुद्यते।—Tait. Sam., VI. 4. 7.

agé.when speech was undivided into its component elements, it was Indra who is said to have divided speech, and thenceforward it is known as व्यक्तिता वाक् or analysed speech. This though apparently incredulous, is strengthened by the evidence of the Mahabhāsya 1 where a tradition is recorded to the effect that Indra made a thorough study of words under the tutorship of Brhaspati-the divine teacher. Further, the name of Indra may he traced in the list of eight Sabdikas or grammarians. But we do not know whether it would be a truism or a positive mistake to ascribe the authorship of the so-called Aindra grammar to Indra as a divine personage. There is, however, no wonder that the conception of a grammar had first originated with a respectable divine being, because Panini is also said to have received the first 14 Sotras from the lord Siva and these rules are consequently known as "Māhesnara Sātra." Nandikesvara 2 in his Kāśikā has shown how on the pretext of beating drum the lord Siva revealed the fundamental principles of grammar. Similarly, Sarvavarman, the author of the Kūtantra Sūtras. is said to have received the nucleus of his grammar from Kärttikeya and hence the system

¹ ''एवं हि यूपति—हहस्पतिरिन्दाध दिखं वर्षसहरू प्रतिपदोक्तानां शब्दाना शब्दपारायणं प्रोवाच मार्ना जगास" (—Mabābhāṣya, Vol. I, p ठ

वत्तावसाने नटराजराजो ननाद ढङ्का नवपववारम् ॥
 चङ्क्षंज्ञाम: सनकादिसिङ्कानेतादमभ शिवन्द्रजालम् ॥

is popularly known as "Kumāru Vyākaraņa." 1 Whatever value we may attach to these narratives and traditions, there is every reason to suppose that long before the grammarians of the Alexandrine period, the Hindu teachers had developed different schools of grammar and succeeded in giving them a highly scientific character.

Before concluding this topic we need only make a passing reference to what has been said by Bhartrhari in regard to the origin and importance of grammar. Following in the wake of Patanjali, the author of the Vakyapadīya 2 describes grammar as the foremost of all Vedāngas and as a direct auxiliary to the Vedic studies, supporting as it does the correctness of the Vedic forms. He is loud in eulogising the importance of grammar, for he boldly asserts that it is impossible to comprehend the meaning of words without an adequate knowledge of grammar. He maintains grammar to be the most sacred of all branches of learning and calls "Adhividya" and sometimes "Ajihbhā rājapaddhati." As an exponent of the doctrine of 'Sphota,' Bhartrhari looks upon grammar from a different standpoint, raising grammar to the dignity of Agama and Smrti, for he is

Vākyapadīya, I, Kār. 11.

[े] शहरस्य सुखाद्दानीं श्रुला चैव पड़ानन:। लिखेख शिखिन: पुच्छे कलाप इति कथाते॥

^{*} त्रासतः बहाणसम् तपसामुत्तमं तपः। प्रथमं कृत्दसामङ्गं प्राष्ट्रव्यीकरणं बुधाः॥

even prepared to maintain that the study of grammar ultimately leads to salvation ¹ Vyakarana-Smrti, he holds, is a set of rules that helps the comprehension of correct words, it seems to be almost without beginning ² (नित्य), because such a process as followed by grammar appears to have been current from time immemorial

In my "Languistic Speculations of the Hindus" I tried to show on the basis of some pissages from the Rg Veda and Brahmanas that speculations on language and grammar had their origin in India in a very remote age. The Samhitā literature represents, of course, the crude beginning of grammatical speculations, and there is consequently absence of systematisation and elaboration. It is interesting to see that the scientific accuracy of these speculations is almost unquestionable. The earliest reference to grammatical speculations, we may venture to add on the authority of Patanjali and Sayana, is to be found in the Rk Maif Tail, etc., which

¹ तत्त्वाववीध शब्दानां नास्ति न्याकरणाहते"—\ kyspadiya I Kar 13 तद्दारमधवर्गस्य 'and तद्दाकरणमागव्य पर ब्रह्मधिगस्यते

⁻Vākyapadıya I Aár 14 & 22

[&]quot;सच्चानिक्यते नित्वा साधुलावया कृति । —Vakyapadiya I Kar 29 and तव्यादक्षतक ज्ञास कृति वा सनिक्यतान् । वाणिकारयते विष्टे जव्यातामञ्ज्ञासकृत् ॥

[—]Vākyapadiya I Aar 48 * चलारि प्रज्ञा तथीऽस्य पादा हे ग्रींचे सप्तडलाखी चस्य। विधानजी हवभी रीरवीति मडी देवी मधीं चावित्रमा—Rg Veda 4 58 3

admits of double interpretations—sacrificial and grammatical. The bull spoken of here represents the science of grammar and is said to be a divine being characterised by sound. Its four horns stand for four component parts of speech नासाख्यातोपसर्ग-निपाता:; three feet for three tenses (present, past and future); and two heads and seven hands symbolise respectively two kinds of Padas (सुबन्त and तिङ्न्त) or नित्य and कार्यशब्द and seven caseendings. Another Rk, as we have already pointed out, speaks of four different forms of speech (Parā, Paśyantī, Madhyamā and Vaikharī) and lays down that it is the fourth form -of speech that is current among men. The ancient term denoting a grammarian seems to have been "वागयोगवित" meaning 'one who knows the connection of words, viz., combination of stems and suffixes;' and it is emphatically stated in a Rk that $V\bar{a}k^2$ or speech reveals herself entirely to such 'analysers of speech.' While commenting on the Rk सुदेवोऽसि वरुण, 3 etc., Patañjali explains the expression सप्तसिया as an allusion to grammatical case-endings which are seven in number. There are many passages the Samhitas which have thus either direct or indirect bearing upon grammar—a fact which

Bhartrhari also speaks of Sabda or, more properly, Sabda-Brahman, as a Bull representing the Supreme Deity—"प्राइमेहानस्यमं येन सायुव्यमिष्यते''—Vākyapadīya, I. 132.

चलारि वाक्परिमिता पदानि तानि विदुर्जीह्मणा ये मनीिषण:।

² ''उतीलको तन्वे विससे जायेव पत्य उशती सुवासा:''—Pg Veda, X. 71. 4.

³ Rg Veda, VIII. 69. 12.

proves beyond doubt that Indian speculations on grammar are decidedly the oldest of their kinds. In the Tait. Samhitä, as we have already shown, Fäk is said to have been originally undivided into parts, and that it was Indra who analysed speech in response to an appeal made by gods.

Then, we turn to the Brahmann literature. Here we find the real beginning of grammar. · The etymological explanations of words, such as, यहरीदीत् तहुदस्य सदलम् and so on, showing us at once the derivative meanings as well as the method of analysing words into their parts, bring us face to face with grammar in its growth. The Nairuktas or etymologists adopted this method of explaining words and have quoted largely from the Brahmanas. The term Fuakarana. meaning as it does the 'science which dissolves words into elements' (stems and suffixes) and thereby brings out their exact mennings, is in itself an indication that grammar and etymology are intimately connected with oach other. It is obviously for their mutual dopendence that Yaska has expressly stated that the science of etymology (Nirukta), though it has its independent character as well, may be viewed as a complement to grammar. The difference between the Sainhitäs and the Brahmanns is not. far from speaking of their subject-matter, one of melodious poetry and monotonous prose, but a careful study will reveal that there is distinct difference of language too. In the transitional period of this literary activity we find, as we have already shown, that the older Vedic forms have almost disappeared and new words and expressions with greater tendency towards classical forms were coming into existence. That the Brāhmaṇa literature made some progress in grammatical speculations is quite evident from the fact that there occur here and there such grammatical terms as \(\mathcal{V}acana \) (number), \(\mathcal{V}i - \) bhakti (case-endings), Dhātu (root) and so on. Of the Brāhmaņas the Gopatha deserves special mention, since it contains in a passage 1 almost all the popular technical terms of Sanskrit grammar. In its enumeration of different branches of learning the Chandogya Upanisad makes mention of such a branch of study as वेदानां वेद:, which is explained by Sankara as referring to the science of grammar. The epithet "the Veda of the Vedas," as applied to grammar, serves to indicate the indispensable character of grammar for an derstanding of the Vedic texts. That is why grammar is compared to the face of the Vedas. Patañjali also observes that grammar is preeminently the greatest of all Vedāngas.

Even in so remote a period as that of the Brāhmaṇas, necessity was already felt to devise

¹ श्रोंकारं पृच्छाम:। की घातु:? क: प्रत्यय:? क: खर:? किं प्रातिपदिकम्? कि नाम? किं साख्यातम्? किं लिङ्गम्? किं वचनम्? का विभिक्ति:?

practical means for the preservation of the older texts and the natural outcome was the evolution of the Vedāngas. Of these Vedāngas, Šiksā and Nirukta are more or less related to grammar. The Siksūs or treatises phonetics deal with letters (vowels and consonants), accents (Udātta, Anudātta and Sparita), different organs of pronunciation, Sandhi or suphonic combination and so on. We do not, however, fail to see that the "Siksās." though their main importance lies in the correct recitation of the Vedic hymns, deal with the phonological side of grammar. That grammar has connection with accents is clearly shown by the fact that the so-called Samāsas, so far as the Samhitas are concerned, had to be determined by different modulations of accents. Here again we first meet with "Sandhi," i.e. the combination of letters with one another in accordance with certain euphonic principles. The arrangement of words, as shown in the "Padapātha", serves to evince an attempt not only at disjoining the so-called "Sandhis" but clearly indicates how the grammatical method of analysis had already been in operation. treatises on phonetics are almost irrecoverably lost. The Pada-pāţha texts which are popularly attributed to Sakalya only seem to have been well preserved.

Early Sanskrit literature had to suffer enormous loss; and nowhere such loss is more remarkable as in the case of the Prātisākhyas and the

Niruktas. We have got no oldest specimen of these classes of literature indicating the historical and continuous development of so ancient but extensive a literature; and what have practically survived seem to have a comparatively modern origin. The Prātiśākhyas, even in their present forms, are sufficient evidence that the study of grammar as a science had already been taken up with all earnestness. "If the nature and contents of our existing Prātiśākhya literature," says Dr. Belvalkar, "can safely be made the basis of any inference, we may suppose that these earlier treatises (1) classified the Vedic texts into the four forms of speech known to Yāska; (2) framed and carefully defined some of the primitive Samjñās or technical terms; and (3) possibly also made some more or less crude attempts to reduce the words to their elements and explain the mode of their grammatical formation."

We have already referred to the fact that Yāska, who flourished at a date not later than 700 B. C., had a good many predecessors—both etymologists and grammarians; and his work is not the first of its kind. The list of etymologists and grammarians, as mentioned by Yāska, gives unmistakable proof that Yāska had already found in existence different schools of the Nirukta and grammar. We are naturally inclined to think that the speculations on grammar which had had their crude beginning in the Brāhmaṇa literature had gradually obtained

wider scope and scientific character and finally developed inte regular systems long befere Yaska. That plagiarism as a literary theft was unknewn in ancient India is borno testimeny te by the fact that a teacher, whenever he happened to cite anything in support of his particular view, either from his predecessers or centemperary authors, was not at all slow to acknewledge his indobtedness te them by mentioning their names. This practice has been of considerable help to us, as it enables us to traco the names of those teachers whose names, like their works. weuld have been otherwise undiscoverable. In the Pratisakhvas mention is made of a good many teachers some of whem were undoubtedly grammarians. In the Taittirlya, for instance, are mentioned some twonty teachors, but we fail to trace there the name of any reputed grammarian. Ameng the hest of teachers mentiened by Yaska, there are four, namoly, Sākajāyana, Gārgya, Galava, and Sākalya who are credited with having founded their respective schools of grammar and their works scem to have been existing even in the days of Pāṇini. Yāska has recerded a centrevorsy which had ensued between Sakatayana en the ene hand and Gärgya and the grammarians on the ether, with regard to the reducibility of words to roots. Sākatāyana seoms to have been ene of the oldest grammarians, and some of his views (as his work is no longer available) might

be collected from the works of later authors. Mention is made of Sākatāyana in the Atharva-Prātisākhya in connection with combination, division, and disjunction of words. Yāska has thrice referred to Sākatāyana and has probably given his doctrines verbatim thus:—(1) 'All words are derivable from roots'; (2) 'Prepositions have no significance by themselves apart from nouns and verbs to which they are prefixed'; (3) his fanciful derivation of the word "Satya" from two different roots (as, in).

Though our knowledge of ancient grammarians is nothing but scanty and meagre, it is admitted without contention that speculations on grammar had already taken a definite form long before the Christian era. The few observations. as mentioned above, will serve to show the extent of scientific accuracy exhibited by the Indian grammarians. Yāska had undoubtedly many treatises on grammar and etymology before him and he made ample use of them. The theory enunciated by Sākaṭāyana as to the reducibility of all words to roots was accepted by Yāska with all earnestness; he followed it as a basic principle in all his etymological explanations. He classified speech into four forms, namely, noun, verb, preposition, and indeclinable, giving their exact significance. This four-fold classification of words seems to have been taken by Yāska from some earlier works on grammar. He not only distinguishes nouns from verbs with grammatical terminations (sup, tin) hut

Among the ancient grammarians, Vyādi and Vājapyāyana appear to be somewhat prominent, specially as the exponents of two popular doctrines of grammar.

Vyādi and Vājapyāyana are said to have been reputed grammarians. The former is well-known as the author of a huge work on grammar called 'Saṃgraha.' Pataājali has referred to this work, as an authoritative one, while discussing the eternality of Sabda. Mention is again made of Vyādi in the Vārttika as one holding 'substance' (इज्.) as the meaning of all words. This is, in short, what we know about Vyādi. The name of Vājapyāyana also occurs in the Vārttika. In conjunction with the Mīmāṃsaka point of view, Vājapyāyana holds that all words are expressive of 'class' (पाकति).

28 PHILOSOPHY OF SANSKRIT GRAMMAR

Next we pass on to Pāṇini, the popular author of the Astadhyayī. As the founder of a scientific system of grammar which has survived the destroying hands of time, Pāṇini is regarded as the highest authority on grammar. Pāṇini is mentioned as one of the reputed eight grammarians. His work is often alluded to as a great system पाणिनीयं सहाशाखं पदसाधुत्वज्ञणम् 1 and sometimes as "Vyākaraņa-Smrti." 2 He was not a pioneer in his attempt, but had the advantage of consulting many earlier treatises on grammar before he could develop such a system which bears the stamp of scientific perfection in so remarkable a way. With him closes a period of Sanskrit literature which represents the beginning of the classical period. His aphorisms have a history behind them and presuppose a vast literature. Prof. Goldstücker 'Pāṇini: His Place in Sanskrit Literature' has dealt with the question of pre-Paninian literature and has discussed at length Pāṇini's scope of knowledge; but my views differ from those of the learned professor in some points. The object kept in view in writing these pages is to show in broad outlines the philosophy of Sanskrit grammar and not to attempt a study of grammatical historical literature. Prof. Belvalkar's learned work 'Systems of

¹ Parasara-Upapurana.

[ं] सापुत्रज्ञानविषया सेपा व्याकरणसृति:। Vakyapadiya and तत्कर्भतद दितीयार्यंडस्येच पाणिनी: सृति:।

Grammar,' however, gives a historical survey of different eystems of Sanskrit grammar, and is a valuable contribution to our knowledge.

Though Pănini had many predecessors in the same line, it is his "Aştādhyāyī" alone that has survived as a great landmark in tho domain of Sanskrit litorature. To a student of ancient Indian history, Pāņini's "Aştādhyāyī" has got its historical importance too. Thus, judged from both grammatical and historical standpoints. Panini'e work is a very valuable record of Indian culture. Many other works on grammar following in the wake of pre-Paninian and Pāṇinian schools came into existence and gavo rise to a vast literature which is almost without a parallel. The system of grammar founded by Pānini was etudied with uncommon zeal, as a Vedānga, by so reputed echolars as Kātyāyana and Patanjali. Attempts were also made from time to time to elaborate and supplement it in such a way as to make it a complete whole. Kātyāyana to whom is attributed the authorship of the 'Varttikas' tried his best to supplement the work of Panini, having paid keen attention to the new stock of forms that gradually obtained currency in the course of linguistic development. Then came Patanjali with his wonderful genius and unpuralleled erudition and wrote his famous commentary the 'Mahābhāsya,' which is still regarded as the highest authority on all problems of grammar. He

may be said to have changed the angle of vision. He proceeded on a new line with the consequence that grammar received a far more scientific treatment in his hands and ultimately came to be regarded as a particular system of philosophy. He approached grammar from a logical standpoint always trying to find out the principles underlying the aphorisms of Pāṇini and Kātyāyana. There is indication in the first 'Ālnika' of the Mahābhāsya that grammar was not only a heterogeneous combination of Sūtraś with Patanjali, but it was treated by him as a regular science.

Though virtually a commentary, the Mahābhāṣya has its originality both in method and exposition; it brings the system of Pānini to perfection and provides a vast field of study. Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali are popularly known as the "Triad of grammarians" and the system as "Trimuni Vyākaraņa" (त्रिमुनि व्याकरणम्). Next came Bhartrhari, the author of the "Vakyapadīya," who seems to have made a masterly study of the "Mahābhāṣya" which fitted him to write his famous work dealing mainly with the philosophical aspects of grammar. It was, therefore, finally in the hands of Bhartrhari that the philosophical character of grammar became more and more conspicuous and grammar was ultimately established as a distinct system of philosophy.

To give a consistent history of grammatical speculations and the huge literature that evolved

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out of them lies almost beyond the compass of this work. What we have tried to show in the foregoing pages is to point out that the speculations on grammar which had had their orude beginning in the Brāhmanas and subsequent literature had to pass through different stages of perfection before they could develop into regular systems in the hands of Sākaṭāyana, Sākalya, and others.

The indispensable character of grammar for understanding the Vedic texts was a matter of so great concern that grammar came to he regarded as the greatest of all Vedangas. The importance of grammar lies in the fact that without a thorough knowledge of grammar one cannot distinguish correct words from incorrect ones (as there is no difference of meanings) and consequently fails to attain that religious felicity which is only attainable by the use of correct words. The study of grammar enables one, on the other hand, to discriminate the correct words as opposed to the so-called "Anabhramsa." Bhartrhari calls grammar " Smṛti" 1 which has for its subject the knowledge of correct words. One may argue that the knowledge of correct words may be obtained from popular or ourrent usage and consequently grammar does not serve any useful purpose. Bhartrhari 2 meets this

¹ साप्तकानविषया सेषा व्याकरस्यम्तिः! षविन्हेदैन शिष्टानासिदं स्मृति-निवस्तनस् :—Vškyapsdiys, I, 143.

वस्तावनीयः मन्दानां नास्ति व्याकरबाहते ।--11. 1. 13.

argument by holding that grammar derives its importance from the fact that it lays down principles covering almost the entire field of correct words and has thus become a practical standard for distinguishing the correct words current among the "Sistas" from corrupt forms. For the recognition of current words, we should take recourse to certain principles to avoid unwarranted uses; grammar is identified with such principles made on the authority of the Vedas, conforming to the current uses and handed down to us through generations of teachers. "Vyākaraņa-Smṛti", as Bhartrhari often applies this epithet to grammar, is current from time immemorial and does not appear to have suffered any breach of continuity in the course of its development. The author of the Vākyapadīya is not content with this statement only but goes further and maintains that the study of grammar leads ultimately to salvation. How final emancipation is obtained from a study of correct words will be understood only if we, like the ancient seers, try to find out the mystical aspect of sound and look upon words as an emblem or symbol of All-pervading God. The origin of the doctrine of 'world-producing Logos' or भन्दब्रह्मवाद: may be traced to an attempt to discover the divine element in words. Puņyarāja quotes a verse 2 which states that

वदुदारमप्वर्गस्य वाङ्मलानां चिकित्सितम् । पविवं सर्वेविद्यानामधिविद्यं प्रकाशते ।—Vākya., I. 14.

⁵ Nākyapadīya, I, p. 8.

water is the most sacred thing in the earth; the Vedic mantras are more sacred than water, hut grammar is even superior in sanctity to the Vedas. The references given above are intended to show the respect that was accorded to grammar in those days.

CHAPTER II

ANUBANDHA AND CATEGORY

Grammar—Name and definitions—The Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar—Anubandhas—Categories of Grammar.

The earliest name whereby the science of grammar was designated is possibly वेदानां वेद: 'the Veda of the Vedas,' as is to be found in the long list of Sastras enumerated in the Upaniṣads. The popular term 'Vyākaraṇa' appears to be an old one; it points at once to the analytical process (ন্র্লোর) by which words are dissolved into bases and suffixes. expression like আন্তানা বাৰ্ meaning 'divided speech' is also to be met with in the Vedic literature. Both the terms व्याकारण and वैयाकरण occur in the Nirukta. Grammar is also called श्व्ह्याच, and the grammarians are popularly known as মাহ্নির and sometimes as 'वागयोगवित्,' i.e., one who knows the combination of speech. Patanjali has used the expression 'शब्दान्शासन' instead of व्याकरण at the very beginning of his work, his object obviously being to point out that the first and foremost function of grammar is to show how by their conformity to the rules of grammar correct words are distinguished from incorrect ones. He derives the term व्याकरण as 'व्याक्रियन्ते व्युत्पाद्यन्ते शब्दा अनेनेति-व्याकरणम्' and speaks of both words and rules as what constitute grammar that supports the eorrectness of Sanskrit words (लध्यनचर्णे व्याकर्णम्). Ho holds further that the knowledge of words does not really follow from the rules nlone. but from a clear interpretation of these rules showing both examples and counter-examples. Of the six Augas, Patanjali maiatains, grammar is decidedly the greatest, as it directly holns the study of the Vedus. Durga holds that grammar coasists of rules and primarily deals with the physical structure of words, whereas the science of ctymology lays greater stress on the psychological aspect, viz., significance. Grammar scems to have attained to scriptural authority, for Bhartchari and others are often found to ascribe such epithets to gramamar, as व्याकरणसृति and व्याकरणागम. There is a special section on grammar ia the Purva-Mimainsa system where grammar has been referred to as a branch of Smyli having bearing upon Dharma. The way in which grammar comes in close touch with Dharma may be shown by, the fact that grammar, as a science, deals with the correct forms of words, the proper knowledge of which is necessary for the attainment of religious merits. Though the correct Saaskrit forms, says Patañjali, as well as the corrupt words are equally expressive of sense, it is only the use of correct ones that is attended with religious felicity. Moreover, grammar is the only instrument whereby correct words are distinguished from corrupt forms, and the meanings of words are ascertained. The importance and usefulness of grammar for a thorough knowledge of the Vedic texts cannot, therefore, be over-estimated.

It will be a mistake to suppose that Sanskrit grammar, as defined above, is nothing but a number of rules that attempt to explain the formation and analysis of words in a manner that has nothing to do with principles as such. Words are so numerous and so diversified in forms, that the grammarians had had to face a great difficulty in making a thorough study of words. Scholars of the reputation of Patanjali and Durga failed to take notice of the entire field of words 1 which, as we find, is always being enlarged with the advancement of knowledge. But credit to the vigorous attempts of the Indian grammarians who succeeded conspicuously in their study of words and placed the grammatical speculations on a purely scientific basis.

It is really striking to see how the grammarians could systematise their studies of words in spite of such varieties of forms. Great as the task was, the grammarians proved equal, as they adopted the scientific method and framed the rules on the principle of generalisation and particularisation, taking notice of all possible forms. Still greater was the difficulty in determining the radical and

[े] श्रहं च भाष्यकार्य कुणायैकिषयानुभी । नैव ग्रन्दान्वुधिः पारं किमन्ये जङ्बुद्धयः

inflexional clements in words. Analysers of speech as they were, the grammarians had to reach the last stage of linguistic analysis, and this, as we know, was practicable by the application of the principle of अन्त्यव्यतिरेक or the method of agreement and difference. The conclusion to which we are naturally led is that Sanskrit grammar was not busy with isolated words but was based on principles. An attempt may be made here to show that the study of grammar is not a mechanical way of mastering 'the conjugation and declension of certain forms and that grammar does not give a cumbrous process of fanciful derivations. Grammar, like all philosophical systems, has its own categories and logic and is ultimately based on the principles that are strictly philosophical. The study of grammar on a philosophical line received its inception at the hands of Patanjali who, in his elaborate commentary known as the Mahābhāṣya, has dealt with the grammatical problems from a different standpoint and has practically given them a philosophical character. The work of Pāṇini has been treated by Mādhavācaryya as a system of philosophy.1 Grammar was no longer looked upon as an artifice but as embodying the principles of spontaneous growth. Bhartrhari seems to have made a careful study of the Mahāhhāṣya; this had not only widened his scope of knowledge but befitted him to

explain the principles of grammar from a purely philosophical stand-point. With him grammar was a regular system of philosophy and he treated it as such. What Patanjali and Bhartrhari have done for grammar is really wonderful; they would always deserve our admiration as the founder of an interesting branch of study as the 'Philosophy of grammar.' Their conspicuous contribution towards the building up of this new school of thought is none the less important and valuable than what Plato and Aristotle have actually done for philosophy proper. Thanks to the labours of these grammarians, we can boast of this peculiar system of philosophy to the rest of the world.

Having taken a brief survey about the origin of grammatical speculations and the subsequent periods in which those speculations had been systematised by the ancient grammarians in a scientific way, we now proceed to shew, following the line of thought of Patañjali and Bhartrhari, that Sanskrit grammar may be studied as a regular system philosophy. There was a time when the authoritativeness of grammar reached such a height as to deserve such epithets as आगम and स्रति, and the author of the 'Sarvadarsanasamgraha found in the Pāṇiniyan system of grammar certain characteristics which induced him to treat it, as if it were a regular system of philosophy. Now, as a system of philosophy,

grammai must have its Anubandhas, eategeries and principles Grainings, to begin with, is mainly connected with Sabdas and their corresponding significance, and is, therefore, popularly called Sabda-sastra The relation, ag im, in which words stand to the world of ebjects is one of Pacya-Pacaka (conneter and connoted), and there are 19 many words as there are objects to be named Thus, no see that the scope of named cevers almost the entire sphere of thought It" is said that the entire world of objects resides in words in a subtle form and the so-called Pacua and Vācaka are not really different but essentially one and the same thing Further, ne cognition 2 whatsoever is ever possible without the use of words, and the knewledge of all descriptions sooms to be bound up with words

Every system of Hindu philosophy has its own Anubandhas Grammar, when viewed as a system of thought, may be shown to have its particular Anubandhas (1) Grammar has Sabda as its subject. (2) the relation of grammar with Sabda is that the former analyses Sabda into stems and suffixes (Nexica and News), and thus helps the understanding of the significance

¹ मस्वेवेवायिता महिर्मियसाय निवस्त्रनी I—Vakyapad ya 1 119 and महिद्दानिव ज्ञान सर्वेगस्ति मासत I— 1 124

² वाचितिव प्रसादित खोतवाया प्रवर्षते 1—Kəryadarśa 1 3 and द्वमन्धतम झरख जायत सुवनतयम्। यदि शब्दाह्रय ज्योतिराशसार न दीचते १—Küryüdarśa 1 4

While explaining the expression वेदानां वेद:, as an epithet of grammar, Sankara states that grammar by division of words enables us to compremeanings thereof. As regards the Prayojana or object, it is definitely stated by the expression शब्दानुशासन, that is, the first and foremost object of grammar is to formulate such principles as would 'serve to distinguish correct forms from incorrect (अपसंग) Kaiyata rightly observes that by the expression शब्दानुशासन, the author of the Mahābhāsya sets forth the immediate object of grammar and the statement रचोहागमलघूसंदेहा: प्रयोजनम् enumerates only the indirect purposes that are served by the study of grammar. So far as Adhikārī is concerned, it is sufficient to say that one desirous of having the knowledge of correct words is alone competent to take up the study of grammar. It is known to all students of Hindu philosophy that the Indian teachers have, as a rule, discussed the question Anubandhas in the very beginning of their discourses, with the obvious object of inducing people to those studies. There are reasons to believe that this was followed as a traditional practice, because Yāska too in his Nirukta did not fail to treat of such Anubandhas.

Having dealt with the Anubandhas of grammar, Patañjali has drawn our attention to the fact that the statement of objects (Prayojana) is of no use, as both the Vedas and grammar are required to be studied without having any

definite object in view. The question 1 of Prayojana may nrise with regard to other branches of studies apart from the Vedas, because it is definitely enjoined that the unconditional duty on the part of a Brahmin is to make a study of the Vedas with the six pepular Augas (grammar, etymology, etc.) and acquire a therough knowledge of them. He gives us a glimpso of the timehonoured custom regarding the ancient method of teaching in India. The Brahmins are said to have devoted themselves in ancient times to the study of grammar just after their Upanayana eeremony was over; and they were ellowed to study the Vedas only on their attaining a sufficient knowledge of grammar. But time has much changed. People new take up the study of the Vedas first, as their shorter span of existence does not allow them to master grammar before attempting such a vnst field of study. Further, they cannot practically afford to dovote the greater pertion of their life exclusively to the acquisition of preficiency in grammer, since they like to turn out teachers, capable of speaking Sanskrit, in course of a short duration. This is why they take to the study of the Vedas just in the beginning of their

¹ वैदातिरिक्तविपये एव प्रयोजनान्यान्यानं न तु वैद्विषये।

[—]Dhāsya Pradipodyota.

* पुराकत्वे णतदाशीत् मंत्कारीकरकार्लं नाह्याः व्यावर्णं पाणियते।
तेप्यतकत्त्वानकरवातुत्रानम्दामधेश्यौ बैदिकाः ग्रन्दा एपदिग्रन्ते, तद्दाले न तथा,
वेदमधील लरिता बन्नारी भवीता (—Mahhbbaya) Vol. I, p. 5.

academic career. Grammar is called Uttarā Vidyā which is capable of being understood to a considerable extent by intelligent students, engaged in the serious study of the Vedas. What Patañjali has observed here is also applicable to much recent times. The presentday scholars are more or less actuated by the desire of securing recognition as Pundits in as short a time as possible. With this object in view, they engage themselves to the study of many Sastras, though superficially, before they have obtained sufficient proficiency in grammar to qualify them to take up other branches of study. The statement of Prayojana has indeed some other reasons. Patañjali has anticipated an objection that might be raised against the so-called necessity of making a study of grammar. We know that words—both Vedic and Laukika -form the subject of grammar. The study of grammar as a science, some may argue, is of no importance, because the Vedic words might be learnt from the Vedas and the correctness of Laukika or current words from popular usages.1 The study of grammar, if pursued for the knowledge of words, is, therefore, nothing but useless. Now it is simply to do away with unreasonable arguments that Pāṇini wrote his famous Aṣṭādhyāyī clearly showing the

¹ वेदान्नो वेदिका: शब्दा: सिद्धा लोकाच लीकिका:। तसादनर्थकं व्याकरणमिति। तेम्य एवं विप्रतिपन्नवृद्धिम्योऽध्येत्रम्यः सुद्धद् सूत्वा चाचार्यं इदं शास्त्रमन्वाचष्टे—इमानिः प्रयोजनान्यध्येयं व्याकरणम् ।---Mahābhāsya, Vol. I, p. 5.

objects for which grammar should be studied. The enunciation of *Prayopana*—both direct and indirect—is, therefore, necessary to show that the study of grammar is indispensable for the knowledge of the Vedic texts and the accurate discrimination of correct Sanskrit words.

The eternality of Sabda, as supported by the grammariaus, furnishes anothor objection as to the usofniness of grammar. As a matter of fact, if words are held to be eternal, the science of grammar, which teaches the formation and analysis of words, should necessirily become useless.1 The author of the Varttika meets this position by helding that the principles laid down in grammar serve to put a stop to certain undesirable consequences.2 One may, for instance, be led to think that the root mri always retains the form mrji in all declensions (according to the wording of the Dhatupatha); but grammar in such a case brings forward ecrtain restriction, viz., grammar toaches " that the root mrj changes to mārji (gets Vrddhi), when it is followed by suffixos other than Lit.

By categories of Sanskrit grammar, we mean precisely the fundamental concepts of grammar. Sabda is pre-eminently the basis on which rests the entire structure of grammatical science.

^{&#}x27; यदि तर्षि नित्या, शब्दाः किसये मास्त्रम् ?

² किमये माम्त्रमिति चेत्रिवर्तकलात् सिडम्।

[—] Var, 10, under the rule, 1 an, 1.1.1

* तथानेन निहत्ति कियते। सन्नेरिकतृतु प्रव्ययेषु स्विप्रसङ्घे सार्जि, साधु-भैनतीति।—1014,

As Sabda is intimately related to thoughts logic, the extent of Sabda-śāstra to be immensely wide. The categories of grammar, looked at from a wider point of view, comprehend almost all those that are enumerated by the Vaisesikas. Mention is here made, among others, of the following grammatical concepts:-(1) Genus and individual (जातिव्यित्ति), (2) Co-inherence (सामानाधिकरण्य), ससवाय (inseparable connection), (3) Hetu and Karana, (4) Quality (शुण), Substance (द्रव्य), Relation (सरबन्ध), Parts and the whole (श्रवयव and अवयवी), Prakrti and Vikrti, and Efficiency (ম্নি:). The inclusion of Śakti in the grammatical categories marks, however, a departure from the Nyāya-Vaisesika stand-points.

First, both class and individual are taken by the grammarians as the significance of all words. There is, as we know, a great controversy as to whether words denote a class or an individual. The two well-known grammarians Vājapyāyana and Vyādi held opposite views with regard to this problem, the former, like the Mīmāmsakas, was an exponent of the Class-theory, while the latter advocated the Individualistic theory. We have elsewhere pointed out that the Naiyāyikas' seem to have brought about a reconciliation between these contradictory views by holding that it is neither class nor individual alone that is usually denoted by words, but an individual qualified by the class (जात्यविक्वित्रव्यिता) is the meaning of all words. As to the view of the grammarians,

Patanjali is of opinion that both class and individual are taken to be the sense of words. He particularly observes that Pānini had the same view before him while framing the rules of grammar.

It is not only in the Nyaya system of philosophy that wo frequently meet with such terms as मामानाधिकारक or co-inherence and कारण or cause, but grammar also has these concepts and their proper expositions. The term सामानाधिकारक means 'the state of being substratum of two qualities' The class of compound known as Karmadhāraya is based upon the conception of such co-inherence. In an instance like नोहोत्पन्तम्, both blueness and 'the state of being lotus' inhere in a common substratum, ie, lotus.

There is an elaborate treatment of both Helu and Karana in Sanskrit grammar. The very conception of Kāraka is intimately related to that of cause (कियानिसिंग कारकम्) By Helu is meant the material cause. In the grammatical conception of Helu, wo should remember, there is no room for action. Karana or instrument, defined as a 'cause associated with action' (व्यापादन कारणे करणम्) is intimately related to action. There is, however, no essential difference between Helu and Karana, it is only the association with action that makes the difference.

The question of quality comes invariably in connection with the consideration of Visesana

¹ द्रव्यादिविषयी हेतु कारक नियत्तियम 1-Vakyapadiya

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Vyañjana, Itaravyāvartaka and Dharma generally the terms whereby grammatical conception denoted. The quality is almost the guna. or as we find in the Nyāya-Vaisesika systems. Patanjali seems to have only reproduced a Sūtra of the Nyāya philosophy while he enumerates guna as sound, touch, form, smell and taste. Under the rule 4.1.44. Patanjali has made an attempt to give a clear definition of guna. Guna, he holds, is what inheres in substance, sometimes liable to destruction, found different classes, not produced by action and essentially different from substance. Elsewhere, he explains guna as what serves to distinguish an object from others (belonging to the same class भेदका गुणा:);2 as, for instance, the same entity as water is said to be either hot or cold, according to the difference of quality. Further, he continues that gunas are also found to be non-differentiating (श्रभेदक),3 as a man, say Devadatta, retains the same name, no matter whether he is a boy, young or old.

¹ सत्त्वे निविश्तेऽपैतिपृथग्नातिषु दृश्यति । श्राधेयशाक्रियानस् सोऽसत्त्वप्रक्षति-र्गणः । And उपित्यन्यन्यदृष्टी दृत्यान्तरेष्वि ।

[—]Mahābhāṣya under the rule, Pāṇ., 4. 144. याचक: सर्वेलिङ्गानां द्रव्यादन्यो गुण: सृत:।

² and ? Mahābhāṣya under the Vār. सेदकलात् गुणस्य, Vol. I, p. 41. एकोऽयमात्मोदकं नाम तस्य गुणमेदादन्यलं भवति। अन्यदिदं शीतमन्य-दिदमुणमिति।

उभयमिदं गुणेपूत्तं मेदका अभेदका द्रति।

grammatical idea of Pisesana (इत्राच्यावर्त्तकावर्म) is, therefore, essentially the same as that of gung. According to the grammarians, words like ner, otc., are expressive of both the quality and the object qualified. Bhartphari, while speaking of guna, gives much stress 1 the differentiating character as well as on dependent 2 nature of guna, Its dependent nature means that we cannot conceive of a guna or quality without considering at the same time a substance in which that particular quality might inhore (द्वापारतन्त्राम and भेदकत्वमत्र प्रधानगणन्त्राणम्). Much has been said with regard to the object and quality in Sanskrit grammar, specially in the Mahābhāsya. According to Bhartrhari, genus, such as गील, is also included in the category of quality.

A substance is the substratum of qualities (गुणायो द्वार). Patanjali defines substance ³ as what does not lose its essence even when different qualities come to inhere in it. A fruit, for instance, remains the same, when in course of time its blueness gives way to redness.

मंसर्गिभेदकं ययन् सन्यापारं प्रतीयते । युणलं परतन्त्रताच्य याम्न चदाहत्ता (—Vēkyapadīya, S. p. 145.

द्रव्यपारतन्त्राक्ष गुणानाम् । Helârāja भेदकलं चात सुख्यं गुणलचणम् ।
 वस्य गुणानरेव्यपि प्रादुर्भवत्सु तत्त्वं न विद्यते तह द्रव्यम् ।—Mabābbāŋa。

under the rule, Pāṇ., 5. 1, 119.

Bhartrhari 1 holds substance to be eternal and enumerates soul, object, nature, body and the four elements as synonyms of dravya. We give below the sum and substance of what Helārāja has said in connection with Dravya. Dravva, he maintains, is of two kinds:2-transcendental and popular; it is the latter that are comprehended by Vyādi when he says that all words signify substance. Brought up in an atmosphere of sacred traditions and religious culture, the Hindu teachers are generally found to have approached all problems from a standpoint that is more or less metaphysical. Thus, while speaking of so concrete a phenomenon as Dravya, they have brought in the subtle q estion regarding the ultimate nature of substance, as conceived by different philosophers. Dravya, looked at from the transcendental standpoint, is the same as Soul. Those who support the non-dualistic view are of opinion that it is the all-pervading Soul alone that manifests itself in manifold object and appears to be diversified in association with different qualities (उपाधि). The Buddhist philosophers hold that an object (वस्त) having its own identity as its own mark (खलचण्म) and capable of doing works is known as Dravya. The followers of the dualistic view understand

¹ वस्पूपलचणं यच सर्वेनाम प्रयुच्यते । द्रव्यमित्युच्यते सोऽधीं भेदात्वेन विविच्ति: ॥ —Vākyapadīya, 3, p. 141.

त्रातमा वस्तु स्वभावश्व श्रीरं तत्त्वमित्यिषि। द्रव्यमित्यस्य पर्यायासच नित्यमिति । स्थिति: ।—Vākyapadīya (द्रव्यससुद्देश:), 3, p. 85.

ट्र द्रव्यं दिविषं पारमार्थिकं व्यावहारिकं च |—Under the Kārikā, 3, p. 85

oxistence or nature by *Dravya*. According to the view of Cārvāka, the four elements, namely, earth, water, light and air which, in their particular combination produce the body and sense-organs, are considered to be *Dravyas*.

Sambandha or relation is of various kinds :-it may be one of Facya-Vācaka, as exists between a word and its sense; or, one representing Bhedaka-Bhedya, as is to be found between Prakrti and Pratyaya, and 1 as eause and effect and so on. Words and mennings are mutually both cause and effect, so far as the verbal-knowledge is concerned. Having shown that the meanings of words are either elnes or individual (orfa or व्यक्ति) or, an individual conditioned by the class. we now turn to the question as to how a partlcular word always seems to be associated with a particular souse. As this question has already been dealt with, a few words are only needed to 12 explain the relation that exists between words and their meanings. The reason as to why a particular word always implies a particular sonso points to the existence of certain relation. whother conventional 2 or fixed by nature, otherwise the word gault might have signified a pot and so on. The Mimamsakas and the grammarians hold, as we know, this rolation to be

[े] शब्द: कारवमधैय स हि तैनीपत्रवाते |-- Vākyapadiya, p. 112.

[ે] મહેતાવૈદ્યામિયાને સલ્યમી પૃદુ: |—Helssia. મહેત્ત્રપુરિતેવેલાં સલ્યમ: સમયચિત: !—Vākyapadiya (3), p - 96 પુત્રાદિર્દર: મહાતાં સલ્યમો દોત્યતા તથા !— ... ,, 110,

eiernal, while the Naiyāyikas explained it as fixed by God's will (संकेत). The question of Sambandha occupies a prominent place in Sanskrit grammar. In grammar Sambandha is generally denoted by षष्ट्री which is technically called Sesa. Under the rule Pān. 1.1.49, Patañjali says that the meanings of षष्ट्री are one hundred in number. One Sabda is said to be related to another when both of them have close affinity regarding their places of utterance. Besides this, words may have among themselves some such relations as proximity, posteriority, etc. (आनन्तर्य, सामीष्य).

, Samavāya or inseparable connection is one in which a quality stands to the object. In carmani dvīpinam ha ti—the relation of skin with the leopard is one of Samavāya.

Avayava and Avayavī or parts and the whole form another concept of grammar. The class of compound known as Ekadešī Samāsa, the Paribhāṣās, such as, Ekadešavikrtamananyavat, Avayavaprasiddheh samudāyaprasidhirb līyasī, and the particular division of Adhikarana, as Aikadešika are instances that prove the grammatical conception of Avayava and Avayavī. Like the Naiyāyikas, the grammarians do not take the whole to be a distinct entity from the parts of which it is composed, but consider it simply as an aggregate of parts.

त्रभ्यन्तरय समुदायेऽवयवः ।—M. B., 1. 23.

The grammarians have taken Praktti to be the final element of words; it is either Nāman of Dhātu. In instances like Yūpāya dāru and Kundalāya suvarnam, the grammarians take both post and earring as modifications of wood and gold respectively. Thus, Praktti also means the original in 'ation to Piktti of modification. To the Sāṃkhyaites, Praktti is the primordial substance out of which the entire universe has evolved. Bhartphari has also started with the doctrine that the whole world may be viewed as only Vivarta or modification of Sa'da-Brahman.

In considering the fundamental concepts of grammar, we can logically put forward what Bhaitrhari has said in connection with efficiency 1 (Sakti) and its different manifestations, such as, space, agent, action and time. The conception of efficiency comprehends in itself the idea of objects: we cannot, to be more clear, . conceive of any efficiency without thinking of certain objects with which it is naturally associated. We can, for instance, hardly think of the power of burning unless we think of fire at the same time. Efficiency and the efficient object, therefore, seem to be practically inseparable, It was on the ground of such inseparable connection that the Naivāvikas did not include efficiency in their categories, as an entity distinct

ग यक्तिइपे पदार्थानामथन्तमनविध्यता: । दिक् भाधन क्रिया काल इति वस्तिभाषित: |—Vākyapadiya, 3. 1., p 157.

from the object. The grammarians, however, admit that efficiency, though parctically dependent on the object (dravyaparatantra), has got its independent character too. Though inseparably connected and entirely identical with objects, efficiency has its own form (Siddhasvabhāva), since all objects are found to exhibit some efficiency or energy, as we may call it, when they perform some actions. What is true is that such efficiency is not directly implied by words which signify objects. Patanjali has clearly shown that the thing and its quality or efficiency, though related inseparably, are different; as, for instance, in using the comparative and superlative forms, such as, sweeter and sweetest, we do not apply the degree of excellence to the thing itself but to its quality, i.e., sweetness.

Both space and time are regarded as *Dravya* by the Naiyāyikas, but the grammarians take them as efficiency inherent in objects. Space involves the notions of limit, priority, posteriority, and so forth. Generally, we have the idea of space when we say 'This is prior to it;' 'This is posterior to it;' 'From this place onward,' and so on. In instances like these, we get the fifth case-endings denoting *Avadhi* or *Apekṣā*. But when the relation between the whole and the parts is meant, we have Ṣaṣṭhā, as in *Pūrvam Kāyasya* (the fore-part of the body). The Vaišeṣika system also mentions space as a

¹ परापरले सूत्तीनां देशभेदनिवत्वने !—,Vākyapadīya, 3, p. 159.

Drarya, and takes space as one eternal entity without division. The so-called divisions of space, as north, west, east, etc., are only conventional; they are usually determined by the motion of the sau (Adityagatyā).

Next we come to the second manifestation of efficiency, i.e., Sadhana or netivity. This Sadhana i implies that energy or activity of a thing whereby actions are performed As an instrument of actions, this Sadhana is of great importance, so far as the grammatical conceptions of eases, such as Nominative. Objective, Instrumental, etc., are concerned. The word Sadhana may be takon as a synonym of Kāraka, as both of them imply an agent or instrument of action. Pataniali has identified Sadhana with the combination of qualities (Gunasamudanah Sadhanam). What is true of a quality is that it always appears as a distinguishing mark of the thing wherein it inheres and this is exactly the case with efficiency also. Helaraja, therefore, is of opinion that the statement Sadhanam2 vai Dravyam of the author of the Mahabhasya may be explained as implying the identity of Sadhana with efficiency. It is by drawing an identity between the officiency and the officient thing that Pataujali has somotimes attributed

¹ कियाचासीनिचमी सामध्ये साधन विदु: [-- Vākyapadiya, 3, 1, p 173

[े] यत्तु साधनं वे द्रव्यमिति साचे द्रव्यस्य साधनलाभिधानं तत्त्वस्ति गतिसत्रोमदाः विवयसव्यवनलव्यम् :—Ilela aja under the Kår, 8 1, p 173

Sādhanatva to things also. As a solution of the question as to why efficiency is considered to be Sādhana or active agent and not things themselves possessing such efficiency, Bhartrhari continues to say that the whole universe seems to have been made up of efficient force (Sakti-kalā) which reveals itself in manifold thing. The manifold aspect and diversified character of the world is due to the corresponding plurality and diversity of this efficiency. Patañjali understands by active agent 'an aggregate of quality.'

Time is held to be a kind of efficiency. The Naiyayikas, as we know, have treated of time as a Dravya. Time is said to be the ultimate substratum of the world; it is indivisible and eternal. In grammar, time has an important place as indicative of tenses. Patanjali 2 defines time as that whereby both growth and decay of objects are perceived. The division of time into day and night indicates some sorts of conjunction of actions with time; action or Vyāpāra here the motion of the sun. is immaterial and conceived as a of eternity. The popular division of time moments, hours, etc., are only artificial. grammar, we hear of three-fold division of time, namely, present, past, and future. Under the rule $P\bar{a}\eta$. 3.2.123, Kātyāyana 3 rightly observes

कालो हि जगदाधार: कालाधारी न विदाते।

² येन मूर्तीनासुपचयाश्यापचयाश्य लच्छन्ते तं कालमाह:।
— Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 409.

[ै] सन्ति च कालिवभागाः।— $V\bar{a}r$. b. तिष्ठन्ति पर्वताः। स्थास्यन्ति पर्वताः। तस्युः पर्वताः।

' that time, though essentially indivisible, is spoken ' of as present, past and future in the science of grammar. Patañjali has given threo instances indicating the three different divisions of time, as 'Mountains exist;' 'Mountains existed' and ' Mountains will exist,' and goes on to say that in the above examples the existence is to be understood as pertaining to the action of the kings that are oither present, past or would come in future.1 Patañiali has also shown tho divergent views regarding the existence of such a division of time as 'Present time.' Some ' say, he continues, that there is nothing like present time. Their view is thus represented :-'The wheel does not exist, nor the arrow is thrown; the streamlets do not flow towards the sea. The whole universe is motionless; there is nothing that moves: he who can realise it is not blind.' The second and third verses quoted by Patañjali remind us of the arguments whereby the Madhyamika's school of the Buddhist philosophy set aside the popular divisions of time. Some, again, hold, on the contrary, that there is

"न वर्तते चक्रसिषु नै पायने न सन्दने सरित सागराय। कृटखोऽथ खोको न विचेष्टिताखि यो छेव प्रयति शोऽप्रानसः।

¹ दह भूतभविष्यदेर मानामां राजां या: क्रियाक्ताकिष्ठतेरधिकरणम । - Mahabhasya under the rule, Pan , 3 2 123

⁹ नास्ति वर्तमान, काल इति---

⁵ ष्रतागतमतिकान वर्तमानमिति चश्चम । स्वेष च गतिनीसि गन्छतीति किमुख्यते ।—Mëdhyamika Karika

[💃] असि वर्तमान काल इति। आदिव्यगतिवत्रीपलस्थतः।

⁻M Bhaşya, Vol II, p. 124.

present time, though it is imperceptible like the sun's movement Patanjali seems to have been a scholar of wide culture and thoroughly acquainted with the principal systems of Indian philosophy, consequently it is not unlikely that he might have studied the Buddhist philosophy as it existed in his time.

Next we come to $Kriy\bar{a}$ or action as the last manifestation of efficiency. The conception of $Kriy\bar{a}$ plays an important part in Sanskrit grammar, specially in connection with $K\bar{a}rakas$. $Kriy\bar{a}$ is the meaning of verbal roots ($Dh\bar{a}tvar-thah\ Kriy\bar{a}$). $Kriy\bar{a}$, holds Patanjali, is immaterial, invisible and is only comprehended by inference.

The method followed throughout Sanskrit grammar is purely analytical: grammar does never attempt to coin new words, but dissolves words into their radical and formative elements in accordance with the principle of Anvaya-Vyatireka or the method of agreement and difference. The Indian grammarians, as have said elsewhere, had a conception of scientific methodology, as is clearly evidenced by the way in which they had analysed words of so diversified character and determined their Prakṛti and Pratyaya. The grammarians had to experience great difficulty in the course of analysis of words. The author of the Mahābhāṣya gives us clear idea as to how the grammarians, proceeding on the line of Anvaya-Vyatireka,

succeeded in distinguishing the radical from the formative cloments. We do not like to repeat here what wo have already said. It will suffice here to point out that the grammarians seem to have taken a group of similar forms such as, ghafah, ghafena, ghatāt and pacati, pacatah, apāksīt, ote., and then proceeded to find out the common and uncommon eloments in them. Now the common or unaltered element, namely, ghata and pac, which has not undergone any important change in all those forms is called Prakrti; the uncommon elements, on the other hand, ing. at, ti, tah, which are liable to variations in different forms, are termed Pratyaya. This is, in short, the process whereby the grammarians could successfully dissolve the words.

Though the adherents of the dectrine of Sphota take all words to be indivisible and cternal and look upon all such disintegrations as purely artificial, we do not fail to notice the scientific value of such a procedure that furnishes an instrument to get into the meaning of words. There are three forms in which words generally appear : sentence, inflected form, and the radical and formative elements. Of these, a sentence is the logical unit or the significant part of speech. Words, ns we have already said, have no indopendent existence upart from n sentenco. According to the Valyavadins, i.e., those who take a sentence to be real, indivisible, and the only significant unit, the analysis of n sentence into its constituents, i.e., Padas, is at best artificial, but recourse is taken to this process, however imaginary, as it provides the only means of showing the meaning of a sentence. The Padavādins, on the other hand, hold that Padas are real, and seek to prove the unreality of a Vākya, as an indivisible unit. A sentence, so to speak, is nothing but an aggregate of Padas, consequently a sentence has no separate existence apart from its constituents. The aphorism of the Prātiśākhya defining Sandhi is construed by the Padavādins in such a way as to indicate the priority of Padas to Samhitā and the reality of Padas is thus sought to be established. According to them, Padas, though essentially indivisible, are analysed into Prakti and Pratyaya in order to bring out their significance. The decomposition of words into Prakṛti and Pratyaya is the central problem upon which are concentrated the entire speculations on grammar. It is by such analysis or Samskāra, as it is often called, that the Sanskrit grammarians could exclude Apabhramsas from coming under the cognisance of their systems of grammar. The view of Pāṇini and Patañjali, as explained by Bhartrhari and Helārāja, shows that both of them were in favour of the Vākyavādins, i.e., Padas are unreal and have no separate existence, whereas a sentence is indivisible and really significant by nature.

¹ पदम्कति: संहिता (—Prātiśākhya. पदानां संहिता योनि: संहिता वा पदाम्या |—Vākyapadīya, 2, 59,

The expression Padakāra, as used by Patañjali, is a sufficient indication that Padas are essentially unreal. It is simply for the understanding of unintelligent people that the grammarians have taken recourse to such an artificial process, as the separation of Padas from a sentence.

[े] न खर्चकन पदकारा चतुनको। पदकारकात्वस्यम् — Mahabbaşya, Vol III, p 117. Punysiala under the Vakyapadiya Kar., 267. यत यदि पदानां सावता स्थात नदा तीयां स्वत एव शिक्षतात् पदानि कुर्वनीति पदकारा स्योतस्वस्तर्ते स्थात्। तथास्थासि पदायसन्यानि । एकसिमिसस्सावकं वाकान्। तदस्ववीधनाय पदिकाराः कविता हति।

CHAPTER III

SAMJÑĀ AND PARIBHĀSĀ

Samjñā or grammatical technics—Paribhāṣās or axioms of grammar—Rules of grammar.

Every system of philosophy has its particular concepts and contains necessarily a set of corresponding terms that are more or less restricted in their sense. Terms of this description, which are specialised in their significance, are popularly called Samjñā or technical terms. The Nyāya system, specially the Navya-Nyāya, contains a large number of such technical terms. These words, it must be remembered, are not used by the Naiyāyikas in their popular sense. To a Naiyāyika the words Prakāra and Pratiyogin, for instance, are not denotative of kinds and competitive respectively, but usually express an adjunct and anything that is non-existent. The use of such technical terms has manifold advantage. Samjñās are often used for the sake of brevity and conciseness, and are consequently adopted in most of the treatises on science in their respective fashions.

यस्याभाव: स प्रतियोगी।

A Samiñā generally means an enunciation or mention of something by name. Vātsyāyana has used the word sēn; as a synonym of Samiñā, and holds that the logical or scientific procedure comprehends enunciation, definition and examination, as necessary for the scientific treatment of a subject. The grammarians also, as is evident from their method of treatment, have followed this scientific process. To enumerate something hy name is what is known as Samiñā and those that are denoted or comprehended by such Samiñā are called Samiñī. Patanjali defines Samiñā as a shortest name which is adopted for the sake of brevity.

In the Sātra हिंदादेच Pān. 1. 1. 1, the word छाँद्दा is a Samjāā and चात् and ऐच् are Samjāā. But how are we to know that it is a Samjāā? The Sātra quoted above forms the opening aphorism of Pāṇini and there is no preceding rule like Samjāā that may be taken as an Adhikāra-Sūtra. The question raised by Pataūjali' is that Pāṇini ought to have used the word Samjāā before the rule हिद्दादेच, so as to avoid the ambiguity as to whether इदि or चादेच् is to be taken as Samjāā. To recognise $\tilde{V}rddhi$ as a Samjāā naturally presupposes an adequate conception of Samjāā itself. Pataājali further observes that even the

[ै] नाममाचक्यनं सैद्या।

विविधा चाम्य शास्त्रप्रकृति:—उद्देशो खचणं परीचा चेति ।

³ हडाादीनां मन्दानां संज्ञेत्यव संमत्ययो यदा स्थात ।

enunciation of संज्ञाधिकार is not sufficient enough to give an accurate cognition of Samiñā and Samjñī, as there is hardly any evidence in favour of accepting the word Prddhi as a Samjñā and आदेच as Samjñī. He then refers to the ancient teachers whose usage is the only criterion for the precise knowledge of a Samjñā. That the word Vrddhi denotes a $Sami\tilde{n}\tilde{a}$ (as opposed to a $Samj\tilde{n}\tilde{\imath}$) and not a $Samj\tilde{n}\tilde{\imath}$ is evident from the usages of the ancient grammarians. The fact is that the technical terms like Guna and Veddhi, as used in the Astadhyayi, are not really of Pāṇini's invention, but they are rather supposed to have been borrowed from earlier systems of grammar. Similar is the history of all proper names, both popular and the Vedic; as, for instance, the name 2 Devadatta, with which parents baptise their newly-born son, continues to gain currency in the society by the force of popular usage. Another view that seems to be none the less plausible is that the grammatical technics, such as, Guna and Vrddhi. were too popular terms to require any exposition or even enunciation. It is probably for this reason that Pānini did not think it worth his while to make a distinct rule as $Samj\tilde{n}a$ as would facilitate the knowledge of Samjñā.

¹ श्राचार्याचारात् संज्ञासिहि:। यथा लौकिकदैदिवेषु |---Mahābhā\$ya, Vār. 4.

Patañjali centinues further that some grammarians, while interpreting the rule in question, have elearly indicated that the word Prddhi is a Sanjāā and प्रादेच is Sanjāī. In order to bring out the exact significance of the rule विचराटेच, some grammarians, again, have (only given the examples of Piddli ne, असैपीत, अकापीत्) only enumerated the Sanijais of Vrddhi, such ne, पाटैच. under the rule सिचि वृद्धिः परमेप्टेप and have thus made it sufficiently clear that the word Pridhi is expressive of पारंच in grammar. The relation between the words Praddhi and Adaic is, therefore, one of the indicating and the indicated. The rule serves practically a two-feld purpose: it expresses a Samjiā as well as makes the word Vrddhi a Samjāā. What Patanjali deduces from these facts with regard to the distinction . between Samiña and Samiñi is that what implies something is a Samina and what are so implied should be regarded as a Samini. The author of the Varttika has suggested two more criteria so as to show the distinction between Samiña and Samiña more clearly. (1) Samiñā is formless,2 whereas Samiñīs are found to have forms It is a fact of common experience that a Samjñā, liko Devadatta, is given to a mass of flesh having certain form

[ै] ते सन्यासप्ट यथा स्व्याप्यसे सा सभा थे प्रतीयने ते संभिन इति ।

Mahābhāṣya, Vol I, p 38
ै चनाकृति .—Var 6. Bhāṣya चयुवानाकृति रंभा । चाकृतिसल

पनाकात .— Var 6. Bhasya प्रयोगाकात क्या । पाकातमः मित्र । लोक वि प्राकृतिमती मसिपियम्य देवद्त क्रित क्या क्रियते ।

Again, where there is a form, there is a difference. Moreover, Samjñā is one, while Samjñīs are more than one. (2) A Samjñā may be recognised by some special mark. Patañjali holds further that Samjñā and Samjñī, like nouns and adjectives, seem to have co-inherence as well as equal case-terminations. To the grammarians, \bar{A} daic (which is formed by the process of Pratyōhāra from the letters enunciated in the so-called Siva-Sūtra) is really expressive of sense. Some, again, take the word Vrddhi as indicative of the forms of words, viz., the word Vrddhi and Adaic are mutually convertible. Patanjali few more characteristics has suggested a whereby Samjñā and Samjñī might be clearly recognised. Samjñās, he maintains,2 like Vrddhi and Guna, are repeatedly mentioned in grammar, but such is not the case with their corresponding Samjñīs, for it is more convenient and attended with more economisation of labour to mention a Samiña, say Vrddhi, than enumerate each time Adaic which contain greater number of letters. When Samjñās are really adopted for the sake of brevity and conciseness, the word Vrddhi is preferable to \bar{A} daic from a practical point of view. it often comes to our notice that Sāmjñī is , placed before the $Samj ilde{n} ilde{a}^3$ in the rules of grammar

¹ लिङ्गेन वा। - Vār. 7.

² श्रावित्तेनाः मंजा भवन्ति । हित्त्रिशब्दयावर्तते नारै व्हन्दः ।— Ibid.

अथवा प्वोंचारित: संजी, परीचारिता संजा |—Ibid.

(as in पदेहण:). But the rulo ष्ट्रहिरादेच forms an exception, as the word Prddhi comes here first. This anomaly is explained by Patanjali as a particular instance where the word Friddhi has been! given priority only to indicate a sense of auspiciousness (सह लार्चम). Hoth Samiñā and Samiñi being thus reciprocally convertible, a question is raised against their mutual dopondenco (अन्योन्याययत्). As a matter of fact, we get a Samjir like Vrddhi for Adaic and the Sanina again serves to indicate Adaic. The defect of such mutual dependence is finally set aside by Pataniali on the ground of the eternality of word (निषंत नित्यगद्धतात्-Var. 9). Adaic are permanent word-forms, for the denetation of which a Samjāā like Fradhi is adopted, but the Samina itself does not practically bring them into existence. The eternal view of Sabda 2 does not, however, render the science of grammar absolute. ly uscless, sinco grammar, as it is primarily cencerned with the exposition of correct words. serves to romovo all possible cenfusion and misinterpretation by the formulation of rules.

Bhartrhari has even tried to show the permanent character of such Samjūū-Sabda and acknowledges the relation between Samjūū and Samjūū as permanently fixed. But this view is open

भाइतिक पाषार्यी महतः प्राम्वीषय मङ्गलारे इहिम्प्यमादितः प्रवृक्ति ।—
 M. B. under the role Pap. I.I.I.
 यदि तर्षि निवा प्रयाः किमर्य शास्त्रम् १ निवतैकं ग्रास्त्रम् ।—Ibid

मिल एवत सम्बन्धी वित्यादिषु सवादिवत्—Väkyapadiya, Kår
 2 360.

to objections and is contrary to our experience. Samjñā or proper names are purely of human invention, men giving names to objects according to their own desire. The arguments whereby Bhartrhari sought to refute this popular view are as follows: It is admitted that in certain cases Samiñās are restricted in their denotations by the usages of men; as, for instance, one might say, 'From this day the word Ditha would mean this person.' But so far as the relation between a Samiñā and a Samiñī is concerned, there is no denying the fact that the word Ditha, 'like the word gauly, is also connected with its meaning by permanent relation.2 Bhartrhari has divided Samjñās into two classes-Krtrima (as ti, ghu, etc.) or artificial, and Akṛtrima (as Ditha) or popular names current in the society. The so-called artificial $Samj\tilde{n}\bar{a}s$ are of modern origin; their significance is confined to the area of those Sastras wherein they are used, that is to say, they have no meanings popularly assigned to them.

Having thus discussed the different criteria for the recognition of $Samj\tilde{n}\tilde{a}$ and $Samj\tilde{n}\tilde{i}$, we now proceed to speak a few words more on the

And हन्त्रादीनां च शास्त्रेऽचिन् शक्तावच्छेदलचणः। शक्तिसीऽभिसम्बन्धी विशेषणविशेष्यवत्।—Kār. 1. 870.

शास्त्रकारादिभि: क्षतः।—Vākyapadīya. क्रविमा शास्त्रीया पारिभाषिकीत्यच्यते।

¹ नतु च नित्यतं संज्ञाशन्दानामनुपपन्नं संप्रतिक्रियमाणत्वात्—क्रतकत्वाद-नित्यतं सम्बन्धस्थोपजायते। संज्ञाया: सा हि पुरुषेर्यथानामं प्रयुक्यते।—Vākyapadīya. ² माजानिक्षमाधुनिकः संकेतो दिविधो मतः।...कादाचित्कस्वाधुनिकः

number and nature of such Saminas. Different systems of grammar have their different Samiñas; as, for instance, Panini uses ac and hal, whereas Kātantra system has Svara and Vynjana in their stead. It will be evident from a study of these Samiñas that most of them are meaningless outside the short compass wherein they are used; they are neither to be found in lexicon, nor current as significant words in their specialised sense. Samjñā-Sabda, as a rule, are not derivable (অব্দর); and though popular words, such as, Vrddhi, Guna, etc., are used as Samiñā, their popular significances have practically no connection with what they signify in grammar. Bhartrhari says that the meaning assigned to such Samjiā-Šahda by the grammarians is to be taken as modern convention, as opposed to the divine convention. It is to he noted here that the two Samjñā-Sabdas, namely, Svara and Pynjana, as are to he found in Yaska's Nirukta and in the Kātantra system, and which are undoubtedly older than ac and hal respectively. are really significant (स्वयं राजते इति स्वर: व्यवनमन्वक). It is, therefore, believed that the Katantra system has preserved the old grammatical technics more faithfully than that of Papini, who is rather credited with

¹ Kātantra system has also retained such old grammatical terms as Kēritā (Pāṇini has vio), ' Varlamānā (bhabantī seems to have been the oldest term for Vārlamānā), Bhavityanti, etc.

having invented a peculiar way of enunciating letters, a system of $Praty\bar{a}h\bar{a}ra$ unknown to other grammarians, and certain technical terms like ac and hal, etc.

The word Samiñā means ordinarily a name. Just as an object is found to have a good many names in popular speech, so in grammar a form may have different Samjñās. It is to be borne in mind that excepting a few instances like Svara, Vynjana, Lopa, Dirgha, etc., as used in grammar, there are Samjñās as nadi, ti, ghu, etc., which are absolutely meaningless and purely artificial. There are numerous Samjñās in grammar; they are made use of by the grammarians view to secure the brevity and conciseness. They may be, however, divided into two classes, according as they are significant and meaningless. The Samjñās belonging to the group are almost the same as used in popular speech, though with a specialised significance, while those that come under the second group are absolutely meaningless except in grammar. There are certain Samjñās, such as, Nadī, 2 Agni,3 Sraddhā4 which are used as types to denote respectively words ending in lengthened ई, জ, short র, ন, and lengthened স্ব. The so-called Siva-Sūtras,

¹ वर्षसमामाय:। Katantra—सिद्धी वर्णसमामाय:।

² Pāṇ. 1. 4. 3—यूस्त्राखरी नदी।

³ इदुदिग्न:—Kalāpa. नामपाद, 8.

^{*} 羽 平雪!—Ibid, 10.

though unintelligible by themselves and entirely meaningless to others, representing a great departure from the popular order of letters, have great importance to the students of the Aştādhyāyī, as they are suitable for making Samjñās like an, in, etc. Jagadīsa understands by Samjñā 1 all names having convention or Samketa and classifies it under three classes, namely, Naimittikī, Paribhāsikī, and Aupādhikī. Samjūās are artificial; their origin may be traced to an attempt to find out the shortest symbol to denote a group of individuals. The system of Samjaa is thus important for more than one reason; it is the shortest possible name for a class and consequently marked by brevity. The Samiñās adopted in different systems of grammar are so variant that one cannot expect to make a successful study of any system of grammar without having a thorough acquaintance with its particular sets of Saminas.

Logic means agreement of facts with truth. Grammar in dealing with the formation of words and formulation of rules has sometimes shown strict comformity to truth. What is true of logic is thus true of grammar too. Soience, as is well known, takes for granted certain axioms which are more or less self-evident truths and consequently require no explanation. These axioms or generalised

[े] रुटं संकेतवज्ञाम सेव संग्रीत कीरोजि,--- Sabda faktıprakāsıkā Kār. 17.

having invented a peculiar way of enunciating letters, a system of $Praty\bar{a}h\bar{a}ra$ unknown to other grammarians, and certain technical terms like ac and hal, etc.

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³ द्रदुदिग्न:—Kalāpa. नामपाद, 8.

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¹ क्ट संकेतवज्ञान सेव संशिति कीकाति,—Babdasaktıprakasıka Kur. 17.

statements (deductions) are freely made use of by different systems of philosophy. These are deduced from common experience. Geometry, for instance, begins with a number of such axioms (e.g., the whole is greater than its parts) and shows their applications in the exposition of problems. Logic, as a science, has also its particular axioms (a thing is what it is, viz., the law of identity) which are not. only applicable to logic alone but are found to be used in other departments of science for their incontestable validity. Here we find the reason why logic is popularly called the 'science of all sciences.' It has added doubtedly to the scientific character of grammar, for it has also treated of such axioms. These axioms or generalised statements are known in grammar as Paribhāsās. The fact that is established by the Paribhāṣā¹—'A thing does not essentially become a different one even when some of its parts get deformed,' or, more clearly, 'A dog does not become anything but a dog when its tail is cut off'-is one of common experience and equally true in ordinary life also. In grammar we find a good many Paribhāṣās. The Paribhāṣās, as used in grammar, may be explained as what represent the highest grammatical generalisation. The Paribhāsā be broadly divided into two classes: (1) Paribhāsās which are not restricted in their

applications to grammar alone but equally hold good in other spheres of experience; (2) Paribhasas that are closely associated with grammatical operations and contain technical terms of grammar. The Paribhāṣās like एकदेश-विकतमनन्यवत, etc., which does not contain any grammatical term and are true to all sciences, bolong to the former group of the Paribhagas. Paribhāşās falling under the second eategory are those that contain grammatical technics and are conched in grammatical terms. sueli as, यबोहेगं संज्ञापरिभाषम्, उपपद्विभक्तेः कारणविभक्तिव सीयसी, etc. These cannot be explained for obvious reasons without reference to grammar. From a study of the Paribhasas belonging to the formor class, it appears that they are decidedly the older and more popular than those coming under the second group. Wo fail, however, to trace their origin with a degree of certainty. They are sometimes presupposed by the rules of Panini and sometimes deducible from the rules of the Astadhyayı. Panini had undoubtedly before him many axioms of this description when he composed the rules of the Aşţādhyāyī. It is clear from the statement of Nagoji1 (who has collected these Paribhagas-122 in number and oxplained them) that some of these Paribhāṣās were used as regular

-Paribhäşendušekhara.

¹ प्राचीनवैद्याकरणयस्त्रे दाचनिकात्रक प्राचिभीयस्त्रे आपक्रयायसिङ्गानि भाष्यवार्षिकवीर्तिकानि यानि परिभावादपानि साम्बन्धकार्यस्त्रे ।

Sūtras by older grammarians. Pāņini has, however, incorporated some of these Paribhāsās in his Astādhyāyī¹ and some of them are suggested by the rules. The Paribhāṣās established by either Jñāpaka or Nyāya have been refered to by Kātyāyana and Patañjali. Generally speaking, there are three kinds of Paribhāsāś:—(1) Vācanikī—verbatim used as Sūtra by older grammarians; (2) Jñāpaka—as deduced from the interpretations of Pāṇini's rules; (3) Nyaya referring to the axioms either taken from the experience of ordinary life or established by logical inductions. There are, again, two different forms of Nyāya-Nyāya-Siddha and Loka-Nyāya-Siddha. The Paribhāsā-सनिपातलचणो विधिरनिमित्तं तिद्वधातस्य—is an instance of Loka-Nyāya-Siddha, because the truth it conveys is sufficiently proved by the facts of daily life, viz., 'A thing should not be the cause of destroying that wherefrom it derives its very existence.' These Paribhāṣās are of practical help to us for understanding the rules of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. Nāgojī has not only taken notice of those Paribhāṣās alone which might be deduced or taken directly from the Varttika or Bhāṣya, but has undoubtedly treated of the Paribhāṣās taken from other grammarians. There is a Paribhāsā 2 which expressly enjoins

समर्थ: पदविधि: ।-Pāṇ. 2. 1. 1. विप्रतिषेधे परं कार्यम्। — Ibid, 1. 4. 1.

व्याख्यानतो विशेषप्रतिपत्तिन हि संदेहादलचणम।

that for the removal of doubt and ambiguity in connection with a rule of grammar, the interpretations of the learned commentators are to be regarded as the only authoritative and decisive ones. Some Paribhāṣās with their respective meanings have been referred to in the 'Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus' under 'Logic of Grammar.'

Having shown the nature of Samjñās and Paribhāsās according to their grammatical interpretations, we now propose to say a few words regarding the characteristics of the grammatical aphorisms. The style followed by the grammarians in constructing the rules is the same as adopted in the so-called Sūtra literature. This style of composition, in which most of the standard works of Hindu philosophy have been written, was adopted by the grammarians, as they unduly favoured brevity and conciseness, sometimes to the extent of unintelligibility. How much the grammarians favoured brevity and conciseness in the composition of Sūtras is best illustrated by the Paribhasa 'अर्धेमावालाघ-वेन प्रवोत्सर्वं मन्यन्ते वैयाकरणाः.' The characteristic features of grammatical rules are as follows 1:-(1) The Sūtras should be so framed as to contain the least number of letters. (2) The Sūtras to be constructed in such a way as to avoid ambiguity and doubt. (3) The Sūtras

चलाचरमधिन्द्रिष्यं सारवत् वियतोसुखम् ॥ निर्दाधमनवर्यं च सूत्रं सुविव्हं।

must be impregnated with meanings. Panini is said to have composed the rules of the Aştādhyāyi with all religious solemnities and great caution, Patanjali strongly believes that even a letter of his aphorisms, far from speaking of the entire rule, is not likely to be meaningless. (4) The Sūtras must have widest applications. This is exactly the case so far as the general rules (डत्सर्गविधि:) are concerned. (5) The Sūtras should be free from all defects and reasonable at the same time. The Sūtras having these qualifications generally fall under six categories, namely, Samjñā, Paribhāṣā, Vidhi or rules that enjoin something, Niyama or rules that enjoin restrictions, Pratisedha or prohibitive rules, and Adhikāra. Samiñā Sūtras are those that point out grammatical technics, such as, Vrddhi, Guna, Lopa (disappearance), ac, hal, etc. As regards the Paribhāṣā Sūtras, we have already pointed out that certain Paribhāṣās were incorporated by the grammarians in their systems of grammar as regular Sūtras. The Adhikāra Sūtras are of four kinds.2 Patañjali has illustrated three different kinds of Adhikāra.

As to the principle followed in the formation of rules, it must be clearly stated that it was

¹ प्रमाणभूत श्राचार्यो दर्भपविचपाणि: ग्राचाववकाशे प्राद्युख छपविध्य महता यवेन स्वं प्रणयित सा, तवाशकां वर्णेनाप्यनर्थकेन भवितं किं पुनिर्यता स्वेण।

[—] Mahābhāsya, under the rule Pāṇ., 1. 1. 1. 2 गोयूष: सिंहदृष्टिय मण्डूलम् तिरिव च। गङ्गासीत:प्रवाहय अधिकारयतुर्विध:।

indeed a great difficulty to make a thorough study of each word. We are told that Indra, oven under the intership of Brhaspiti, and continuing his study for a great length of time, failed to make an exhaustive study of words. How then the grammarias had succeeded in such an ardinoutask? Patanjali rightly observes that the rules of grammar should be framed on the scientific basis of generalisation and particularisation, so as to enable one to make a study of words, though so diversified and numerous, with the least amount of effort. He clearly shows that the rules and gram Pap. 3, 2, 1 and stanggard at Pap. 3, 2, 3, were written by Paaini having the same object in view.

Now as to what constitutes a grammar. Patanjali has elaborately dealt with the question in regard to what is precisely meant by grammar. It is too well known a fact that it is the Sutras that constitute grammar or, in other words, grammar is entirely identical with the Sutras. We use the word Vyākarana with reference to a number of Sutras and do not practically understand anything else. But there are cortain objections in the way of accepting this view as an accurate one. The difficulty that arises on the

¹ Mahahhanya, Vol I. p 5.

[°] छत्समावनदी। कविहृत्समै: कर्तवः कर्तवः—Mahabhasya Vol I, p. 5

[ै] चय स्वाकरचिमियस ग्रन्थ कः पदार्थः । गृहत्। स्ते स्वाकरचेपष्टाधंडिनुपः पहः।—Var 10 शस्त्रापतिः। सस्ते सुद्धेः। सपे। प्रोक्तादयस्य तितताः।

assumption of identity between grammar and Sūtras is that the question of relation, as is indicated by the expression (व्याकरणस्य स्तम्) 'the rules of grammar' becomes necessarily incomprehensible or incompatible, that is to say, the above expression clearly indicates that grammar is actually different from the Sūtras. Again, no cognition of words would be possible, if grammar were identified with the Sūtras, because the knowledge of words does not practically follow from the Sūtras, but rather from the interpretations and expositions of such rules. Words are then held to be constituents of grammar and this view is considered to be sufficient to meet the aforesaid objection. But this is also not absolutely free defects, inasmuch as the identity of grammar with words would render the derivation of the term Vyākaraņa (व्याक्रियन्ते व्युत्पाद्यन्ते ग्रब्दा अनेनिति) simply inconsistent. The drift of the arguments is that words are derived by means of Sūtras and not by other words. Moreover, the rules like सदे, प्रोत्ताद्यश्च, तत सवः, तेन प्रोत्तम्, etc., will be inconsistent with their meanings, if words are held to be identical with grammar. In fine, Patanjali sets forth the conclusion that words and Sūtras in their combination form the life of grammar (लच्चलच्णे व्याकार्णम्).

The word Sandhi literally means conjunction of two; in grammar it implies the combination of two letters having close proximity. The definition of Sandhi as given by Pāṇini (which is also to be found in the Nirukta) lays stress on the extromo proximity of lotters, whether vowels or consonants, as the primary condition of Sandhi (Parah sannikarşah Samhitā).

It has already been pointed out that the word is the same as sound. A word is, again, of two kinds, namely, sound as produced by the beat of drum, and sound as distinctly audible and oxpressed by letters. To the former class belong those sounds which are not capable of being ropresented by letters and have no real expressiveness like popular words that consist of letters. These letters, whether 48 or 49 in number, represent phonologically all possible modulations of voice. There are eight different places, such as, chest, throat, nose, head, tongue, roof of the tongue, teeth and lips wherefrom letters are produced and they are named accordingly. The order in which letters are to be read is said to be fixed (Siddhovarna-samāmnāyah), but Pāniai seems to have shown some amount of ingenuity. as he gives rather a clumsy arrangement of letters only to serve the purpose of forming the Pratyāhāras. The method adopted by Pānini may he scientifically acourate, but it really marks a departure from the popular order of letters.

The subtle form of Nāda having its origin in the Mūlādhāra proceeds upwards till it reaches the vocal apparatus and becomes audiblo; it develops into distinct sound whon it olothes itself with letters. This is usually the process wherehy letters are produced. Letters are transient and liable to

disappear just after their utterance is over. According to the time required for pronouncing, a sound is said to be short, long and protracted. Letters are broadly divided into two classes: Svara and Vyanjana. Svara is so called because they are distinctly audible by themselves; Vyanjana requires the help of vowels for their intelligibility. The use of ac and hal in the place of more popular terms Svara and Vyanjana represents one of Pānini's manifold innovation.

There are generally two different ways in which words are uttered-rapid andPatañjali maintains that close proximity is to be taken as the fundamental condition of Sandhi. It then follows almost naturally that no such Samhitā or the combination of letters takes place when two words are uttered at intervals. It is said in defence, however, that proximity of letters is the same, whether they are uttered rapidly or slowly. It is practically the time, as is required by the speaker to pronounce the words, that makes the utterance either rapid or slow. Three 1 definitions have been suggested to explain Samhitā, but no one is found to be strictly accurate and free from defects. The last tentative definition, which brings in the idea of order as priority and posteriority among letters, uttered

¹ शब्दाविराम: संहिता; ज्ञादाविराम: संहिता; पौर्वापर्धमकाल यपेतं संहिता। --- Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāp., 1. 4. 109.

² पौर्वापर्यमकालव्यपेतं संहिता चेत् पूर्वापराभावात् संहितासंज्ञा न प्राप्नीति— न हि वर्णानां पौर्वापर्यस्ति—Mahābhāṣya.

without any intervention of time, is also open to objection, because the very idea of priority and posteriority is inconceivable in regard to letters that are never uttered simultaneously. Bains is to be understood with reference to space, as we apply the terms Purva and Apara to things when they are found to exist simultaneously. But such is not the case with letters. It is practically seen that we cannot pronounce two letters at a time. The vocal organ that operates in pronouncing the letter ga is not the same that gives rise to au-sound and so on. Again, for the transient character of sound, aa is no longer existent when au is uttered. It is to be carefully noted here that Paurvaparya. as stated here, is not to be taken as referring to time, because letters are liable to destruction after the utterance is over, and there can be no relation as priority and posteriority between the existent and the non-existent letters Pataniali. then, arrives at the conclusion and brings the whole discussion to a close when he holds that Paurvāparya, as the essential requisite of Samhitā, pertains to intelligence, that is to say, the determination of priority and posteriority of letters is the operation of intelligence.2 An intelligent man adopts the following procedure

बुद्धिविषयमेव शन्दाना पौर्वापर्धम्—Mahābhāşya.

in ascertaining the order of Paurvāparya:—This word is to be used in this sense and this word consists of these letters. Then, he proceeds to determine them one after another.

There is another definition of Samhitā given in the Prātisākhya¹ which has also given rise to a considerable discussion. The main difficulty lies in the way of disjoining the compound Padaprakrti which admits of double pretation. If we take the expression Padaprakṛti as meaning पदानां या प्रकृति सेयं पदप्रकृतिः, it would naturally follow that Samhitā or combination is the original form of speech wherefrom Padas are separated. It is quite evident from this exposition that Samhitā represents the original form, whereas Padas are only modifications. According to another interpretation, which treats of the expression Padaprakṛti as an instance of Bahuvrīhī and lays down that Padas in their combination constitute Samhitā: Padas are to be taken as Prakṛti and Saṃhitā as merely modified forms. The question raised here is one of great importance, as it forms the fundamental problem of the linguistic science. The point at issue is to decide which of these (Samhitā and Padas) represents the original form. Durga 2 has advanced arguments to show that Samhitā is Prakṛti and Padas represent only Vikṛti. He

पदमहतिः चंहिता ।

[ं] मंदिताया: महातिलं न्याय: 1—Nirukto, p. 135.

has based his arguments on the fact that the Vedic Mantras bave come down to us in their Samhitā form (but not as isolated Padas); Samhitā or combined forms are first studied by the Vedic scholars and the Mantras are specially recited in their Samhitā form at the time of sacrificial performances. It is an established fact that we do not meet with an instance of fatfat in the Vedic Mantras.

A careful study of the rules concerning Samhitā will make it clear that the principles underlying such Samhitā are based on regular phonological basis. The rule दकी यणिंव, which enjoins that E. E. E. followed by ac. are changed to y, v, r, respectively, records rather a phonetic tendency according to which g+q. when uttered at a stress, are apt to take the form of z and so on. The transformation of ginto य, as in दध्यत, is due to the fact that hoth g and g are letters that originate in the same place and have necessarily natural affinity for combination. Jaimini has clearly stated that in zwa letters do not undergo any modification but a new letter comes into exis-The rule स्थानेऽन्तरतमः enjoins that in case of Adesa, a letter having close affinity, either through the internal efforts or owing to the similarity of place of utterance, is to take the place and function of Sthani,

These instances will suffice to show that the rules of $Samhit\bar{a}$ are outcome of natural tendencies, as are illustrated by phonetic laws. In popular usages, $Samhit\bar{a}$ is sometimes obligatory and sometimes optional. It is thus stated in a $K\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$: $Samhit\bar{a}$ is obligatory in Padas; between roots and prefixes and in compounds; in all other cases $Samhit\bar{a}$ is optional.

There are, broadly speaking, five kinds of Sandhi, according to the nature of letters that enter into combination. Among these five, the so-called Prakiti-Sandhi (an instance of Sandhi which is not attended with necessary changes and modifications) forms a peculiar We call them peculiar in this sense that the instances of Prakrti-Sandhi are so rigid that they retain their original forms intact and do not come under the general principles of Samhitā. In an instance like late ime where no change is brought about by rules of Sandhi, it is really difficult to distinguish it from ordinary forms. In cases like this, Sandhi is to be determined only by accents. Similarly, compounds and non-compounds were distinguished in the ancient Vedic age simply through the instrumentality of accents.

When a conjunction between two letters takes place in $Samhit\bar{a}$, we usually find that two individuals do not retain their separate

मंहितैकपदि नित्या नित्या धातूपसर्गयो:। नित्या समासे वाक्ये तु सा विवचामपेचते।

forms but merge into one and consequently give rise to a new letter which, though practically different from them, has close affinity with those letters. In the course of combination, letters are sometimes dropped as in Preedarah and sometimes, they undergo medifications as in Dadhyatra. The chunges and modifications brought about by Sandhi are natural and not artificial. In etymological explanations of words we find instances of productions of letters (Gavendrah), inversion of letters (Simhah), medifications of letters (Sodasah) and disappearance of letters (Preedarah).

वर्णगमो गवेन्द्रादी सिंड वर्णावपर्ययः । योङ्गादी विकारः स्थात् वर्णनामः प्रशेदिरे ॥

CHAPTER IV

THEORY OF SPHOTA

Theory of Sphota-identity of Sphota with Progona-its origin and nature-arguments against the assumption of Sphota.

The Hindu grammarians are credited with having for the first time enunciated the doctrine of Sphota which forms one of the outstanding features of Sanskrit grammar. It is at once the essence and result of Indian speculations on grammar; it embodies the careful ingenuity and keen-sightedness on the part of the Indian grammarians, and ultimately proves by drawing identity between Sphota and Brahman Sabda-tattva and Brahma-tattva are different in name but essentially convertible with each other. The grammarians have, however, carried this theory to such an extent traced the final germ of speech to so subtle an element as to place the dissertations on words more or less upon a metaphysical level.

The history of Sphota, judging from the height of contemplation it discloses, is calculated to reveal a mystical vision, and shows a

¹ प्रश्लीविव्यचरं माहस्तसी पूर्णामने नमः ॥—Vaiyākaraņabhūsaņa, Kar. 72. and निष्मप तु नश्लीव स्तीटः।

पनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शन्दतन्तं यदचरम् ।--- Vakyapadiya, Kar. 1.

poculiar pious tondency which seeks to explain all phenemena as emanating from semething divine. The original conception of Sphota goes back to the most ereative period of Indian thought, we mean the Vedic, when Vak was considered to be a manifestation of allpervading Brahman; Pranara regarded as the ultimate germ of all speech-sounds and Sabda viewed as an imperishable and potential factor in the creation of the world. Philosophy, so to speak, begins with concrete objects of thought and finally arrives at more and more nice abstraction. The grammarians, in the same way, started with the physical analysis of words and conceived sound as what clothes itself with letters. They proceeded still further and on minute examination of internal phonomena. grasped the remotest form of speech, riz., Sphota. that is manifested by sound, eternally existent, indivisible and really expressive of sense.

It is, however, difficult to ascertain as to when and with whom this theory had first originated. History does not definitely mention the name of any particular philosopher, so far as the authorship of this theory is concerned. All that we know about its history is that this theory received a streauous support at the hands of grammarians, while almost every system of Hindu philosophy had attacked it mercilessly and rejected it as being absurd and inconsistent.

³ ध्वनियहाः, नित्यः, चल्लाः, वाचतः।

We do not, however, definitely know of any grammarian who may be said to have formulated this doctrine, nor do we find any specific mention of Sphota in the aphorisms of grammar. We only repeat that our knowledge is not permitted to proceed beyond the limit that the theory of Sphota found much favour with the grammarians, who seem to have carried it to such an extent as to finally inter-weave Sphota with Brahmatattva, thus raising the artificial character of grammatical speculations to the dignity of theological discourses. But this is not the sufficient reason why we should take this theory as one of grammatical origin. On the other hand, it might be maintained with a greater degree of certainty, on the evidence afforded by some other popular theories of unknown origin, that the '. Indian grammarians had already found the nucleus of the theory in existence in some form or other. They interpreted it consistently with their views and finally made it their own by giving it a distinctly grammatical stamp. What the grammarians have practically done with regard to this theory is that they popularised it with all earnestness and ultimately incorporated it into their systems as a tenet of fundamental importance. Similar is the original history of of the popular doctrines of Hindu The main doctrines of the philosophy. Sāmkhya school, for instance, seem to have been transmitted through generations as a common heritage of man and current as a

distinct line of thought long before they were systematised by Kapila or Paŭeasikha. In this process of tracing the origin of old doctrines, we may be allowed to seek for some clue as to why the Vedas are emphatically declared by orthodox teachers as works not of human origin; and why it is anotheritatively laid down that the Seers, who are mentioned by names in the Vedic hymns, are far from being the real authors.

To give a clear idea of Sphola, we find it necessary to start with Pranava. It has repeatedly been stated in the Vedic literature that the mystic syllable, i.e., Pranara, ropresents the primordial speech-sound wherefrom all forms of Pak are supposed to have been evolved. This sacred combination of three particles (अ. उ. म), which is still uttered with the numost severence and regarded as a positive emblem of the supromo God, is said to have flashed forth into the heart of Brahman, while he was absorbed in deep meditation. Pranava unfolded itself in the form of Gayatri, which again gave birth to the three Vedas-this is how the cosmic world came into existence from so subtle an entity as Sabda. Whon we present this orthodox view in all its bareness and accordingly maintain that the entire world of Valhas Pranava as its ultimate source, we should

[े] स्वयमुदेव भगवान् विदी गीतः समातनः। शिवाधा शवि पर्धमा समारिऽन्य न कारकाः--Mobabbagavate Parapem.

crave the indulgence of modern scholars who are likely to discard it as an unscientific and irrational theory. The Suta-Samhita 1 divides Pranava into two kinds, namely, Para and Apara. The former is the same as Brahman, while the latter is identified with Sabda. must be admitted at the very outset that while dealing with so mysterious a thing as Pranava and showing the orthodox belief in the potency of Sabda, we are really drifted to a land that lies far beyond the range of common experience. Pranava has two more aspects-external and internal—corresponding to those of Sphota. Vācaspati 2 in his gloss under the aphorism विशोना वा ज्योतिसती has attempted to show the internal aspect of Sphota. There is a lotus, it is said, having eight petals, that resides in the region between heart and abdomen; the three constituents of Pranava represent in the lotus, the solar, the lunar and the fiery regions respectively. Above it, as the Brahmavādins are only allowed to perceive, rests the Brahma-Nāda assuming the form of अर्धसाता. अर्धेसाता (capable of being perceived by the Yogins) which represents the Turīya or the fourth part of Pranava that resides in

¹ परः परतरं ब्रह्म ज्ञानानन्दादिलचणम्। प्रकर्षेण नवं यसात् परं ब्रह्म स्वभावतः॥ चयरः प्रणवः साचाच्छन्दरूपः सुनिर्भेतः। प्रकर्षेण नवलस्य हेतुत्वात् प्रणवः स्वृतः॥

[ं] उदरोरसोर्मध्येऽधोसुखमष्टदलं पद्मं तद्रेचनप्राणायामेनोर्डसुखं कला तवालम्बने चित्तं घारयेदित्यादि।—Yoga Sütra—Vācaspati on the Bhāṣya. 1.36,

the heart of all beings, is called Nada-Sphota. It is emphatically laid down that the consummation of Yoga lies in the positive realisation of this absolute entity. Reference is made to this Nada in the Markandeya Purana,1 where it is identified with Sakti or the supreme potency that exists from eternity and is not capable of being uttered by vocal organs. The history of the Hindu 'Trinity of gods' seems to have a close connection with the theory of · Pranava, for the three elements (अ, उ, म्) constituting the Pranava are popularly believed to represent the three principal Hindu deities, viz., Brahman, Visnu and Siva. Now it is almost safe to assert without any 'contention that Sphota, taken as an imperishable unit of Vak (usually manifested by sound), which finally accounts for the evolution of speech, is analogous to Pranava; or, to take a still more orthodox view, it is the same as Pranava. Moreover, the expressions like आंकार एव सर्वी वाक् and स हि सर्वशब्दार्थमकति: which are, strictly speaking, applicable to Sphota also, serve to confirm our belief regarding the identity between Pranava and Sphota. The analogy is so striking that Nagesa does not hesitate to compare Sphota with the internal phase of Pranava.2

प्रधेमामा स्थिता नित्या यातुवार्या विशेषतः। 1.

^{*} स चाय स्कोटः भान्तरप्रवद्भय एव |-- Laghumanjuea, p. 889.

In the Upanisads, however, we miss the term Sphota in its grammatical significance, but we frequently meet with the words Pranava and Aksara as expressive of Brahman. quently, the specific term Sphota, as understood by the grammarians, seems to have acquired a special meaning at a later period, when the grammatical speculations began to obtain more and more philosophical treatment and ultimately encroached upon the domain of pure metaphysics. The Seers of the Upanisads have already declared in unmistakable terms that Brahman is reducible to Pranava, or. Pranava is a living symbol of the Supreme Being. Accordingly, they have advocated the worship of Pranava 1 as a form of spiritual practice that leads to a state of perpetual bliss. So much sanctity and reverence were accorded to Pranava and its potency and spiritual character eulogised in such a manner that Pranava came to be regarded as Brahman itself. What a unique place Pranava occupied in the spiritual thought of India is evident from the numerous Vedic passages and from the traditions that have gathered round it from the Vedic times. In the Yoga system of Patañjali, Pranana is not only held as what positively denotes the Supreme Being," but repeated utterance of Propora is also suggested as an instrument for attaining the concentration of

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mind We may thus adduce abundant evidence in defence of the sacrid character of Pranara All scriptural passiges, specially the Vidie hymns, begin, as a rulo, with this sicred syllable. The natural outcome of such specialitions evalting Pranava to divinity accounts, if we are allowed to hold, for the evolution of the theory of Sabda-Brahman, so conspicuously dealt with by the reputed author of the Vähyapidiya Woliave dilated at great length upon the unique spiritual aspect of Pranava, with a view to prepare the ground for the behof that Sphola, like Pranava, is ultimately convertible with Brahman.

The four forms of Val, denominated in Parā, Pašyanti, Madhyamā and Vailhavī, may be viewed as indicating the different stages through which Sphota (Nada-Vindu) receives manifestation Both Parā and Pašyanti are too subtle and delicite to be comprehended by senseorgans, the former residing in the Mulādhāra in the shape of motionless Vindu, and the latter coming up to the navil region pushed by the internal wind Of the four forms, it is Madhyamā that indicates Sphota All these are, however, more or less mystorious The popular form, viz, Vaikharī is what is uttored by the ocal organs and is capable of being heard by others

प्रनाहि।नधन नद्य प्रष्ट्रतस्तं यदस्यस्—Vakyapadiya Kär 1 नद्गोरं गर्यनमाण गस्यानितसन्तः।

निर्द्धारम् त्रह्मोव स्तीट 1—Varyakarana bhupapa under ƙar 72 १ परा वाड्सूलवकरणा पग्यनी नाभिर्मीस्थताः । दृदिस्या मध्यमा श्रीया वेखरी कळदेशता ।

It is further 1 held that $N\bar{a}da$ is simultaneously produced by Madhyamā and Vaikharī, but there is considerable difference between the two. We may have some cognition of $N\bar{a}da$ as produced by Madhyamā, either at the time of counting $(Japa)^2$ or when ears are shut up. What is of vital importance is that this form of Sabda, as is manifested by $madhyam\bar{a}$ - $n\bar{a}da$ is what we precisely call Sphota: it symbolises Brahman and has eternal existence. Sphota is further said to be essentially one and without divisions. are, in short, the salient characteristics of Sphota. According to this theory, however, it is one and the same indivisible Sphota that is represented by Varna, Pada and Vākya, just as one and the same face 3 appears to be long and round when seen through stone, sword and looking-glass, or, as a piece of stone, taking reflection from red or blue flowers, seems to be either red or difference The between ka and ga^4 blue. is not practically due to the diversity of Sphota, but points to the peculiarities of sounds that serve to manifest Sphota. It is to prove both the unity and indivisibility of Sphota that it is often compared to the sky and consciousness which, though one and admits of no fractions, are said to have such attributive difference

[े] युगपदेव मध्यमावैखरीभ्यां नाद उतपद्यते—Mañjūṣā.

 $^{^2}$ मध्यमानादय कर्णपिधाने जपादी च स्चातरवायुव्यङ्गः $-M_{
m B}$ $m jar{u}_{
m sar{a}}$.

यथा च सुखं मणिकपाणदर्पणव्यञ्जकोपाधिवणात् दैर्ध्यवर्तुललांदिभानं तहत्।

व्यञ्जकध्वनिगतं कल-गलादिकं स्पोटे सासते।

ns, uziain, uziain and Jira, Israra, respectively. These who take uz and and to be similarly indivisible units, express their views in the following wny: Just as letters are devoid of parts, so no letters are comprehended in Padas as their constituent elements. Strictly speaking, it is not admissible to take words separately by splitting up a sentence. To those who advocate the divisibility of both Pada and Pākya, it is the last letter that indicates Sphota, each preceding letter being only necessary for a cognition of the intended sense.

In view of the difference between Madhyamā and Faikharī, we may divide seund into twe kinds, namely, natural er everlasting (inexhaustible) and unnatural or momentary. It is the natural seund only, which is generated by Madhyamā, that suggests Sphola. The unnatural (aprākīta-dhvani) sound is so called because it rises from Prākīta-dhvani and undergoes an amount of modifications in the shape of long and short sound. Sphola being essentially one and without any modification is not at all offected by the quick utterance of sound, which practically refers to Vikrta-dhvani. Considering

¹ पर्र न वर्षा दिश्चने वर्षेष्वयदा इतः। वाक्यात् पदानाशस्यनं प्रविदेकी न कञ्चाः—Väkyapadiya, 1, 17.

³ पदवाकायोन्त सरायात्वपविश्विमवर्षेक्षण कोट एक एव । पूर्वपूर्ववर्षेक्ष त.त्पर्ययाहकः:।—Maiiju:a.

³ ध्विनित्त हिबिध: । प्राक्षती बैक्कतव । क्लोटल यहचे छतु: प्राक्षती ध्विनित्वति । हिनिस्ति बैक्कत: प्रतिप्रविते — Valyapadiya, 1. 77

Sphota to be permanent, as an internal phenomenon, the grammarians have scanty regard to the logical view advocating the momentary character of Sabda. The existence of a permanent form of Sabda, as is represented by Sphota as such, proves a dubious point, so much so that it merited no support but adverse criticisms from all leading systems of Hindu philosophy. While they speak of production and destruction of Sabda, the Naiyāyika's seem to have Kārya-Sabda (as opposed to Sphota) in their view. They refused to take a more psychological view of Sabda apart from what appear to be a matterof-fact one. Consequently, they lost sight of those internal operations that are associated with the evolution of sound that goes to prove the existence of a permanent source of sound (Sphota). Another point which is none the less important in this connection is that Sphota alone,1 as is evident from its derivative meaning, is really associated with the expressiveness of sense.2 It is for the sake of convenience and popular practice that we assign meanings to Sabdas, but a closer examination of both the internal and external facts will show that Sphota is finally the significant element of speech.

As to the reason why Sphota is said to be one that does not admit of any division into

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स्मुटत्यघींऽसादिति स्मोट:।

वाचकता स्प्रोटिकनिष्ठा।

parts, we should frankly state that the ultimate nature of Sphola, so far as it is brought to our comprehension by sound, letters and combination of words, seems to be undifferentiated, Physical structure of words only differs by virtue of Tikela-dheani, but the very life of Salda, or. more clearly, the original Aoda, is absolutely one and practically changeless. What we really mean is that, though the word Gauh differs from the word Ghotoh both in physical and psychological aspects, the ultimate germ giving rise to such sound is really one and the same. Sphota being one and permanent, Bhartrhari rightly observes that such difference, as is caused by sound, is not at all essential. The apparent difference t of words is thus due to that of sound whereby Sphota is indicated. Sphota is practically one; it is only the indicator of Sphota, viz. sound, that differs.

It is evident from what we have noticed above that it is difficult to form a definite idea of Sphota without a proper investigation into the internal phenomena connected with the evolution of sound. We assume the existence of such a mystic element beyond sound only through the instrumentality of external sound that serves to indicate Sphota. But we are never allowed to demonstrate its existence with a greater degree of vividness. There is no

[•] फ्रीटे व्ययक्ष्मनियतकलादिमानान् ककारी वृह दशीपाधिको निदम्यवद्वारः। —Manjaya

'at

doubt that the internal operations, as referred to above, and connected with the materialisation of thought into sound, are what actually take place in the utterance of sound. It can hardly be denied that in the course of such translation something that lies dormant within (Avyakta) gets itself manifested by degrees while passing from the innermost part of the body to the vocal apparatus. The internal wind which plays so important a part in the transformation of consciousness into sound has been alluded to in connection with the psychological aspects of language (vide Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus).

In oppsition to the Naiyāyika standpoint, according to which Sabda is momentary and consequently liable to both production and destruction, Patañjali has strongly supported the permanent character of Sabda. It is curious to note that the attributives whereby he usually characterises Sabda, or more properly, Sphoṭa, are exactly those that are often ascribed to Brahman. There is convincing evidence that Patañjali, as a representative grammarian, had early realised the distinction between two kinds of Sabda, namely, created and permanent. It is explicitly with reference to Sphoṭa or permanent wordform that he used such expressions 2 as, Nitya,

¹ इङ ही शब्दात्मानी नित्य: कार्यय |—Mahābhāṣya.

[ै] नित्येषु च श्रव्देषु कूटस्थैरविचालिभिद्देर्णैभैवितव्यमनपायोपजनविकारिभि:। —Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 18.

Avikārī and Kūtastha. In connection with the exposition of the class-theory of Sphota, as opposed to the individualistic one, he has given us 'some glimpse into the salient features of Sphota. -Sabda is, maintains Pataujali,1 what is perceived by auditory organs, comprehended by intellect, manifested by sound and pertains to the sky. This definition, if we are allowed to stylo it as such, though concise and garbed in highly philosophical languago, seems to be impregnated with deep significance, and purports to bring out the exact meaning of Sphota. Having regard to the importance of this definition, we think worth while to take up the expressions of the Bhāsya one by one and explain thom in the light of Kaiyata and Nagesa. Perceptible by the sense of hearing is used to indicate that tho organ of hearing is only a fraction of ether? wherein Sabda or sound is directly perceived. Both Nyāya and Vaišesika systems havo taken Sabda to be a positive quality of ether. Sound a which has its origin in the vibration of ether is capable of being perceived only by the organs composed of the same element. Patanjali scems to have an accurate knowledge of the scientific fact in regard to the production of sound, The expression comprehended by intellect offers

भौबोपनसिर्वृहिनियाद्यः प्रयोगेषाभिञ्चलितः चाकामदेशः वर्दः । —Vol. I, 1. 1. 2, p. 18,

^{*} मञ्जीक्षरगुण: गीनगाहा: 1-Prasastapada Bhasya.

an explanation as to how words, though consisting of letters that are liable to disappear as soon as they are uttered, are found competent to express the intended sense. The answer is the same as suggested by the Naiyāyikas.1 It is practically from the last letter that the cognition of the entire word is derived together with the impressions produced by the preceding letters. It is evidently an intellectual operation which enables us to retain the recollection of the entire structure of a word, even when we hear the last letter 'alone. Manifested by sound implies that Sphota, though permanent, is not always comprehensible, but comes under our cognition only when the vocal organs are engaged in operation for its manifestation. Nāgeśa states expressly that the oneness of ether implies similar oneness in regard to Sabda or Sphota. We speak of priority and posteriority in respect of Sabda just in the same way, as we are apt to say ghatākāśa and maṭhākāśa having regard only to the difference of attributes. Of both ether and Sphota, the so-called difference is only due to their different attributes (upādhi). The singular number in Sabda is intended, as Nāgeša points out, to indicate both the unity and indivisibility (एकलमखाडवा) of Sphota.

It is quite evident from what he has said of Sphota that Patanjali recognised three prominent

[े] पूर्वपूर्वध्वन्युत्पादिताभिव्यक्तिजनितसंस्कारपरम्परापरिपाकान्त्यवृद्धिनियास्य-द्रत्यर्थः ।—Kaiyata.

characteristics of Sphota, viz., unity (Ekatva), indivisibility (Akhandatva) and etornality (Nityatva), In considering the question of time (as is required for the uttorance of a word), he rightly observes that it is sound that seems to be either long or short, but what is manifosted by sound, i.c., Sphota, is not at all effected by the variations of sound. Ho takes the instance of a drum and continues to say that sounds that are produced by beat of drum1 are not of equal velocity, some travelling 20 yds, and somo 30 yds, and so on: The essential difference between sound and . Sphota. which has proved so difficult a problem to othersis clearly brought to light by Pataniali. He declares in unmistakable terms that Sphota represents what is Sabda proper, whereas sound is only a quality, that is to say, it serves only to manifest Sphota. The relation is, therefore, one of the indicator and the indicated. He further elucidates the point that Sabda has two aspectssound and Sphota: it is sound alone that is usually perceived and appears to be either long or short as the case may be, while Sphota remains entirely unchanged and is not readily perceptible by sense-organs.

The foregoing observations will serve to show that Sphota, though strictly one and indivisible, is also capable of being classified as internal and

[ं] एवं तर्हि स्कोट गरा धानि गन्दगुन,। कथम् । भेगौधातवत्। भेरौमाहल जाधिहि शतिपदानि गन्धनि। स्कोटलावानैव धानिलता हर्षिः। धानि स्कोटस गन्दाना धानिस्तु खलु-लन्दार्व।—Mahābbaşya, Vol I, p 181,

ecternal. So far as the innate expressiveness of sense is concerned, it is the internal form of Sphota (that lies within and is only manifested by sound) that is really significant. The external form of Sphota, as is comprehended by our hearing organs, has no such intimate relation with the meaning. In all our linguistic enquiries we engage ourselves more or less to the investigation of the external aspects of a language, but we take very little notice of the internal phenomenon which forms the very life of a language. We assign the meaning to sound, as we fail to proceed further so as to grasp the ultimate reservoir of sound that is really associated with the significance. It requires only a moment's consideration to realise that sounds or vocalised thoughts are not only produced by the operation of vocal organs, but have their origin in certain ethereal region of the body, which does not vary, though the modulations of voice are always different from one another. The grammarians have thus sought to explain the existence of an internal cause of sound. The external form of Sphota is, again, of two kinds, denoting class and individual.

As a great exponent of the Mahābhāṣya, Bhartrhari has dwelt at length on the question of *Sphota*. Bhartrhari begins with the enuncia-

¹ स्कोटो हिनिध:। वाह्य: श्रास्थलर्य। ततान्तरस्य सुग्धं वाचकलम। Kunjika on the Manjūṣā, p. 237. श्राधन्तरस्कोटो वाचक इति सिह्नम्।— —Manjūṣā.

tion of two kinds of Sabda, as the indicator and the indicated, the former representing the ultimate germ of speech-sound, and the latter being what is really expressed by Sabda.

In view of the popular bolicf regarding both plurality and order (krama) of Sabda, he makes his position clear by pointing out that no question of order, such as priority and posteriority. and that of plurality can logically be raised in relation to Sphota, which is essentially one and eternal. It is sound, he maintains, that passes through successive stages in course of articulation and appears to be either long or short in proportion to the exertion required for the utterance of a word. It is practically due to the varying modulations of voice, as caused by the vocal apparatus, that 'ka'-sound seems to be different from 'kha'-sound and so on. But Sphota, it must be remembered, remains unaffected. A parallel example 2 is thon sought to explain the relation between sound and Sphota. It is a fact of common experience that the sun, though practically a fixed body, seems to be quivering and moving when it is seen through the agitated water of a pond. Just as the agitation of water is reflected on the sun, so (inspite of the oneness and undifferentiating character of

¹ बातुपादानगब्देशु शब्दी शब्दिविदः। एको निभिक्तं शब्दानामपरोऽर्थे प्रयुक्तते।—Vākyapadīya, p. 20.

प्रतिविक्षं यथान्यत स्थितं तोयिक्षयावशात्। तत् प्रवृत्तिमित्रान्येति स धर्मः;
 न्यौटनाद्योः:—VAkyapadiya, I, 49.

sphota) order and difference pertaining to sound are falsely attributed to Sphota. The dual aspects of Sabda, as referred to above, imply that Sabda has the potency of expressing itself as well as its meaning that is associated with it by inseparable connection. This fact is further corroborated by the epistemological evidence. His main thesis may be briefly stated in the following words: Sabda, like light, is supposed to possess a double function, as grāhaka and grāhya. A light is luminous by itself and serves to illuminate others. Similarly, a Sabda is first comprehended and then becomes expressive of meaning.

Then, he proceeds to show how Sabda is evolved. Reference² is first made to the view (as that of the Naiyāyikas) that does not take Pada to be anything but a combination of letters, and similarly does not recognise a sentence as distinct from Padas and letters. The grammarians, however, entertain quite an opposite view, because they maintain Vākya-Sphota to be an indivisible unit that knows neither division nor order. It is nothing but an artificial device of grammar to analyse a sentence into parts (Padas) and those parts again into stems and suffixes.

¹ गाह्यतं ग्राहवालं च हो शक्ती तेजसो यथा। तथैव सर्वशब्दानासेते पृथगवस्थिते।—Vakyapadiya, I, 55.

² तडणें यतिरिक्तेन पदमन्यन्नविद्यते। वाक्यं वर्णपदाभ्यां च व्यतिरिक्तं न किञ्चन।—Vākyapadīya, I, 72.

There are, as the grammarian maintains, two different aspects of words, namely, Kārya or popular form and Nitya or the permanent form of speech. The former is generally produced by the oxercise of vocal apparatus and serves to give a reflection of internal consciousness, the latter is what represents the ultimate germ of speech. Sphota is identified with this latter aspect of speech.

The three views regarding the eognition of sound and Sphota may be thus briefly summarised 1:-(i) Sound when produced is heard by the auditory organs and becomes the positive instrument whereby Sphota is comprehended. (ii) Having assumed the material form through the medium of sound, Sphota is eapable of being heard. (iii) Sound acts upon the organs concerned and serves to manifest Sphota. Bhartrhari lends his support to the last one. Sound is the outer garment of Sphota. Though incomprehensible and inconceivable by itself, Sphota reveals its existence through the medium of sound. Sound and Sphola are intimately related to each other. As the scientists have found out atoms or electrons as the final factor of creation, so the grammarians started with sound and ultimately reached the subtle element of speech to which the term Sphota

[े] यदा जनाकुसुमद्दमानुयक्तमैन स्कटिकादीनां यह ये तथा ध्वनिद्दमानुयक्त एव स्कोटचारिकायोगीपनध्यते दित कैशाचिन्यतम, etc.—Papyarāja under the Vākyapadiya, Kār. 1, 82,

was significantly assigned. As to how sound and Sphota, related to each other as the indicative indicated, are to be comprehended, and the Bhartrhari refers to four different views on the subject. Some say that Sphota is recognised as identical with sound, just like a piece of marble red in contact with a Javā-flower; looking some holding sound (though not cognisable by itself) to be indicative of Sphota; some maintain that the exact nature of Sphota being too subtle to be determined, it is sound only that comes under comprehension; some, again, freely admit is really manifested but it is Sphota indistinct and unintelligble on account of the distance wherefrom it is evolved. No doubt, Bhartrhari has here recorded the views of his predecessors and contemporary grammarians in order to do full justice to so important a But we can hardly afford to pass over these views without taking notice of the unique advancement of grammatical speculations, as is clearly borne out by these references.

Referring to the intellectual process involved in the comprehension of Sabda, Bhartrhari ¹ says that the cognition of Sabda practically follows from the last sound together with the impressions made by the preceding ones.

The immediate consequence of holding Sphota to be one and indivisible was a grave

¹ नादैराहितबीजायामन्येन ध्वनिना सह। त्राहत्तिपरिपाकायां बुद्धौ । शब्दोऽवधार्यते ।—Vākyapadīya, Kār. 1, 85.

oue, as it threatened to strike at the fundamontal principle of grammar by making all process of analysing sentence and words purely artificial. The science of grammar is primarily based upon the principle of analysis. Now to instify the procedure of grammarians, it must be said on the contrary that they had no other alternative than to isolate words from a composito sentence, in order to make the sense of words intelligible to others. It is simply due to our inability. Bhartrhari strongly argues. that we cannot comprehend a sontence without taking it to be a combination of words and words as consisting of no parts (Prakeli and Pratuana). An examination of facts shows that the grammatical method of analysing sentence and words into their component parts, however nrtificial from the standpoint of Sphota, is calculated to afford the only sciontific means. so far as the knowledge of meaning is concerned.2

The doctrine of Spho(a, as expounded by the grammarians, is not a creation of fanoy and the result of idle philosophising; it is rathor based on the facts that spenk for themselves. A moment's notice is only required to realise the existence of some inexhaustible petency

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म्यवहाराय मत्यनि प्राम्ताधेप्रक्रिया यदा:1—Våkyapadlya, 2. 231.
Роруагаја—एवं च निरुवयदेविवि वर्षेपदवाखेषु मात्राविभागो वर्षविभागः
पद्दिभागय कान्यनिको मिथ्लि भाव: .—Under Kår. 03.

गाम्बीयप्रक्रियानिवाहकीपाय: 1

lying inside the body, which is conceived to be at work at every time of utterance. Sound that we hear is not produced by the operation of vocal organs only, but has its origin elsewhere. However subjected to adverse criticisms by the opponents, the dectrine of Sphota, with all its mysticisms, will continue to appeal to speculators on the psychology of language, as embodying the most accurate explanation with regard to the origin of $\mathcal{V}\bar{a}k$. That the principle of grammatical analysis is more or less fanciful is evident from the fact that systems of grammar have their different nomenclatures and technical terms, though they have practically kept the same object in view and treated of the same subject.

This analytical method, though at best artificial, is supposed to have much utility, as it practically enables us to have an insight into the actual state of things. Starting with such unreal process as the division of sentences and words, with the obvious object of facilitating the study of words, the grammarians finally succeeded in obtaining a truer perspective while dealing with the problem of *Sphota*. Bhartphari² rightly observes that proper attention and close enquiry are needed to arrive at the final goal, running through a passage so artificial and bewildering.

¹ शास्त्रेषु प्रक्रियाभेदरैविद्यैवीपवर्ण्येत ।—Vākyapadīya, 2. 235.

² यथैव दर्भनै: पूर्वैंद्र्गत् सन्तमसेऽपि वा। अन्ययाक्तत्य विषयमन्यथैवाध्यवस्यति।
— Vākyapadīya, 1. 90.

As it is imperfect observation that makes a rope look like a serpent, and such delusion ceases to exist the moment it is cautiously examined, so the grammarians first treated of a sentence as having many parts and those parts as containing various letters. But their mode of vision is materially changed on a closer examination of facts and they finally describe Sphota as an imperishable and indivisible unit without any reservation. The discourse on Sphola reached its culminating point when Sphota was regarded to be as great as Brahman itself. The doctrine of grammar has thus ultimately identified itself with the same transcendental reality which has always proved to be the be-all and end-all of metaphysical speculations.

The later grammarians, specially Sesakṛṣṇa, Nāgeša, Bhaṭtoji and Kondabhaṭṭa, have dealt with the problem of Sphoṭa more clearly and elaborately but all following the line of Pataṇjali and Bhartrhari. The arguments advanced by Seṣakṛṣṇa in defence of Sphoṭa are briefly as follows: An indivisible unit as Sphoṭa should be accepted on the ground that the sense usually denoted by a word can neither be derived from an individual letter (as it would render all other letters entirely meaningless), nor from a combination of letters, for letters being liable to destruction as soon as they

¹ न प्रश्वेतं न मिलिला न चैतस्यतिगीचराः। चयंस्य वाचका वर्णाः किंतु स्कोटः स च विषा ।—Bphotatatvanırūpaya.

are uttered, it would be practically impossible to have a congregate of such transient letters. It is not even sufficient to say that they are cognisable by the same act of memory, because, if it were so, the undesirable consequence will be the identity between such groups of words as, Nadī, Dīna and Rasa, Sara (there being difference of order only), as they consist of the same letters and are comprehended by the same faculty of retention. The grammarians have, therefore, proceeded a step further and recognised the existence of Sphota, which is suggested by sound, eternal and not at all divisible into parts.

We can compare this view with what Patañjali has said with regard to order in letters. As
two letters, Patañjali argues, cannot be simultaneously pronounced on account of their transient character, it is useless to raise the question
of priority and posteriority in connection with
letters. This order is to be understood as an
intellectual one. Seșa continues to say that
the cognition of Sphota follows from the last
letter together with the impressions made by the
preceding letters.

The later grammarians have to a certain extent shown prolixity in enunciating as many

न वर्णानां पौर्वापर्यमस्ति । उचितप्रध्वं सिलाच वर्णानाम् ।

[—]Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 356.

² बुिं विषयमेव शब्दानां पौर्वापर्धम्।

पूर्वपूर्वानुभूजन्यभावनासचिविऽित्तमी। चेतिस स्पुरित स्प्रोटः।

as eight different forms of Sphota, such as, Yarna-Sphota, Pada-Sphota, Vakya-Sphota, Akhanda-Pada-Sphota, Akhanda-Vakya-Sphota Varna-Jāti-Sphota, Pada-Jāti-Sphota, Vākya-Jati-Sphota. The author of the Sabda-Kaustubha has clearly dealt with all these classifications. It must be, however, remembered that these varietics, with the single exception of Vakya-Sphota, are more or less unreal and not accepted hy all grammarians. Reference has already been made to two kinds of Pakya-Sphota, viz., class and individual. An attempt is now made to see how far these standpoints (Jati-Sphota and Vyakti-Sphota) are in concordance with the Mahabhāsya. Sabdatva which pertains to all Sabdas is regarded to be a class, and consequently, neers for hy its very nature 1 deserves to be treated as eternal. Bhartrhari has thrown some sidelight this point. The word Sphota in Sugar स्फोटमात्रं निर्द्विग्यते has led some to favour the view Sphota is virtually a class that is suggested by individual words or sounds, and that ग्रन्दव्यक्ति receives the designation of dhvani by suggesting Jati-Sphota. Some, again, hold 2 on the other hand, that Vyakti-Sphota (as opposed to Jāti-Sphota) is one and imperishable. As to the apparent plurality of Vyakti, they maintain that the interval or intervention caused

¹ नित्यानिकसमदेतलम्।

भाकतिकलवादी तसा निल्ल सन्दति।—Bhatyapradipodyota.

by time and words, which tends to prove the diversity of one and the same Vyakti as a, is only due to the variation of sounds whereby Sphota is suggested. According to this point of view, it should be borne in mind, the a-sound in da is not distinct from that in nda. This view is, however, open to objections and is finally set aside by Patañjali. Those who like Patanjali advocate Jāti-Sphoṭa¹ advance their arguments to repudiate both unity and eternality of Vyakti-Sphota on the ground that a seems to have more than one form, according as it is called udātta, anudātta, svarita and pluta. It is not even reasonable to suggest that the same a which is first pronounced as udātta is next taken to be Anudatta and so on, for, if it were so, Sphota would cease to be eternal on account of its assuming diverse forms. Thus, $J\bar{a}ti$ -sphota is finally accepted as what gives the correct solution of the problem.2

Having thus discussed the salient characteristics of *Sphoṭa* from all possible standpoints, we now proceed to see how *Sphoṭa-vāda*, which is popularly attributed to the grammarians, was received by different schools of Hindu philosophy. However carefully conceived and ingeniously nourished by the grammarians, the

¹ जातिरेव एका, भन्दव्यक्तयस्त्रनना इति वादीलर्थः।—Uddyota.

² त्राक्ततिग्रहणात् सिद्धम् ।—Mahābhāşya, I. 1.2. एवं व्यक्तिस्मोटपचे निराक्तते जातिस्मोटपच एवाश्रीयते।—Kaiyaṭa.

[्]तसाप्तिना एवानित्या एवाकारा:, प्रत्यक्षिचा त्वाक्तिनिवन्धनेति जातिस्कोटपचीऽव व्यवस्थापित: (—Kaiyaḥa.

theory of Sphola scoms to have a strange fate. because it failed to have any favourable treatment at the hands of reputed philosophers. What is still more regrettable is that it was rather subjected to stern and vigorous criticisms. Though it embodies, so to speak, the crowning achievement of all grammatical speculations. the theory of Sphola unfortunately mot with nothing but disapproval on all sides. The only school of Indian thought which appears to have lent support to the assumption of an invisible speech-unit as Sphola, is, if we are allowed to hold, the Yoga system of Patanjali. It is practically on the ovidence of such aphorisms. as Yoga Sutras 1, 31 and 3, 17 and the expositions of Vyasa thereon, and partly in consoquence of the supposed identity between the authors of the Mahabhasya and the Yoga Sutras, that the existence of Sphota is said to have been recognised and supported by the author of the Yoga Sutra. Truth to tell, there is no clear mention of Sphota as such in the aphorisms of Yogn system; it is only in the comments of Vyāsa and the gloss of Vācaspati that some light has been thrown on the question of Sphota.

It is too well known a fact that all objects of thought, with the exception of Primordial matter and Soul, are declared to bo बार्ट or

मक्रतिपुरुपयीरन्यत् सर्वे कार्वेनिति।

products by the teachers of the Samkhya school. Having taken a rather perverted view against the orthodox interpretations, they have rejected the fundamental tenets of the Mīmāmsakas, viz., eternality of sound,1 eternality of the Vedas and eternality of the relation between sound and meanings. It requires no other evidence, hold the Sāmkhyāites, but ordinary perception and inference to prove that Sabda is produced by the agency of vocal organs and has only momentary existence. The Sāmkhya Sūtra (5.57) distinctly rejects Sphota as practically incomprehensible. The reason of their refutation is a very simple one. As no other element apart from letters comes to our notice in the cognition of a word, it is absolutely useless to assume the existence of Sphota (which passes our vision and comprehension) as distinct from letters.2 letters are, on the contrary, directly perceived, it is more reasonable to take them to be expressive of the sense. If, again, letters are supposed to be meaningless by themselves, we are allowed to doubt the so-called expressiveness of Sphola. Now, the point at issue is when letters are found to be really expressive of sense, the assumption of Sphota in addition to letters becomes a superfluity which the followers of the Samkhya school are not prepared to accept.

¹ न राव्हीनयलं कार्यतामतीते; 18—Amkhya Sütra, 5. 58.

[ं] मतीलप्रतीतिभां न फोटाताक: गब्द: 1—Samkhya Satra, 5. 57. मतीतिवैषांनासमतीत: फोटम्य वर्णातिरिक्तस्य, तामात्र फोट: गब्द: किंतु वर्णा एव । —Singleys-Vitti.

There is another argument which also goes against the indivisible character of Sphota. As meanings are liable to changes according to the different arrangement of letters (as in $Nad\bar{t}$ and $D\bar{t}na$) and as sounds are diversified in their character and have manifold significance, we cannot reasonably take Sphota to be one and eternal. The conclusion to which this argument leads is that Sphota, being inconceivable, is far from being Sabda proper. It is letters alone, no matter if they are perishable, that constitute words in the real sense of the term.

No comment is, however, necessary to show that the Samkhyaites, who profess to be rationalistic, have taken notice of only the outward aspect of speech and have totally neglected the more important side of the question, viz., psychological or internal aspect. Their main difficulty is that they ascribe significance to so transient a thing as letters, but do not strive further to find out the permanent source of Sabda, as is manifested by sound. As to non-perception of Sphota, it must be remembered that the Sphotavadins also were not slow to emphasise the difficulty that hes in the way of having a perceptional knowledge of Sphota. They made no secret as to the necessity of a thorough concentration of mind in order to realise the existence of Sphota. It requires a good deal of mystical power, or some amount of spiritual vision, as is given rise to by the awakening of Praina-netra, to grasp the cit-aspect (Sphota) of the Supreme Being.

Moreover, Sphota is not capable of being perceived by ordinary sense-organs: it is only suggested or manifested by sound.

Regarding the existence of Sphota (as distinct from letters), the views of the Mīmāmsakas, as ably represented by the author of the Ślokavārttika, are far from being reconcilable with those of the grammarians. Having taken a purely physical view of Sabda, the Mīmāmsakas, like Sankara, turned to the old theory of the revered teacher Upavarşa¹ and accordingly identified Sabda with letters. To assume something as Sphota apart from letters, is, as they hold, opposed to all cognition and experience. Letters are actually perceived in a word, as, for instance, the word gauh does not appear to have any other element excepting the three constituent letters—ga, au and visarga. It is curious to note that while so much stress is laid on the popular experience, the importance of the logical aspect of Sabda has altogether been ignored, so as to weaken the ground on which the grammarians sought to build the edifice of Sphotavāda. When Sabda, as a combination of letters, is practically seen to be expressive. of the sense and as no other factor is found to be in operation in the comprehension of the meaning, it is nothing but superfluous to assume the existence of Sphota, as distinct from letters.

¹ वर्णा एव तु भ्रव्ह इति भगवानुपवर्षः (---V. S., I. 8. 28.

The grammarins, it must be remembered, have declared Sphota to be virtually distinct from letters and further held Sphola to be the only significant element of speech. The Mimim-sakas maintain that letters have no parts and that there is no such collection in the cognition of words apart from that of the component letters, In assigning moaning to words, the Mimamsakas had to face one difficult problem. The question presented itself in the following form :-Are all letters individually significant by themselves, or, is it an aggregation of them wherehy the meaning is expressed? The untenable character of the first view is clearly ovident, since the competency of each individual letter to signify the intended sense is contrary to our experience. As regards the second view, it is not possible to have an aggregation or a simultaneous combination of letters, simply for the reason of minute intervals in the uttorance of sounds. The Mīmāmsakas make their way out of the difficulty by saying that the significance of words dopends upon the convention or popular usage. As the comprehension of the meaning directly follows from the lotters that constitute a word, and as nothing olso is required for the purposo, it is only logical, they hold, to take letters as what express the sense. Kumarila shows further how by accopting

¹ वाचकता स्क्रीटैकनिष्ठा।

^{*} Wilcaig:-Bloka.varttika.

Sphota as an entity, we are liable to make a number of unnecessary assumptions, such as, the existence of Sphota, distinctness of Sphota from letters and its indivisibility. Tf quite clear from what we have said that the arguments advanced by the Mimāmsakas against Sphotavāda are, generally speaking. ducible to two only, namely, the existence of Sphota apart from letters (i) involves a negation . of :perceptible facts (হুছোনি) and (ii) is an unwarranted assumption of something that is invisible or imperceptible (সহস্থানা). .The concluding verse 1 of the author reveals, however, the reason why he could not lend support to the theory of Sphota. As a matter of fact, the assumption of Sphota, which makes all divisions of a sentence and words merely artificial, is found to be entirely inconsistent with the main tenets of the Mīmāmsā system, for it renders ūha, prayāja, etc. (which pertain to letters, words and sentences) absolutely conventional. It is, therefore, to retain the genuine character of the Vedic texts that Kumārila made such a vigorous attempt to refute the existence of Sphota.

The Vedāntins have fully acknowledged the eternality of Sabda. They have, on the authority of scriptural texts, even gone to the extent of investing Sabda with the potency of producing the entire world. While dealing with Sabda

¹ वर्णातिरिक्त: प्रतिषिध्यमान: पदेषु मन्दं फलमाद्धाति।
कार्याणि वाक्यावयवाश्रयाणि सत्यानि कर्त्तुं क्वत् एष यवः॥—Slokavārttika. Kār. 137.

(Logos) and its 'world-producing power,' Sankara has conveniently devoted considerable space under the Vedanta-Sutra 1.3.28 to find out the exact nature of Sabda. With his characteristic manner of presenting arguments, he first ' points out the incongruities that become almost unavoidable, if letters having both production. and destruction, were to be regarded as Sabda proper. Subsequently he continues to acknowledge Sphota as what represents the permanent form of Sabda. The way in which Sankara has at first advanced arguments in defence of the existence of Sphota, exposing the untenable features of वर्षेपच, leads one to believe, though temporarily, that he entertained no antagonistic view against the grammatical interpretation of Sphotavada. This impression is, however, of a short duration, hecause next we find Sankara 1 more favourably examining the view of Upavarsa almost in the same way as the Mimāmsakas. As to the question of production and destruction of letters, he argues that it really implies the re-cognition (प्रत्यभितान) of the same letter. What is meant is that different letters are not produced and uttered each time. but, as a matter of fact, the same sound, say ka (as in kala and kāla) is heard. It should he, however, noticed here that the Naiyayikas are not prepared to take the above as an instance of re-cognition, but explain the

Vedanta Sutra, Sankara Bhasya under the aphorism, 1.328.

sameness of ka-sounds as due to their belonging to the same class (ক্ৰে). To sum up the two views: According to the Mimāmsakas and the same ka-sound is Vedāntins, the again and again, whereas the Naiyāyikas do not maintain the non-differentiation of the individuals and consequently take all ka-sounds as belonging to the same class. This re-cognition, continues Sankara, does not follow from the knowledge of a class; it is individual letters that are comprehended each time. Again, we accustomed to hold the form though it consists of three distinct letters, as one word. How is it, then, possible to have such a cognition of oneness when its component parts are far from being one? Having attributed the diversified character of one and the same letter to the difference of sound, he proceeds to say that sometimes many things form the subject of one intellection, as many trees, for instance, are denoted by one word 'forest' (Vana). At last Sankara sums up the arguments on both sides. viz., Varņavāda and Sphotavāda, and after a minute examination of facts arrives at the conclusion that the view maintained by the Varnavādins 2 is simpler and appeals more to reason and experience, while that of the Sphotavadins is vitiated by prolixity and involves far-fetched

¹ श्रनेकस्याप्येकवुद्धिविषयत्वम्।

² वर्णवादिनी लघीयसी कल्पना, स्कीटवादिनस्तु दृष्ट्रहानिरदृष्टकल्पना च वर्णांश्रेने क्रमीण ग्रह्ममाणाः स्कोटं व्यक्षयन्तीति स स्कोटोऽघं व्यनक्तीति गरीयसी कल्पना स्वात—Sabkara-Bhägya.

speculations. To hold, he observes, letters, as they are comprehended one after another, to be indicative of *Sphota*, which is said to signify the intended sense, is to take a superfluous view of the whole problem.

According to the Nyava-Vaisesika point of view, sound is a quality of ether, comprehended by the organ of hearing, and has only a momentary existence. It is of two kinds-(1) sound as represented by letters like kg. ctc.: (2) sound as produced by heat of drum and blowing of conches and the like. The former, viz., and-जसप्रान्द, is alone significant and is generally used as a medium for communicating the ideas. Prasastapada, the well-known commentator on the Vaisesika-Sūtras, has attempted to show how words are produced. The view of this commentator regarding the origin of sound_is almost the same as is to be found in treatises on Sikene A desire is first felt within, the author says, hy the conjunction of the mind with the soul, for the utterance of sound (in order to give oxpression to the thoughts rising in the mind); then efforts are made which bring about a movement in the region of internal air. Thus moved by causes from within, the internal air proceeds unwards till it comes in contact with the vocal apparatus. This conjunction which is followed by vibrations in ether gives rise to sound that is destroyed as soon as it is uttered. A word is, therefore, Kārya, as opposed to Nitya. The Naiyāyikas as well as the Vaisesikas have thus taken a non-eternal view of Sabda differing from the grammarians who assume a permanent form of Sabda, as is represented by Sphota.

In his annotation on the Bhāṣya, Śrīdhara 1 has made an attempt to show the absence of logic in the grammatical conception of Sphota. He first raises the question whether meaning is expressed by a sentence or by Sphota. If a word is nothing but a collection of letters, holds the Sphotavādins, and a sentence not at all distinct from its component parts, then there be no comprehension of the meaning whatso-For neither individual letter is competent convey the entire meaning (as it would render other letters simply redundant), nor is a combination practically possible, as all letters cannot be pronounced simultaneously. The author meets this objection by holding, for argument's sake, that letters are eternal and not transitory, as in that case such an aggregate would not be incomprehensible. But this argument cannot stand for obvious reasons. It is further argued by the opponent that letters are perceived one after another and then impressions are produced in the mind. This is also untenable. For, if there is order in recollections, as shown above, there would be no co-existence of sounds to form an aggregation. As the comprehension of the meaning is otherwise impossible, the Sphotavādins have been led to acknowledge

Nyāya-kandalī (Śrīdhara) — Sk., p. 267.

the existence of Sphola, as what expresses the meaning. But such an assumption has no justification to a rationalist philosophor like Sridhara. The following arguments, among others, are sought by Sridhara to refute the existence of Sphola: Sphola is nover directly percoived, but falsely assumed by the grammarians; the denotation lies within the word and not with an imperceptible entity as Sphola. To assume Sphola, as distinct from letters, is as fallacious as to conceive a 'flower in the sky.'

Before bringing this topic to a close, we have one word more. Censidering what has been said about the doctrine of Sphota by different schools of Indian philosophy, it is sufficiently clear that the main contention raised against Sphota is based upon the fact that the assumption of Sphota is contrary to all perception and involves far-fetched speculations. Having taken their stand on the facts established by direct perception, the opponents of Sphotavada seem to have carried the popular view in their favour. But it would be a positive mistake to suppose that what the Sphotavadins tried to establish is nothing but fanciful. It cannot be, however, denied that the Sphotavadins made no secret as to the imperceptibility of Sphota by ordinary means. Moreover, it is repeatedly pointed out

Nyāya-Kandali (Śridhara), piz., Sk, series, गुद्यये संस्कारनिद्यदम् —pp. 269 270. तदेवं वर्षेश्व एव संस्कारदारियाधैप्रवयसभ्यवादयुका स्तोटकव्यना। गननक्रसस्थिय स्तोटकव्यना न युक्ता।

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that the realisation of Sphota requires a good deal of spiritual meditation as well as perfect concentration of mind. As it is not logically correct to take anything to be unreal, simply because it is not directly perceived, we do not find sufficient reason to deny the very existence of Sphota which, though imperceptible, is said to be manifested by sound. Sphota, to speak the truth, bears comparison with the soul, as both of them come under our cognition through the instrumentality of inference, the former being indicated by sound and the latter by volition, effort, pleasure, pain, etc. As to the other side of the contention, we should say that the upholders of Sphotavāda minutely examined all external aspects of words before they could grasp so subtle an entity as Sphota by unfolding the psychological phenomena underlying the origin of sound.

To summarise what we have said Sphota: Sphota is the same as Sabda-Brahman Brahman revealed in the form of $V\bar{a}k$. Sphota represents the internal aspect Pranava; it is eternal and cannot be divided into parts (akhanda) and expressiveness lies with Sphota and $V\bar{a}cakat\bar{a}$ with not Padas, isolated from the akhanda-vākya—the indivisible unit of speech. That there is no essential difference between Sphota and Pranava has been clearly stated by the ancient seers. Nāda 1 or primordial sound is said to have first

समाहितात्मनी ब्रह्मन् ब्रह्मणः परमेष्ठिनः।
 ह्याकाशादभुद्रादो ब्रितिरोधाद्विभाव्यते॥—Laghumañjūṣā, p. 389.

originated in the spatial region of the heart (hrduākāša) of Brahman when he was deeply This subtle form absorbed in meditation of sound is expable of being perceived by shutting the auditory passage of the ears Out of Nada arose Omhara, the solf-radiant. creative factor, which is regarded as the positive symbol of the supreme Being Viewed from the standpoint of Yoga, Sphota, Pranava and Pratibha are almost the same. The internal aspect of $V\bar{a}h$. as is represented by Para and Pasuanti, is inseparable from est-sakts, the fountain source of all cognitions Pranava or Pratibha, as we may call it, has its permanent scat in the heart of all sentient beings, its fourth part is what is known as ardhamatiā or Sphota 1 Further, it is held that Sphota which serves to manifest Vak is heard by the supreme Soul (Paramatman). when the sense-organs lie inactive in a state of sleep 2 Both Sabda and Artha are in reality the manifestation of one and the same Soul .* it is only to the grammarian that one gets the designation of Vacala and the other as Vacya Pratibha or intelligence is shaped by Sabda and Artha The inseparable connection in which Sabda stands to Artha also points to their origination from the same source, ie.

¹ सोऽछ प्राणिमात्रस्य छत्न्य प्रषवन्तुरीयायोऽधनात्रादणे नादो वा स्कीट इ.सुचाते।—Laghumanjusa p 890

ग्रंगीत य इस स्कीट सुत्ते श्रीने च ग्लाहक् 1—16d p 391 एकस्थेनाक्षानो भेदी गन्दार्थानप्रकस्थितौ 1—16kyapadıya, 2 31

Buddhi. Durga makes this point clear when he continues to say that Buddhi (Pratibhā) residing in the heart of all in the form of knowledge (abhidhāna) and knowable (abhidheya) gets materialised into Sabda and Artha respectively. 1 Again, it is said that what is denoted by all sentences is nothing but Pratibhā (Pratibhā eva vākyārthah). According to Bhartrhari, it is mahāsattā or mahāsāmānya (ultimate reality) that is really denoted by all Sabdas. It is one and without any division (vibhāga) and order (krama). To him who has not attained that spiritual vision which enables one to visualise the all-pervading reality, this mahā-sattā falsely appears to be manifold, as the objects possessing it are diversified in their external outlook. Sphota is identified with this mahā-sattā. Sphoṭa is the ultimate germ of all word-forms (Sa hi sarvaśabdārthaprakṛtiķ); words may differ from one another, so far as their external aspect is concerned, but the internal or intellectual one (Sphota) remains the same. The Vaiyākaraņas used to look upon Śabda as the audible manifestation of Brahman and advocated constant meditation on Sabda or Sabda-Brahman as a regular form of Yoga that ultimately leads to the emancipation of the Soul (param Brahmādhigamyate).

The standpoint wherefrom the grammarians have viewed the ultimate germ of all

¹ गरीरे छिभिधानाभिधेयच्पा बुद्धिर्द्धे दयान्तर्गतानागप्रतिष्ठिता......
Nirulta, p. 47.

speech-sounds is materially different from those of Śaukara, Kumārila, Śrīdhara and others. To the grammarians, Sphota is sacred and divine, so much so that it is finally identified with Brahman. Notwithstanding all adverso criticisms that have been heaped upon the assumption of an intellectual phenomenon as Sphota, the theory of Sphota, will continue to survive as embodying the most reasonable and scientific interpretation about the origin of sound.

CHAPTER V

SENTENCE AND PARTS OF SPEECH

Sentence—its decomposition—Parts of Speech—Prakṛti and Pratyaya—Upasarga and Nipāta.

In accordance with the strict interpretation of the doctrine of Sphota, as we have observed, the analytical method, though adopted by the grammarians as a cardinal principle, is liable to be regarded as purely artificial. But there is no denying the fact that the grammarians had no other alternative than to take up this process of dissolving sentences and words into their constituent elements, as the only means of getting into the meaning of words. Grammar is not a creation of fancy, nor an artificial combination of rules. Grammar is rather a popular science; the principles on which the structure of grammatical generalisations stand more or less drawn from popular experiences. That a special rule becomes applicable in preference to a general one,1 Patañjali observes, is a fact that is neither enjoined by a divine authority nor sanctioned by the authors

[े] नैवेश्वर श्राज्ञापयित नापि धर्मस्वकाराः पठन्यपवादैकत्सर्गा वाध्यनामिति। किं तिर्हे ? लौकिकोऽयं दृष्टान्तः। लोकेऽपि सत्यपि संभवे वाधनं भवति। Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pār., 1. 1. 47.

of the religious texts, but it is a popular example which is perfectly coasistent with our daily experience Both Kātyāyana¹ and Patañjali have repeatedly drawn our attention to the most important point that the study of grammar has for its object the discrimination of correct words. Though corrupt forms are found to be as expressive of sense as their corresponding correct words, it has been stated with all possible emphasis and caracstness that the use of correct words in conformity with the rules of grammar is alone attended with religious felicity.².

Though there are eight different varioties of Sphota, as we have already pointed out, it is the Vākya-Sphota alone that is held to be real, the rest being more or less artificial. Trom the standpoint of Sphota, Vākya is not divisible inte parts and is the really significant element of speech. Bhartrhari has the following: Just as an unreal process like that of analysing words into stems and suffixes is also resorted to for the knowledge of unintelligent people, so a Vākya

¹ साधनुवासनीऽसिन् यस विभागा तथ साधुलम् :---Var under the rule Pan . 1 1 44

लीकतीऽप्रमुक्ते जन्दवयोगि गान्नेण धर्मनियम ।—Var 1 गान्तपूर्वने प्रयोगिऽस्यदयन्तम् त्व वेदमन्देन ।—Var. 8

समानायामधैगती मन्देन चापमन्देन च धर्मनियम क्रियते 1-

Mahabhasya, Vol I, p 8.

³ वाकासीटीऽतिनिक्वये तिष्ठतीति सतस्यिति ,-- Valyakaranabbuşana,

 $^{^{4}}$ यथा परे विभव्यने प्रकृतिप्रवयास्य । पपोडारक्तया वाको परानासुपवर्णते । Vakyapadiya 2 10 and पपोर्थस्थेव बाक्येम्य प्रकृतिप्रव्यास्वित्।—Ibid, Kar 3 1.

is broken-up into *Padas* by the grammarians with a view to get into the meaning of words. This *Apoddhāra* or decomposition is the first and foremost business of grammar.

There is much divergence of views regarding the precise nature of a $\nabla \bar{a}kya$. Bhartrhari has stated as many as eight different views of the ancient grammarians in regard to the constitution of a Vākya.1 These views are summarised as follows:—A $V\bar{a}kya$ is (1) a verbal form; (2) a collection of words; (3) a class; (4) one and individual; (5) an order; (6) an intellectual assimilation; (7) the first Pada; (8) all Padas differing from one another but having mutual expectancy. Of these only 3, 4 and 6, i.e., class, one and indivisible and intellectual assimilation of meanings are accepted as proper definition of a $\nabla \bar{a} k y a$ by those who maintain the indivisibility of a Vākya. The rest, on the other hand, are supposed to form the accurate definition of Vakya from the standpoint of those who uphold the dissolvability of a Vākya (Padavādins). Again, the definitions of Vākya, as either order or collection of Padas, are compatible with the view of the Abhihitanvayavadins and those as, verbal form, the first Pada. Padas in their different aspects having mutual expectancy, are consistent with the view of the

¹ षाखातगव्द: सङ्घाती जाति: सङ्घातवर्तिनी। एकोऽनवयव: ग्रन्द: क्रमो दुद्धानुसंहति:। पदमादां पृथक्सर्वपदं साकाङ्क्षमित्यपि। वाकां प्रति सतिभिन्ना वहुधा न्यायवादिनाम्।—Vākyapadīya, 2. 1.-2.

Annitāhhidhānavādins. A' Vākva 1 is also defined as a combination of words having mutual proximity, expectancy and compatibility. These three characteristics form the mediate causes with regard to the comprehension of the meaning from a sentence. (1) Expectancy-An aggregate of words that are not mutually expectant fails to give a connected idea; as, for instance, no consistent meaning is cognisable from such an unconnected group of words, as गीराब: पर्पो हस्ती and घटकर्मत्वामनयनं कति: and so on. (2) Proximity implies that words that are uttered at intervals connot have any inter-relation amongst them so as to constitute a eignificant sentence. (3) Competency means that we cannot construct a sentonce out of words the meanings of which are mutually incompatible (as in বহিনা ধিস্থবি). Jagadīśa 2 is not, however, prepared to take these three as direct causes, so far as Sābda-bodha or verbal cognition is concerned, because they would tend to place Sabdabodha under the category of inference. The Naiyāyikas have, therefore, taken them to be Sahakārī (conditions). as opposed to direct causes. Expectancy refers

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¹ वार्क स्वार योग्यताकाहाचित्रपुकः पदोष्ठयः 1—8. Darpaņa. निष्यः साकाहरुग्यः व्यूष्ठो वार्त्यः चतुर्विषम् 1—Jagadišo—Sabdošoktiprakāsikā. Kör. 12.

¹ लिइ जले कान्वयनुष्ठेरनुमितिलसिइ विनायका लिइ जलमेव प्रास्तिय: खक्यपित |—योग्यतार्थगताकाङ्गा प्रान्दिन्छानुमाविका। प्रत्येकं वा मिलिला वा नेति लिइमसिडित: n—8abdasaktı. Kår. 4.

to the physical side (মহুনিছা), whereas competency is to be understood as pertaining to the logical side of Śabda (মুখনিয়া). We generally find that verbal expectancy is satisfied by words alone.1 But what is logically correct is that expectancy is also connected with the meaning and not with the form alone, and consequently the expression पदंसाकाइम् means Pada that is indicative of the meaning having mutual expectancy with that of another. It is sufficiently clear from what Patanjali has said regarding the interpretation of vyapeksā that expectancy really pertains to meanings that are reciprocally expectant. Similarly, competency, as a Sahakāri-kāraņa, is also to be understood as related to the meaning. As the cognition of import (तात्पर्ध) alone cannot produce Sābdabodha independently of expectancy, etc., Gangeśa recognises the necessity of their help for obtaining the so-called verbal cognition. Proximity,2 strictly speaking, is not a cause, it may be so with an unintelligent man, as it tends to help his quick understanding, but in the case of an intelligent man, proximity is not unavoidably necessary for his cognition. Import is also recognised to be the meaning of a sentence. Gangesa 3 states clearly that

ग्राच्दी छानाङ्गा गव्देनेव गृगति ।

³ श्रामि: प्रान्दवीधे न कारणम् । सन्द्रधाविलस्वे न वोधे कारणम्, श्रमन्दस्य तु श्रामनाभावेऽपि वोधो भवतीत्वर्थः ।—Manjūsa, Kunjika Tika.

^{ैं} तात्पर्याधीनं शन्द्रामाण्यम् ।—Tattvacintāmaņi, p. 316. (Sabda-kbaņāa.)

the cognition of import is a necessary condition in the matter of verbal knowledge. sentence is uttored by the speaker with the explicit desire of expressing this sense "-is the way in which Tainarna is generally obtained. But Nagesa differs from the Najvavikas and does not take import us an unavoidable condition for the comprehension of भारताई, inasmuch as the meaning of a sentence is also cognisable oven without any reference to the particular import of the speaker. The cognition of import is essential in the case of those words which have more than one meaning, as हिन, मैन्यव, etc. Nagesa, however, maintains on the authority of the Mahabhasva that it is the knowledge of context (Prakarana), propriety and the like that helps us in determining the particular import of a word when it happens to have more than one meaning.

The author of the Varttika 2 defines Vakua as a verbal form having conjunction with either an indeclinable, a Kūraka, or an adverb. i.e., a verhal form constitutes a scutence in combination with the above adjuncts. Some say,3 as Pataniali observes, that a verbal form with its adjuncts is sufficient to constitute a sentence. It is further suggested that a verbal form alone 4

इदं वाकामेतदर्धप्रतीतीष्ट्या दक्षीचारितम 1-Manjues, p. 524.

^{&#}x27; शास्त्रातं साव्यवकारकविशेवणं वाकास |-Var. 9 under the rule Pan.. 2, 1, 1

अपर बाह-चाद्यातं सविशेषश्रमत्वेष ।-- Ibid.

एकतिङ वाकाम।~Ibid.

is competent to constitute a $V\bar{a}kya$. definitions have made it perfectly clear that a verbal form is the main constituent of a sentence. If we take a verbal form as what constitutes sentence, the meaning of a Vākya will necessarily be Kriyā or action (Kriyā vākyārthaḥ). A sentence, in the grammatical sense of the be framed without term, cannot Jagadīśa does not, however, lend his support to this view. He maintains, on the contrary, that a $V\bar{a}kya$ is a combination of mutually expectant words and does not insist on the presence of a verbal form as the first and foremost condition of a Vākya.1 A verbal form does not, therefore, occupy an important place Jagadīśa's conception of Vākya. contention is based on the fact that when a combination of words like कुतो भवान, which does not contain any verbal form, is also found to be clearly expressive of the sense, it is not strictly correct to hold that a Vākya without a verb is practically incomprehensible. The grammarians hold the opposite view. According to them, a sentence is not at all possible without a verb. What the soul is to the body, so is the verb to the sentence. Jagadīśa has also rejected Amar Simha's definition of $V\bar{a}kya$, 2— Vākya is a combination of words ending in sup and tin'-since it is over-lapping as well as incomplete

[े] क्रियारहितं न वाकामसीत्यादिकासु प्राचां प्रवादो निर्शुत्तिकत्वादश्रहेय:।
——Sabdasaktiprakāsikā, Kār. 13

² सुप्तिङन्तचयो नैवमतिव्याप्तग्रादिदोषत: ।—Sabdasakti. Kār. 13.

or open to the fallaoies of Ativyāpti and Avyāpti. It is to be particularly noticed that with the Naiyāyikas the form ghatam is nothing short of a Vākya, hecause it is expressive of the sense घटहत्तिकर्मत्वम. The way in which Jagadiśa has defined Samasa makes it clear that the form nīlam is as good as a Vākya and the form nīlotpalam is, consequently, a Mahā-vākya. The grammarians cannot do away with the verh, so far as the cognition of a sentence is concerned. As no complete and consistent sense is comprehensible without a verb, the grammarians, as a rule, understand such forms as asti and bhavati in those cases where verbal forms are not actually present. To the grammarians, the expression जुती भवान necessarily implies such a verbal form as agacchati without which neither is the sense complete, nor the proper Karaka (Apādāna) determinable.

It is also a difficult problem to decide what is actually denoted by a $V\bar{a}kya$. There is a great difference of views regarding the meaning of a $V\bar{a}kya$. Some hold that the meaning of a sentence is the same as what is denoted by its component parts; others maintain that a sentence is expressive of the sense that is virtually different from those that are expressed by its constituents, either individually or collectively. Kumārila has thoroughly discussed these two contradictory views in the $V\bar{a}ky\bar{a}dhlkarana$ of his Sloka-Vārttika. The doctrine of the eternality of both Sabda and

its relation to meaning, though so seriously supported by the Mīmāmsakas in the face of much adverse opposition, was not considered to be sufficient to prove the authoritativeness of the Vedas. The validity of the Vedic injunctions, which have come down to us the form of sentences, was questioned by the opponents on the ground that the meaning of a sentence is distinct from those of its constituents. The Mīmāmsakas meet this argument by holding that a sentence is practically a combination of consistent words and denotes exactly what is expressed by each word, i. e., the meaning of a sentence represents only a sum-total of the meanings of its constituent parts. are, so to speak, two views, as held by the two distinct schools of Mimāmsā systems, viz., Bhatta and Guru, in regard to the meaning of a $V\bar{a}kya$: (1) Abhihitānvayavāda 1—It means, as is implied by the very expression, that Anvaya or correlation the meanings,2 as expressed by between words through their respective conventions, is what constitutes the significance of a Vākya. The special import (विलच्यो बोध:) that is usually brought about by the particular connection of meanings and which does not practically follow from any constituent, is, according to this view,

तात्पर्याचौंऽपि चाकार्ध इत्यभिष्ठितान्वयवादिनां सतम् । वाच्य एव वाकार्यः इत्यन्तितानिभानवादिनः ।—Kāvyaprakāśa, p. 27.

गान्दबोध भैकपदार्थेऽपरपदार्थेन्य सन्वन्धः संसर्गमर्थादया भासते।

also supposed to be implied by the Padas themselves. What is exactly meant is that the signi ficance of a Vākya is the same as is denoted by Padas making up a sentence: and (2) Anvitāhhidhananada-According to this view. Padas are first related to one another in a sentence before they can express the consistent meanings, that is to say, the usual meaning is obtained from the particular connection of Padas. The grammarians not only tried to prove the indivisibility of a Pakua, but also attributed the same property to the meaning of a Vakya. Just as there are no parts in a Vākya, saye Bhartrhari, so there is one division, so far as the eignification of a Vākua is concerned. Some hold that the sense expressed by a Vakua is grant.2 To those who. like the Sphotavādins, maintain the indivisibility of a Vākya, the meaning expressed by a Vākya is nothing but Pratibha or intuition. It has already heen pointed out that the internal consciousness (caitanya) reveals itself through the medium of Sabda and gets the designation of abhidheya. Bhartrhari has identified Pratibhā with the mahā-sattā that pervades the whole world of cognition. Though one and indivisible, Bhartrhari continues, it appears to he manifold owing to the diversified character

[े] यस्य न विभागोर्शत छुतीऽर्थम्य सविष्यति।—Vākyapadiya. इति वाकार्थमापि निर्वेभागतं प्रतिपादयति।—Punyarāja

विच्छेदग्रहणेऽयोनां प्रतिभान्तेव आसते। वाकार्यं इति तामाडुः।

⁻⁻ Vākya., 13

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and the Vākyavādins hold respectively Padas and Vākya, as expressive of the sense. The Padavādins, in opposition to the other, take Padas to be the only real elements of speech, and consider an indivisible unit like Vākya as praetically incomprehensible. This view does not carry much weight to the grammarians. The falsity of Padas (they are made by the grammarians), is clearly brought to light by Punyarāja on the strength of an extract from the Mahābhāṣya, where the term Padakūra' (one who makes Padas) has been used as a designation of the grammarian.

All words, as a rulo, consist of two parts—
Prakṛti and Pratyaya. Prakṛti is, again, dividod
into two classes, namoly, Nāman and Dhātu.
The analysis of words into their bases and
suffixes is grammatically known as Saṃskāra;
it forms, so to speak, the cardinal principle
of Sanskrit grammar. We propose to show
the nature of Prakṛti and Pratyaya before
proceeding to consider the characteristics of
Padas that go to constitute a sentence.

Whatever may be the intrinsic value of Sphotavūda from a psychological stand-point, it cannot be denied that the assumption of an indivisible unit as Sphota is materially inconsistent with the fundamental principles of grammar.

⁹ निकाला प्रजासिक्षा नामधातुप्रभिदसः I—Sabdasakuprakasuka, Kar. 14.

[े] न लचलेन पदकारा पत्रकारी पदकारिनांम लचलमतृतस्त्र । यहान्यकं पदं कर्तेयम् |---Under the role पापितः स्ता, Pan., 6. 1. 207

Making all words disassociated from a sentence simply unreal and meaningless and giving a stamp of falsity to the whole grammatical method of analysing words into their stems and suffixes, the doctrine of *Sphota* is calculated to have shaken the very basis of grammatical speculations. There may be reasons for accepting this doctrine inspite of its rigidity and apparent disagreement with the established method of grammar, but we must frankly admit that the principle of analysis, as adopted by the grammarians, is the only scientific means for getting into the meaning of words.

Turning to the question of analysis of words, it must be stated at the outset that all words or, more properly, Padas, consist of two parts, viz., Prakṛti and Pratyaya, though such decomposition is not always possible in the case of the so-called underivable Prātipadikas generally coming under the uṇādi class. Yāska too has referred to two classes of words, namely, words of which both accents and formative elements are popularly known 2 and words whereof these elements are not directly comprehensible 3 by the usual method of grammatical analysis. The analytical process involved in such grammatical device forms the most important

¹ उपाय: जिन्नमाणानां वालानामपलालना:। श्रसत्ये वर्त्मान स्थिता तत: सत्यं समीहते॥—Vākyapadīya, 2. 240.

^{*} समर्वसदमंस्तार: I-Nirukta, p. 154.

[ै] भग्मर्यखरमंस्तार: |-Ibid.

function of grammar and is almost the same as adopted by the etymologists (Nairuktas) for the determination of the meaning of words. This analysis which is popularly known as $Samsk\bar{a}ra$ is the criterion whereby the grammarians distinguished the words of pure Sanskrit origin from corrupt forms (Apabhramsas).

Prakrti, as the vory term implies, is the ultimate germ of speech to which fermative elements (Pratyaya) are added for the evolution of regular forms of words. An attempt te find out two distinct elements (Prakrti and Pratyaya) in a word that dees not essentially admit of any division, on account of its unity and indivisibility, is merc or less fanciful, though not altogether useless, since it holps the understanding of meanings. Bhartrhari defines Prakrti as that form of a werd which, for the purpose of its own signification being qualified by that ef the other, stands in need of certain forms immediately following it. Of these two mutually expectant forms, the former is called Prakrii and the latter as Pratyaya. Pratyaya, as Umāpati2 observes, is said to be, on the other hand, that form of a word the meaning of which cannot be shown to have any relation with that of the other without being conditioned by the significance of the word to which it is added.

[े] यः श्रेतरस्य यसार्षे सार्पन्यान्यक्षेभने । यदपेनसयोः पूर्वा प्रकृतिः प्रत्ययः परः ॥—Sabdafakti under kar. 9.

व सेतरार्थानविक्त्रस्वार्थसान्यवीधने। श्रीरंशमथ: धैपप्रब्द: प्रत्ययोद्धं चतुर्विष: ॥—Ibid.

Jagadīśa has, however, rejected both these definitions as insufficient. He takes both Prakrti1 and Pratyaya to be significant by themselves (Sārthaka), but does not fail to notice their mutual dependence. The relation in which Prakrti stands to Pratyaya is one of interdependence, for neither of them is individually competent to express its own meaning, without having invariable association with the other. On the ground of such mutual dependence, it is contended that these elements taken individually have no particular signification of their own. As a matter of fact, if they had meanings, when taken individually, each of them might have been used independently of the other.2 But it is far from being the case. No meaning is, strictly speaking, conveyed by the word gau when it is not associated with or followed by Pratyaya. Moreover, Prakrti3 and Pratyaya being connected with each other by inseparable relation, it is not grammatically correct to use independently. Grammar does not sanction independent use of either Prakṛti or Pratyaya. This is the train of arguments whereby Patañjali seeks to establish that a word has no parts (such as Prakṛti and Pratyaya), because

¹ पट-पाचकाद्या: प्रक्षतय:, सुप्तिङाद्या: प्रत्यया: स्वीपस्थाप्यार्थस्य बोधं नियमत: थन्दान्तरं सहक्रत्य जनयन्ति ।—Śabdaśakti under Kārikā, 6

[ै] श्रधंवत्ता नोपपदाते नेवलिनावचनात् !—Vār. 7. Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 219.

[े] नित्यसन्बन्धावितावयौँ प्रकृति: प्रत्यय इति।—Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., 1. 2. 45.

meaning is conveyed by the word as nn indivisible whole.1 How, then, are we justified in discussing the menning of Prakrti and Pratyaya, no two distinct elements constituting a word? Here Patnajali takes recourse to the logical method of agreement and difference2 and clearly indicates how both Prakrli and Pratuava, as is evidenced by such forms as vrkşalı and vrksau, mny be shewn to have separate meanings of their own. The base that remnins almost unchanged denetes n thing having stem, brauches, leaves, fruits, etc., and the suffixes signifying respectively singularity and duality. In n group of homogeneous words, as in the above examples, we find that the stem remnins mere or less constant but suffixes are only variant, whereas in pacati and gacchati the suffix is the same, it is Prakrti that is only different. Sometimes the change of Pratyaya brings about a change in the meaning of words (as in harih and harah) derived from the same origin.

Bhartrhari has tried to show that the discrimination of Padas and the comprehension of their exact meanings are, strictly speaking, far from boing real. There is of course no fixed principle so as to precisely determine the

¹ ससुदायन्यार्वे प्रयोगाद्दयवानामप्रसिद्धिः ।—Mahābhāsya, Vol т. p. 219.

Mahabhanya under the rule Pan., 1. 2. 45

Bhartthan-ये मन्दा: नित्यसन्त्रमा विवेके जातगत्त्व:। पन्यव्यतिरेकार्था तेपामधी विभाग्यते ॥—Vākyapadlya, 2. 168.

meaning of Prakṛti and Pratyaya. We cannot 1 definitely say, 'this much is denoted by Prakṛti, and this is exactly the meaning of Pratyaya. In grammar,2 as a matter of fact, we meet with instances where the basic element does not sometimes actually exist, but its meaning usually denoted by Pratyaya (as in $iy\bar{a}n$) and sometimes Prakrti is found, on the contrary, to be expressive of the sense of Pratyaya (as in ahan). He continues further that in an instance like pacanti what is denoted (नर्त्व) by the two different suffixes (vikarana—भप् and নিভ) is generally expressed by one suffix (that is, तिप only) in the case of अति (where sap is necessarily dropped). As to the method followed by the grammarians, Bhartrhari rightly observes that there is rather an absence of fixed rules regarding the process of determining the significance of both Prakrti and Pratyaya,4 because systems of grammar have no agreement amongst themselves so far as the meaning of Prakṛti and Pratyaya is concerned. The systems

¹ नंतु यदा शन्दा नित्यसम्बन्धा विविद्येन ज्ञातशक्तय: खार्थस्य प्रतीतौ तदा कथमेतदवगतमयं प्रकालयधींऽयं प्रत्यवार्थ द्रत्याशङ्कप्रापोद्धारस्थान्वयव्यतिरिकौ निमित्तमिति।—Punyarāja under the Vākya., kār., 2. 167.

² शास्त्रे कचित् प्रक्रत्यर्थ: प्रत्ययेनाभिधीयते। प्रक्रतौ विनिहत्तायां प्रत्ययायय धातुभि: ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2. 231.

उ यमधेमाहतुर्भिन्नी प्रत्ययावेक एव तम्। कचिदाह पचलीति धातुस्ताभ्यां विणा कचित॥—Vākyapadīya, 2. 232.

^{*} नास्रोव नैयत्यं पदपदार्थानाम्—अन्वाख्यानसृती ये च प्रत्ययार्थानिवन्धनम् । निर्द्धिष्टार्थप्रक्षत्यथीः सृत्यन्तर उदाइताः॥ —Vakyapadiya, 2. 233.

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of grammar, though they practically deal with the same subject, are so variant from one another in respect of nomonelatures and the method of treatment that what are shown to be the meaning of Pratyaya in one system are taken to be the significance of Praketi in the other. Notwithstanding such examples, as shown above, we should carefully bear in mind that the meaning of a word is really expressed by both Praketi and Pratyaya in their natural but grammatical combination.

Though different views are hold as to tho significance of Nipātas, there is, however, no divergence regarding the expressioness of Prairts and Praisage The two well-known divisions of Piakrti, namely. Dhatu and Pratinadika, have their meanings fixed by popular usages. Patanjah prefers to designate Prakrit as nimitta in relation to Pratuava which is called nimitti What he intends to imply is that the meanings of Prakrii (as are to be found in the Dhatu-natha and Pratipadika-natha) are more or less known, whereas those of Pratvava are not exhaustively found. Though he unconditionally admits that the whole word (as an aggregate of both Prakrii and Pratyaya) is alone capable of denoting the sense, Patanjali shows clearly how by the application of the logical method of agreement and difference, Prakiti and Pratyaya, as in द्वाः and बची, may be distinctly specified as having their separate meanings. The terms Prakriz and Pratyaya are treated in grammar as two technical words—the shortest name for a class.1 The rule प्रत्ययः, Pān. 3. 1. 1, is explained by Patañjali as an adhikāra-sūtra denoting a Samjñā. He contends further that by virtue of adhikāra this samiñā may apply to Prakrti, Upapada, and Upādhi and consequently they may have all grammatical operations usually pertaining to Pratyaya.2 There arises, therefore, the necessity of making certain restrictions. Moreover, he explains the word Pratyaya in two ways,3 as what either expresses the meaning, or is comprehended. He proceeds to show how to distinguish Prakṛti from Pratyaya; 4 the former, it is said, is entirely comprehensible by the enumeration of roots and Prātipadikas, while the latter is not capable of being known exhaustively. There is another way also to bring out this distinction. Pratyaya is said to be more important (superior) than Prakrti,5 its superiority or importance being due to the fact that Pratyaya as a class is nowhere enumerated (as significant forms of speech) except in grammar. We should not fail to notice

¹ संज्ञा च नाम यतो न खघीय: ।—M. B., Vol. II, p. 3.

³ श्रिषकारिणेयं प्रत्ययसंज्ञा। सा प्रक्षत्युपपदीपाधीनामपि प्राप्नीति। Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., 3. 1. 1.

प्रताययतीति प्रत्ययः।...प्रत्यायते प्रत्यय इति। कर्षः साधनः कर्मसाधनस्य।

र्वं इह च प्रत्ययोऽनिर्ज्ञातः, प्रक्षतुर्रपपदोपाधयो निर्ज्ञाताः। क ? धातूपदिशे प्रातिपदिकोपदेशे च ।—Ibid.

⁶ प्रेषाने कार्यसंप्रत्ययाद्या सिद्धम् — Vār. 3. विक्च प्रधानं प्रत्यय: । — Ibid.

here that Pratuavas like sun and tin are not mentioned separately with their respective meanings, whereas roots and Pratinadikas (as two divisions of Prakets) are to be found respectively in the Dhatunatha and in the enuaciation of Pratinadikas This view which assigns greater impertance to Pratuaga is based on a Paribhāsā.1 The above explanation of Pratuqua may sorve the nurnese of excluding Prakets. Unanada and Unadhi from the extegory of Pratuava. but what still demands solution is to differentiate modification and augment (familian:) from Pratuava 2 as such. A careful study of the formation of words makes it sufficiently clear that modifications and augments (as they appertain to beth Prakett and Pratyaya) seem to have all the qualifications of Pratyaya, though they are not practically treated as such by the grammarians. The modification and augment might be included in the same class with Pratyaya, inasmuch as both of them are wanting in original enunciation prior to their treatment in grammar. It will not suffice to say, as Kaiyata' explicitly remarks, that

¹ प्रधानीप्रधानयो प्रधाने कार्यसम्बद्धः। कि च प्रधान मृत्ययः।—M B under the rule Pan . 3 1 1

विकारागमीयु च परिकालाम्—Vण 4 M B, Vol 11, p 2 प्रथय
 परो भवतीलाधने न च विकारागमा परे संभवति (—Ibid

वंपर स प्रयय न च विकासियमा परे। तिन तैया प्रव्ययस्त्रा न भविष्यतीलैव न व्याप्येयम्। न हि परलिनिमित्ता प्रव्ययस्त्रा, पिय तु प्रव्ययस्त्रानिमित्त परलम्। तथा च परलामायेदिय बहुनकर्षा प्रव्ययस्त्रा भवति। तथा दिव व्यविष्यति— प्रयोजनाभावान् विकासायमानां प्रव्ययस्त्रा न भवति। तथा हि परिभाग प्रवयस्त्रा स्वास्त्रत्ता। तथा हि परिभाग प्रवयस्त्रा स्वास्त्रत्ता ।

Pratyaya has its position fixed, viz., it comes invariably after Prakrti, while there is no such fixity of position with regard to modifications and augments. But what is grammatically sanctioned is that प्रत्यसंज्ञा does not really depend upon the posteriority of position, because bahuc and akac, inspite of their irregular positions, are also included within the category of Pratyaya. Again, forms like nibha, samkāśa, etc., though used after Prātipadikas in the sense of similarity, are not grammatically regarded as Pratyaya.1 It must be noted here that the suffixes like bahuc and akac form irregular instances, so far as the position of Pratyaya is concerned. The difference is then shown by a reference to the construction of the Sūtras. The Sūtras enjoining modifications and augments are generally found to have as what determines them, whereas Pratyaya is enjoined by the Sūtras containing पञ्चमी. There is another criterion to distinguish Pratyaya from both modifications and augments. Pratyaya, as the very term implies, is significant, though the so-called खार्थिकाप्रत्यय like ka forms an exception, viz., it has apparently no meaning apart from that of Prakrti to which it is added. The modifications and augments, on the other hand, have got no signification at all.

It is quite evident that a word, taken as an indivisible whole, is what expresses the intended sense. This is the conclusion Patanjali has

¹ तिङ्येख निभायन्य: स वा प्रत्यय उचाते ।—Sabdasakti, Kār. 10.

arrived at. If this be the general principle that regulates the use of words, bow can we logically say 'this much is the meaning of Prakrti,' 1 and 'this is the meaning of Pratyaya?' Patañjali meets this position by referring to the method of agreement and difference whereby the distinct meanings of both Prakrti and Pratuava are generally comprehended.

The question does not come to an end here. It is further argued that instead of assigning meanings to both Prakrti and Pratyaya, 'it is better to hold either Prakrti or Pratyaya alone as expressive of both the meanings; or Prakrti may be supposed to be the only significant form and Pratyaya only indicative (dyotaka). This is true, Patanjali observes, so far as Sāmānya-Sabda, viz., word denoting a class, is concerned. It must be remembered that without reference to either context or special sense, Sāmānya-Sabda, as a rule, cannot express the particular meaning. But when we say orksah, what we find is that a particular sense is naturally implied. We are, therefore, bound to admit that these are not Samūnya-Sabda. Now what deserves our attention is that in a word both Prakṛti and Pratyaya have their respective meanings consistently related to each

गत्र ज्ञत एतदर्थं प्रकलम्पींद्रथं प्रत्यसम्य इति ? न पुनः प्रकृतिरिवीभावभी व्यात प्रत्यस एव वा |-- Mahabhāşya under the rule Pan , 1. 2 45

सिंह त्वन्यव्यतिरेकाध्यास्।-- Vär. 9. Mahabhanya, Vol. I. p. 219.

other so as to express one indivisible sense. The base, as Patañjali has shown, and the suffix in the word vrksah means respectively (1) a material body containing roots, stem, branches, leaves, etc., and (2) oneness or singularity. Elsewhere it is said that oneness as well as karmatva, etc., are the meanings of the case-endings.¹

is another difficulty with regard to the meaning of Prakrti and Pratyaya. As systems of grammar have no agreement so far as the meaning of Prakṛti and Pratyaya is concerned, one finds it difficult to determine the meaning of them with a degree of certainty. What is said to be the meaning of a Pratyaya in one system of grammar is taken to be the meaning of Prakrti in the other. 2 This is why the Sphotavādins have rejected both Padas and Padarthas as unreal. There is nothing. Bhartrhari argues, as Pada fixed by its very form,3 and no meaning follows from a Pada, but from a sentence. A Pada, in its grammatical sense, has no real existence apart from the sentence of which it forms an integral part. How, then, are we to justify the principle of grammar which treats of such unreal things as Padas? Bhartrhari continues that Sastras

¹ एकलादयो विभक्तयर्षा:। सुपां कर्मादयोऽष्यर्षा:।—M. B., Vol.II, p. 58.

² ये किसंशिद व्याकरणे प्रत्ययाधिलेनीक्तासिऽन्यत प्रक्षत्यर्थलेनीक्ताः। तस्मात् पदपदार्थाद्यसत्यमेव। शास्त्रमप्यसद्भातृपादकमेव।—Mañjūṣā, p. 409.

³ न हि किञ्चित् पदं नाम रूपेण नियतं क्वचित्।—Vākyapadīya.

(grammar) by their diversified methods and procedures only serve to exhibit Avidya or false impressions.1 It must be, however, admitted that the method adopted by the grammarians in the analysis of words, whether real or unreal from the standpoint of Sphotarada, is not only scientifically perfect but immensely helpful to the beginner. Though dealing with words that are unreal and transient, the science of grammar, as we have already seen, does not fail to serve a very useful purpose. Just as one is liable to pass through many unreal phenomena in which he is born, before he reaches the final goal or reality, so the grammarian starts with a false appearance as Padas and is ultimately qualified te have a glance into the mystical element of Pak, we mean Sabda-Brahman, by unveiling the sereen of ignerance.2

Upasargas and Nipātas or Prepositions and Particles are, as we have seen, enumerated hy Yāska⁵ in the list of Parts of Speech. Their linguistic aspects, with reference to their pessibility of having been once used as regular forms of words, have been discussed in the Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus. Now we propose to deal with the grammatical side of the question. We do not find any difficulty in ascertaining the meaning of Nāmans and Dhātus, hut it

गास्तिव प्रक्रियाभिदैरविद्यैबीयवर्षाते ।—Ibid

[&]quot; चसले वर्णान स्थिता तत: सर्थ ससीहते ।—Vikya 2 239.

^{*} चलारि पदजातानि नामारवाते चौपसर्वनिपाताय।--Nirukta, I. 1.

Upasargas and Nipātas have the power of expressing the intended meaning in the strict sense of the term. To determine the precise significance of these two classes of parts of speech is a difficult problem over which the grammarians and the Naiyāyikas seem to have been conflicting.

The definition of *Upasarga*, as given by Sākatāyana, purports to show that Upasargas have 'no meanings when they are dissociated from verbal forms.2 What follows necessarily from this statement is that they are not significant by themselves. The view of such grammarian of revered memory seems to have received approval of Yaska and later grammarians. The indicativeness (dyōtakatva) of Upasargas, as opposed to their direct expressiveness (vācakatva); is clearly pointed out by Yāska³ when he lays down in agreement with the grammarians 4 that Upasargas are far from being expressive of sense, but serve only to qualify or specialise the meaning of Dhātus. Dhātus are said to be of various meanings. The meaning which we generally assign to Upasargas is really denoted by the root itself. The additional sense (as that of perfection in an instance like

^{&#}x27; चतुर्विधपदेष्वच हिनिधस्यार्थनिष्यः। क्रियते संग्रयीत्पत्ती नीपसर्ग-निपातयोः॥—Quoted by Durga.

[े] न निर्वेद्धा उपसर्गा श्रर्थान्निराष्ट्ररिति गाकटायन:।—Nirukta, 1. 3., p. 57.

[&]quot; नामाच्यातयोम्तु कर्मापसंयोगयोतका भवन्ति।—Ibid.

⁴ क्रियानिशेषक उपसर्ग:-Mahābhāşya, Vol. I, p. 256.

prabharati) which is usually assigned to Upasargas is said to be expressed by Dhatus themselves. Gargva on the other hand, emphatically supports the opposite view and clearly shews how various mennings are ofton expressed by Unasargas.1 It is no wonder that Gargya, whe is said to have assigned meanings to each individual letter that enters into the constitution of a word, would differ from the majority of the grammarians in making all Upasargas expressive of particular meanings. Whatever he the real value of Gargyn's argumeots, we cannot holp admitting that his standpoint, though finally rejected by the grammarians, is not absolutely unreasonable. The way io which bhavati differs from prabhavati and tisthati from pratisthate (stoppage of metieo and motion being respectively meant) in their respective meanings is calculated to show how roots like bhū and sthū in their pure and compounded ferms are distinctly different in respect of meaniogs. The method of agreement and difference, when applied to such eases, makes it sufficiently clear that the additional sense, as is obtained from the use of roots combined with Upasarga, is due to the presence of Upasarga, that is to say, the special meaning is directly implied by Upasargas. We meet with many instances of verbal forms to which the addition ef Upasargas materially changes the menning

चयावचा: पदाया भवनीति नाम्य: 1-Nirokia, 1 8, p 67.

of roots—a fact which may be adduced to confirm the position taken by Gārgya. This is the reason which led Gārgya and his followers to maintain the expressiveness of *Upasargas*.

Those who, on the contrary, advocate the indicativeness, argue in the following strain: Upasargas have no specific meanings of their own apart from those of roots to which they are added; the additional or special signification that is apparently given rise to by the presence of an Upasarga is, strictly speaking, denoted by the root itself. Upasar yas serve only as a symbol of indication. That Upasargas are merely suggestive and not expressive of sense illustrated by the expression डपाखेते हरिहरी. Upāsanā or worship cannot be taken as the sense of Upasarga (upa), for in that case there could be no passive voice in उपाद्येते, as the root ās is intransitive. Neither is it possible to consider a combination of anu and $bh\bar{u}$ root, because it is not so mentioned in the Dhātupātha; nor the process of reduplication and the addition of augment (a and \bar{a}) affect Upasargas at all. The verbal roots are said to have various meanings. Those that are given in the Dhātupātha are hot at all exhaustive, but in most of the cases they are simply indicatory. For the verbal form bhabati in 'यागात् खर्गी अवति' is found to imply production instead of denoting simply becoming. Thus, the meaning usually expressed by वीपसर्भधातु, such anubhavati, parābhavati, abhibhavati, etc., are all

capable of being denoted by the simple root bhu. What usoful purpose is, then, served by Upasargas, if they have nothing to signify? Their function, so to speak, is to manifest or give prominence to the latent meanings of roots (which are not ordinarily expressed when the root is simply used). The analogy of a lamp, as shown by Durga,1 is a well-conceived one, for it illustrates the part played by Upasargas in the comprehension of meanings. Just as certain properties (as height, length, etc.) belonging to a thing are rendered visible through the instrumentality of a lamp, and those properties, as a matter of fact, appertain to the thing itself and not to the lamp, even so the addition of Upasargas serves to bring out the meaning of roots. The particular sense, usually assigned to Upasargas, is essentially what is expressed by the root itself.

Patafijali² explains the *Upasarga* as what particularises the action; the verbal form *pacati*, for instance, implies the action, viz., cooking, and when *pra* is prefixed to it, it serves only to qualify the action, adding the special sense of perfection (प्रवर्ष:) to the meaning of the root. He did not, however, fail to notice that in instances like tisthati and pratisthate the addition of an *Upasarga* materially changes the meaning

कियाविशेषक उपस्तै: — Mahābhāsyo under Pāṇ., 1.3 1. प्रतीति किया गस्पते तो मी विशिष्ट ।

of the root. What follows from this is that it is the presence of pra that causes such changes in the meaning (e.g., 'stoppage of motion 'and 'motion'). The above is an instance in which there is apparent opposition between the meanings of Dhātu and Upasarga. The Kārikā, as quoted by Puņyarāja, clearly brings out the characteristics of Upasargas, as will be evident from the substance given below: Sometimes the so-called denotation of Upasargas, as in the above instance, seems to be in opposition with the meaning of Dhātus; some follow the meaning of the root without any disagreement, and some only serve to specialise the signification of the root. Having recourse to the theory that a verbal root admits of more than one meaning,2 Patañjali lays down clearly that Upasargas have no direct expressiveness (like Nāmans and Dhātus) and that their supposed meanings, as perfection, proximity are, strictly speaking, derivable from etc.. the root. Accordingly, tisthati alone (without having connection with any Upasarga) is capable of denoting both motion as well as stoppage of motion.3

Bhartrhari is not satisfied with the remark that *Upaṣargas* are only suggestive, but

रे धालर्षे वाधते कश्चित् कश्चित्तमनुवर्तते । तसेव विश्विनध्यन्य उपसर्गगति-स्त्रिधा॥

² वह्नर्था श्रपि धातवो भवन्ति (-M. B. under Pān., 1. 3. 1.

[ै] तिष्ठतिरेव व्रजिक्रियासाइ, तिष्ठतिरेव गतिक्रियाया निव्निम्।— $Mah\bar{a}bh\bar{a}$ sya under $P\bar{a}$ p., 1. 3. 1 $_{\rm E}$

has discussed all possible standpoints wherefrom Unasargas might be viowed. It is not sufficient, he holds,1 to take Upasargas only as suggestive, because some of them, as pra in pratisthate, scems to be quite good in expressing the sense. Again, when the special meaning is practically expressed by the root and Upasarga in their combination,2 it is not unlikely that Ilnasaraas also have their contribution. so far as the expression of the intended sonse is concerned. Thus, we find that Upasargas may be viewed from three different standpoints, namely, vācaka or expressive, dyotaka or suggestive and sahakari or auxiliary; these three correspond to the three classes, as shown in the Kārikā referred to above.

So far as grammatical operations are concerned, Dhātus are generally found to be categorically distinct from Upasargus. In the Dhātupātha mention is only made of roots and not of Upasargas. Again, the process of reduplication (dvirvacana) and the augment at (adagama) are functions that pertain to a Dhātu alone. Bhartrhari3 here supports the non-difference of verbal forms (abheda-paksa)

³ स वाचकी विशेषाणां सभवाद्गीतकोऽपि वा। शक्याधानाय धातीर्वा सहकारी प्रयुक्तत ॥--Vākyapadīya, 2 190

² धात्पसर्गी सम्युवेवायैविजीक शृत इति धातीरयाभिधाने सहकारिण स्पर्सर्गी: — Ponyaraja under Väkyapadiya, Kär. 2. 161.

[े] चडाटीना व्यवस्थाय प्रयक्तिन विकल्पनम।--Vakyapadiva. 2. p. 153. Punyaraja under it - अडहिनसम्बन्धाय देवलं धातवः प्रश्नपदिष्टा वस्ततः सोपसर्गादामेव धातुलम् ।

and maintains that $Dh\bar{a}tus$, though not capable of being differentiated from Upasargas, are separately mentioned only for the sake of reduplication and adagama, but they are virtually of the specific sense which is expressive sometimes assigned to Upasargas. By Dhātu we should, therefore, understand Dhātu with the necessary Upasarga (Sopasargānāmeva dhātutvam). This view is strengthened by the existence of such root as samgrām, which is inseparably united with (Upasarga) sam and gets both reduplication and adagama, as in asamgramayat and sisamgrāmayişate. The particular action, according to this view, is denoted by the combination of Dhātu and Upasarga. Their undifferentiated character is made clearer when Bhartrhari continues that it is the specialised action (Kriyā-viśeşa), as is signified by a Dhātu jointly with an Upasarga, that gets itself connected with a Kāraka.2 This is why the root $bh\bar{u}$, preceded by anu, becomes transitive and is capable of being used in the passive voice (karma-vācya) as anubhūyate.

There arises a considerable difficulty in deciding whether a root is first joined with an *Upasarga* and is afterwards associated with *Kārakas* or *vice versa*. The conjunction of

1

तया हि सङ्गामयते: सोपसभीहिधि: सृत:। क्रियाविशेषा: संघातै: प्रक्रस्यन्ते तथाविधा:॥

⁻Vākyapadiya, 2, p. 154.

² साधनेर्याति सम्बन्धं तथाभूतेव सा क्रिया।—Ibid.

Upasargas with roots is a question of grammatical importance. Under the rule Pan., 6, 1, 135, Patañjali has reforred to two Paribhāṣās: (i) a root is first joined with an Upasarga and then gets itself connected with Sādhana (Kāraka); (ii) a root is first added to a Sadhana and is noxt related to an Unasarga.1 The second Paribhāsā seems to be more acceptable on the ground that an Upasarga serves to specify the action that is accomplished by Sadhana. The action is not fully accomplished until it is related to a Kāi aka. Though more reasonable than the former, the second view is not ontirely free from objections. Those who lend support to the view, Patanjali holds, that a Dhatu is first connected with a Kāraka and thon with an Upasarga, will find some difficulty in explaining the transitive use of the root as in the expression upasuate guruh.2 It is really the presence of Upasargas like upa, anu and the like that accounts for such uses. Bhartrhari also has not totally discarded the first view, but has adduced a few arguments supporting the priority of relation between a Dhatu and an Upasarga. Tho drift of his arguments is as follows: -A Dhatu

पूर्व हि चातुरुपसर्गेष गुरुपते पदात् साधनेनीत। मैसल् सारम्। पूर्व धातुः साधनेन युग्यति पदाद्वसूर्गण् ।—Msbābhāsya, Vol. III, p. 93.

श्वी हि मनती पूर्वे घातु: साधनेन युव्धते परादुवधर्गेविति, तम पालते गुरुण वक्तमंत्र उपालते गुरुपित केन सक्तमंत्र: सात्।—Mabhabya, Vol. III, p. 9).

भातो: साधनशीयस्य भाविन: प्रक्रमाद यथा। धातुलं कर्मभावय तथान्य-दणि हम्मताम ॥—Vākyapadiya, 2. Kār. 186.

is so called because of its relation to a Kāraka. But how is it justifiable to get the designation as such $(Dh\bar{a}tu\text{-}samin\bar{a})$ before the action $(kriy\bar{a})$ is completed by actual connection with a Kāraka? The action (the meaning of a root) is not likely to be accomplished before it is related to a In order to justify Dhātu-samjñā Kāraka. in a similar case where the root gets itself first connected with an Upasarga before actually coming in touch with a Kāraka, we must beprepared to assume that even the possibility of having future relation to a Kārāka is considered to be sufficient to indicate the relation of Kriyā to Kārakas. This sort of assumption is not altogether unwarranted and rare in Sanskrit grammar. The rule Dhātoh karmanah samānakartīkādicchāyām vā is an instance where the expression Dhātoh karmanah is justified on the possibility of a root having future connection with the objective case (of the root is). The grammarians take it to be an established fact that roots admit of more than one meaning. The special meaning (as is supposed to be the denotation of Upasargas) is necessarily considered to be what is actually denoted by the root itself.

Having shown the three distinct classes of *Upasargas*, Bhartrhari proceeds to maintain the suggestiveness of *Upasargas* (*dyotakatva*) on the ground of logical inference.¹ The three views

 $^{^1}$ स्थादिभिः नेवलैर्धेच गमनादि तु गस्यते । तत्रानुमानाद्दिविधासञ्जर्मा प्रादि- रूचते ॥—Vakyapadiya, 2. 191.

in regard to the meaning of Upasargas are as follows: (1) Upasargas are only suggestive of the sense; (2) Upasargas are sometimes expressive of particular meanings; and (3) the root and Upasargas jointly express the sense. The conclusion to which Bhartrhari has finally come is that Upasargas are only suggestive of the sense. According to popular usage, it should be remembered, the form tisthati is always used to mean stoppage of motion and, consequently, tisthati alone (without pra) is found to be incapable of denoting 'movement.' Here arises the necessity of taking recourse to inference.1 It is to get rid of this anomalous position that the grammarians have sought to establish the dictum anekārthāh dhātavah, so as to render tisthati alone competent to express the sense of It is to be noted that the so-called suggestiveness of Upasargas can also be logically supported, Bhartrhari proceeds further to show how the method of logical inference called सामान्यतोदृष्ट lends support to both the suggestiveness of Upasargas as well as to the plurality of meanings of the verbal root.

Before concluding this discourse on *Upa-sargas*, we propose to give here the substance of what Gangesa has said in this connection. Quite in keeping with the grammarians, he begins with the statement that *Upasargas* are

[ू] धातुरनेकार्थ चपसर्गय योतक इलानुमानेन व्यवस्थायते।—Punyarāja, p. 158,

भात्य सामायतोहष्टेनातुमानेनानेकाथै: 1—Ibid.

only suggestive and not expressive of the sense independently of verbal forms. When we take Upasargas to be suggestive, what is necessarily implied is that they help us in understanding the specific sense of the root. But it may be argued on the contrary that Upasargas are, in accordance with the principle of agreement and difference,2 as good as significant forms of words like $N\bar{a}man$ and $Dh\bar{a}tu$, inasmuch as pra in prajayati gives the idea of perfection (prakarsa) and abhi in abhyāgacchati brings out the sense of 'proximity' and so on. Moreover, if the plurality of meanings on the part of roots is brought forward in support of the suggestiveness of Upasargas, they, it may be argued, might also be taken as possessing manifold meaning.3 To these contentions Gangesa gives his in the following way:-That admit of numerous meanings is accepted by all grammarians, but there is no such consensus of views so far as the meaning of Upasargas is concerned. The sense of perfection and proximity is also denoted by the root, Upasargas like pra and abhi being only तात्पर्यंग्राहक. expression तात्पर्यमाह्न, as applied to Upasargas, is

[े] उपस्मीस्त द्योतका न वाचका:। द्योतकालं च धातोरर्थविभिषे तात्पर्ध-ग्राहकालं तदुपसन्दानेन तत शक्तिर्वा — Tattvacintāmaņi — Sabdakhaņda, p. 854.

³ उपसर्गान्वथव्यतिरेकानुविधानात् पदान्तरवद्वापि शक्तः .—Tattvacintā-maṇi, p. 854.

⁵ धातोरिव तस्याप्यनिकार्थलात् ।—Ibid.

an indication that the Naiyayikas have recourse to laksanā' when they take jayati to be expressive of 'to be in a state of perfection.' Next, he draws a fine distinction botween Dhatu and Unasarya by holding that the root stha preceded by pra has the power of denoting movement, whereas pra (Upásarga) is net (śakta) expressive of the senso by itself but appears like an adjunct (śaktatāvacchedaka).2 That Upasargas are nowhore used as vācaka may be further proved with reference to an instance like vyatise 3 (where the radical element is dropped); it is not vi and ati that are to be regarded as expressive of the sense, but we are compelled to recall to mind the root which is really significant.

Thus the grammarians have agreement with the Naiyāyikas so far as the suggestiveness of Upasargas is concerned. That Upasargas have no power of expressing the sense like Naman and Dhatu is clear from the fact that we are not allowed to use भीमन: प्र: with the same breadth of meaning as is denoted by the expression श्रीभनः प्रकर्षः. Mercover, neither Upasaryas ner Nipātas are capable of being qualified by adjectives. It should be, however, remembered that the capacity for independent use is not the only criterion for discriminating tho

वृतिष्ठ । इत्यम विरोधिनचनया भावोर्गमनोपस्थितिः प्रमध्दस्तु सासपर्ययाद्वतः। -Tattvacintimani, p 856

प्रीधरम्यत्वेन गर्मने प्रतिरिति प्र मन्द म्यातावन्द्वेदको न यक्ष. 1-Ibid.

^{&#}x27;ब्यतिसे' दलादी लुप्त: खुवी धातुरेवावंप्रवाधक: 1-1bid, p 857.

expressiveness of words; for *Pratyayas*, though they are never used by themselves, are regarded to be expressive of sense. The rule Pāṇ., 1.4.93 may be cited as an indication of the meaninglessness of *Upasargas*.

What gave rise to much controversy 2 between the Naiyāyikas and the grammarians is the question of Nipātas. The ground of disagreement is that the Naiyāyikas seem to have drawn a specific line of demarcation between Upasargas and Nipātas. They included Nipātas in the category of sarthaka to the exclusion of Upasargas, whereas the grammarians have not made such whimsical distinction. Yāska4 has, however, shown that Nipātas have a good many meanings-similarity, collection, etc. According to the interpretation of grammar, Upasargas form only a special class of Nipātas having connection with the verb. As both of them belong to the same class of indeclinables, one is hardly justified to take Nipātas as expressive of sense and the other as merely suggestive. The so-called Nipātas only form a class of Avyayas. Words like pra and ca, which have no power of denoting a substance (dravya), are called

[े] घर्वनता नीपपदाते नेयलीनावचनात् ।—Mabābbāsya, Vol. I, 219 and प्रकृतिप्रत्यययोः सम्भूयार्थवीधनालनियमात्—Tattvacintāmaņi.

[ै] प्राद्यी योतकासारयस्तु वाचका इति न्यायमते स्थितं वैषस्यमयुक्तं युक्तिसास्यात्। —Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa.

महाति: प्रत्यवरीव निपातरीति स निषा—Sabdasaktiprakāsikā, Kār. 6.

^{*} उचावचेष्ववेषु निपतन्ति—Nirukta.

⁵ उपसर्गा: सियायोगे—Pān., 1. 4. 59.

Ninātas. The same reason 1 whereby the suggestiveness of Trasaraas is evidently established may be put forward to prove the equal suggestiveness of Nipātas, there being nothing to account for their differential treatment. The Naivāvikas recognise the expressiveness Nipātas for the following reasons: In instances like जनभगते. साचातक्रियते, चलंक्रियते, etc., the addition of Nipātas is attended with a special significance, as cannot be obtained from the simple root kr and bhū, Moreover, Nipātas like sāksāt, namah, etc., is found to have their respective meanings fixed by lexicon and popular usage. The grammarians refute this position. They hold, on the contrary, that the usual meanings expressed by anubhavati, sāksātkaroti, etc., i.c., feeling and interviewing, are really denoted by the roots (bhū and k_T), and Upasargas as well as Nipātas are only suggestive or नातपर्ययाहन. As a matter of fact, we might have used the expression without in the sense of a beautiful collection, if a Nipata like ca were really expressive of the meaning. As the word vrksah alone cannot give the idea of a collection (समञ्च्य), the Mimamsakas take the particle ca as expressive of collection. They do not recognise it to be merely suggestive. But the grammarians are not prepared to take Nipātas

¹ शीतका: प्राद्यो येन निपातायाद्यस्या-Vaiyakaranabhuşana, Kar. 12.

प्राद्यो श्रीतकाषादयन्त वाचका इति न्यायमते स्थितं ८क्तिमाम्बादिति 1-1bid.

as well as Upasargas as capable of expressing sense independently of Nāman and Dhātu. It is on the principle of Anvayavyatireka that the Mīmāmsakas have proceeded to maintain the expressiveness of Nipātas. Their arguments are open to criticism, since they have unduly attributed the significance to Nipālas. When the meaning (collection, etc.) is actually obtained from words other than Nipātas, the assumption of Sakti or significance is nothing but unnecessary, so far as the expressiveness of Nipatas is concerned. If we are allowed to have an assumption of this nature, the word Gangā might have denoted 'bank' (without the help of lakṣaṇā) by means of its primary significance or Sakti.

The negative particle na $(na\tilde{n})$ is also a Nipāta. Generally speaking, the particle nañ has got six meanings-similarity, non-existence, difference, smallness, imperfection, contradiction. But Kondabhatta has tried to show that the sense of imposition (त्रारोपितल) is also suggested by nañ. Accordingly, the word अत्राह्मण does not only mean 'a man other than a Brāhmin,' but one who pretends to be a Brāhmin² (say a Kṣatriya). Following the line of arguments of the Bhāṣya,3 Koṇḍabhaṭṭa has also suggested another view, according to which non-existence

¹ श्रारोपितलं नञ्-द्योत्यम—Vaiyākaraņa, Kār. 40.

One to whom the quality of a Brāhmin is falsely attributed.

⁸ अभावी वा तदर्थोंऽस्तु भाष्यस्य हि तदाश्यात्—Ibid, Kār. 41.

is the sense that is denoted by nan. The expression nivrttapadārthakah1 (as in the Bhāsya) is explained by him as implying the idea of 'nonexistence.' Nagesa, however, does not agree with Kondabhatta on this point. The negative particle appears to be either substantive or attributive in relation to its prativogin. असर्डेम (as a pronoun) is an instance where nañ is used as an adjective and the negative particle is used as a noun in a word like अस: meaning भिन:. Raghunātha Siromani s is of opinion that both reciprocal negation and negation of association are denoted by the negative particle.

Karmanravacanīva is also regarded as a class of Pada. Some grammarians, as Bhartrhari maintains. have treated of Karmapravacaniyas as a special class of Padas categorically distinct from Upasargas. According to this view, there are five different kinds of Padas including Karmapravacaniyas. Those who strictly support the four-fold classification of Padas,5 as enumerated by Yāska, are likely to argue that Karmapravacaniyas, often used as adjuncts to the relation between Kriyā and Kāraka or, simply

Mahabhanys on Pan., 2 2.6. बहापि तक्षि नज्-विशेषक: प्रयुक्तते।

यस्यामावः स प्रतियोगी (

संसर्गाभावीऽलीत्यामावय नजीऽर्थः।

⁻Siromani, Nan-Vāda, pp 1-10.

^{*} दिधा कैंगित पर भिन्नं चतुर्धा पश्चधापि वा |-- Väkyapadiya, 3. Kär. 1.

क्यांप्रवचनीयास्त क्रियाविशेषोपजनितसम्बन्धावक्तदेष्ट्रेतव इति सम्बन्धविशेष-- ,तनदारेण कियाविशेषप्रकाणना चपस्र स्वेबान्तभैवनौति चतुर्धेव पटम ।

⁻Helaraja under Vākyapadīya, 3. Kār. 1.

indicative of relation, deserve to be treated as Upasargas. There is hardly any justification for recognising them as a different class of Padas. In some cases Karmapravacanīyas like anu, prati and su exactly look like Upasargas, though they cannot be grammatically treated as such. So far as grammatical operations (specially the rules enjoining satva) are concerned, it is clearly laid down that the very name (samjñā) Karmapravocanīya is an indication that Karmapravacaniyas are excluded from the categories of both Gati and Upasarga.1 Karmapravacanīyas being thus categorically different from Upasargas, we are not allowed to have satva in examples like pari-siñcati and su-siktam.

Now what is a Karmapravacanīya? It is a class of words which is generally used as an adjunct to sambandha or relation between Kriyā and Kāraka.2 In grammar sambandha is usually denoted by Kriyā or action.3 In some cases, Kriyā 4 by its very nature gives rise to a kind of relation and then disappears without leaving any trace behind. The expression rājapuruṣaḥ, for instance, though apparently

¹ गल्पसर्भसंज्ञापवाद:—Bhaṭṭoji.

यस्वन्यस्य भेदका इति। सस्वन्यस्य सर्व्वः क्रियाकारकपूर्व्वको भवति। -Puņyarāja under Vākyapadīya, 2. 199.

³ तथा हि सर्व: सम्बन्ध: नियानत:-Helārāja.

तत्र क्वित् सम्बन्धं जनयिला क्रिया विनिवर्तते यथा राजपुरुष इति । हि राज: पुरुषोऽयं ; यसात् स राजा पुरुषं विभक्तिं, खतो भरणलचणा क्रियायथाययि-भावलच्यं सम्बन्धं जनयित्वा निहत्ता।—Punyarāja under Kār. 2. 199.

dovoid of any Kriyā or vorbal form, grammatically means there is a man who is supported by the king.' Hero the netion bharana (to support) which denotes a rolation between the king and his man as one of the supporter and the supported is no longer existent. In somo instances, on the other hand, Kriya-pada is practically prosont (as in matuh smarati) and there is no such difficulty in comprehending the intended relation. Logically speaking, a verbal form serves as a link between two concepts, i.e., establishes some sort of relation between them. Sambandha is thus shown to be a product of Kriyā. But there arises some difficulty with rogard to the knewledge of such sambandha, when the verbal form is not actually present. When the verbal form or Kriva-pada is practically absent,1 one may doubt whether the intended sambandha is really givon rise to by Krina or by other agents. In cases of doubt like this, says Panyaraja, Karmapravacaniyas serve to determine the proper relation. The main function of Karmapravacaulyas is thus to point out the particular relation donoted hy a Kriyā. The author of the Mahābhāsya takes the word Karmapravacaniya as a significant one (anvarthasamijna). Ho understands by Karmapravacaniyas those words that are

यदा क्रियापटं कवित यूपते, तदा क्रियानितोऽयं स्थादिति संदिए कर्म-प्रवचनीयेन तत तत्यां क्रियायां नियम्पते इति सम्बन्धितिग्रेष्टः कर्मप्रवचनीयेः, प्रवायते । -Punyaraja.

no longer expressive of $Kriy\bar{a}$, but indicate the relation given rise to by a $Kriy\bar{a}$, whether present or absent. The difference between Upasargas and $Karmapravacan\bar{\imath}yas$ is that the former directly indicates $Kriy\bar{a}$ or specifies the action denoted by a verbal root, whereas the latter only qualifies the particular relation given rise to by a $Kriy\bar{a}$.

What we have learnt from the foregoing discussion is that Karmapravacanīyas are not indicative (dyotaka) of Kriyā like Upasargas. But one may, however, argue 1 that the verbal form that is absent $(Kriy\bar{a}-pada)$, as we have already shown, is deducible from the use of Karmapravacanīya. According to this view, Karmapravacanīyas should be regarded as ākṣepaka, i.e., as what serve to derive by inference a Kriyā-pada that is not actually present. Bhartrhari 2 has set aside this argument by holding that words whereby such verbal forms are inferred are generally found to have case-terminations, but never designated as Karmapravacaniyas. The second case-ending in prādesam, as in prādesam vipacilikhati, is due to its connection with the word vi which practically suggests the act of measuring $(m\bar{a}na)$ and is only a shortened form of

भ्रत्र्ययमाणाया: क्रियाया श्राचिपका: कर्मप्रवचनीया: कलान्नाश्रीयन्त इत्याह।
---Punyaräja

² येन क्रियापदाचेप: स कारक-विभक्तिभि:। युज्यते विर्थेषा तप लिखावनुपसर्गता ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2, Kār. 202.

अत विशव्दी मानिक्रयाया श्राचिपकः । प्राद्देशं विमाय परिलिखतीत्यर्थावगते:॥
 —Punyarāja.

rimāya. Thus, we have deiliyā in prādetim as a case-tormination (Kāraka-ribhakti) and not one obtained in conjunction with a Karmaprara-canīya. Punyarāja further observes that deiliyā available in connection with Karmaprara-canīyas is generally found in cases where sasthi in the sense of sambandha in general would have been otherwise applicable. In some cases, a Karmaprara-canīya like anu becomes a har to the third case-ending denoting between cause.

From what has been said rogarding the

einracteristics of Karmapravacaniyas, it is almost clear that they are not indicative (dyotaka) of Kriyā like Uppsargas, not directly expressive of sambandha which is rather denoted by the second case-ending used in substitution of sasth and not suggestive of a verial form like the word vi, as in prādešam riparilikhati. Having thus rejected the three views, namely, indicativeness, denotativeness and suggestiveness of Karmapravacaniyas, Bhartrhari has finally arrived at the conclusion that Karmapravacaniyas are those that qualify the relation brought about by a Kriyā, whether present or absent.

খাংগাংগাথেট দাদা তুনীয়া ইনুস্থ্য :—Vākyapadiya, 2. 205. কিয়ায়া হাটকলী দায় দাস্থ্য শ্ৰাহক: 1

नापि क्रियापदासीयी सम्बन्ध्य तु शदकः॥—Ibid, 2. 206.

CHAPTER VI

PRAKRTI AND PRATYAY.

Prātipadika—derivable and underivable—its meaning,—Gender—
Dhātu—a division of Prakṛti—Pratyaya—its classifications
—Sup and Tin—Taddhita and Kṛt—pratyayas—
their meanings.

Prakrti is of two kinds-Nāman or Prātipadika and Dhātu. This classification of Prakrti is accepted by Jagadīśa. He observes particularly that what is called Prātipadika by Pānini and others is essentially the same as Nāman. Nāman. is defined by Yāska as what denotes an object-Sattvapradhānāni nāmāni. Jagadīša defines Nāman as that crude form of a word which requires to be invariably followed by prathamā (vibhakti) for the expression of its own meaning. Objects are generally denoted by such pronouns as श्रद:, etc. While giving a definition of objects, Bhartrhari has explained what is really meant by Yāska's statement 'ada iti sattvānāmupa-Durga 1 observes that Naman and deśah. Dhātu are not really different and entirely unconnected with each other. There is, on the other hand, an idea of object hidden in the meaning of a Dhātu and consequently Kriyā

¹ नामि यो घातु: संसत्प्रत्ययोपजनितेन...प्रातिपदिकास्तर्नीन्दितिरैव...द्रया-प्रधान एव भवति—Nirukta, p. 40.

is indirectly implied by Nāman. It has already been pointed out that Nāman too has Dhātu as its ultimate base. Now this radical element which exists in Nāman develops into a Prātipadika while followed by kṛt-suffixes. In this process of transformation it loses its power of directly expressing Kriyā and necessarily comes to denote a substance having number and particular genders.

Prātipadika or Linga, as it is called in the Katantra system, is defined as that crude form of word which, though significant by itself, is other than roots and detached from vibhaktis.1 What is really implied by holding Prātipadika to be significant 2 is that each of those letters that go to constitute a word is not allowed to have the designation of Pratipadika (simply because of their meaninglessness). It is needless to repeat here as to how letters, though meaningless by themselves, give rise to words that are found to be significant. Sripati, the author of the Katantra Parisista, explains the term arthavat as expressive of both existent and nonexistent things, and states emphatically that by 'significant words' one should understand those words only which have the power of

भर्यवद्धातुरप्रत्ययः प्रातिपदिक्स—Pap., 1. 2. 45.

[&]quot; पर्वदिति व्यपदेशाय वर्णानां च मा भृदिति।

⁻Mahabhasya under Pan., 1. 2. 45.

^{ै,} पर्यवदिति सतो स्वतं वार्यव्यामिधायकसुष्यते । यस्त्रेतरिषेचयाभिधानः मित्ररिल, तदिशायनस्तरीय संज्ञा (नासम्बरसम्).—Parifista.

expressing the intended sense independently of others. But $Pratyayas^1$ from their very nature are only significant when they come in contact with Prakrti. It is, therefore, inconsistent with the view that makes Prakrti dependent on Pratyaya for its expressiveness.

The well-known commentator Gopinātha has raised an important question in connection with the import of the word arthavat. In an instance of absolute negation as, śaśa-viṣāṇa,2 (the horns of a hare), he contends, there will be no Prātipadika-samiñā, as the expression does not convey any sense that is materially existent. But what we actually find is that the expressions like śaśa-visānah and ākāśa-kusumam, etc., are used as regular Padas having sup added to them. This anomaly is afterwards explained by him in the following way: -There are two kinds 3 of objects having transcendental or absolute and practical existence, according to the Vedanta standpoint; it is only Brahman that has real existence $(P\bar{a}ram\bar{a}rthika-satt\bar{a})$, the cosmic world exists only in our experience (vyāvahārikasattā). Words like ghaṭaḥ, paṭaḥ, etc., signify objects that have popular existence, whereas the expressions, referred to above, denote things that have practically no material existence.

¹ प्रत्ययास्त नियोगतः प्रष्ठतौरनुगच्छनासदर्धानपेत्त्यैव खार्धानभिद्धानाः । —Kat. Parisista.

श्राविषाणादाविभिधेयस्थाभावात् चिङ्गसंज्ञा न प्राप्ता ।—Ibid.

[ै] अर्थी हि विविध:—परमार्थसन् परमार्थासंय, तान्यभयान्यपि लिङ्गान्यभिधायक-लात्।—Ibid.

grammar, we should remember, hoth of these classes of words are held to be significant, and as such, there is no har to apply the Prātipadika-It is not samjāā to them. The reason is this. absolutely correct to say that the expression ' śaśaviṣāṇah' is absolutely meaning less, hecause and visāna, the two constituents, namely, \$a\$a when taken separately, are found to have their own meanings as hare and horns, but what makes the sense inconsistent is the relation between the parts and the whole. It must be, hov rever, admitt altogether ted that the above expression is meaningless, inasmuch as it mighit be appropriately used as an instance of 'absolute negation' or utter impossibility. Bhartrha ti 2 seems to have realised the fact when he says that words, no matter whether its meaning is existent or non-existent, are always found to produce certain cognition. GopInatha cites in support of his view the authoritative statement of Durgasimha holding that and arrives at the conclusion by ble objects. meanings of words are cognisa whether existent or non-existent.3 mention of

Patañjali has expressly made two classes of Pratipadikas derivable and

चणादयोऽव्यतुपद्दानि प्रातिपदिकानि ।—Mahābhāहर् , Vol. III, p 211

चनधीयावयवावयदिव्यवद्वारीऽसहिष विश्वविद्यादित चलानामिहिनिहर्यं ज्ञानं सन्दः सरीति हि ।—Vaky

त्रती वन्धासुतादिशन्दानां प्रातियदिकलम् ।-Laghu

चतएव टीकाकारोऽपि प्रतीयमान भटनचेति सत्रवाष्ट !- Panisista (Namaprakaranam)

underivable. The words formed by the so-called unādi suffixes are generally called underivable words. The underivable words are those that are not capable of being derived from the recognised roots according to the rules of grammar. words formed by the unadi suffixes are underivable, is, as the Vārttikas maintain, known by the way in which Pāṇini has comprehended the Prātipadikas. To keep up the scientific character of his system intact, Pānini did not think it worth while to make provision for supporting the correctness of this class of words that are and diverse to come under too rigid grammatical generalisation. The so-called unādisūtras are not of Pānini's making, but usually attributed to the authorship of Sākatāvana, who is credited with having enunciated the doctrine of 'reducibility of all words to verbal roots.' Sākaṭāyana seems to have been a grammarian of great reputation whose doctrine was accepted by Yāska and some of the grammarians. As he was not in favour of such a doctrine that tends to make all Nāmans, without exception of even Samjñā-śabda, derivable from roots, Patañjali had but scanty regard for this old gramma-This is clear from the way in which he has derived the word Sākatāyana (Sakatasya tokam). According to the interpretation of Yaska, the underivable words are good as asamvijnāta-śabda, because their accents, grammatical analysis and the radical elements cannot properly be determined by the

usual method of derivation. Of the three classes of words recognised by Durga, the so-called underivable words come under the category of Prakalpyakriya-tabda, as opposed to Pratyakṣa-kriya, inasmuch as in cases like these the radical olement or the meaning thereof has to be supplied by means of inference. The words of this description, as they do not admit of regular derivation, should be derived on the analogy of words having likeness with them, either physically or psychologically. In deriving words like these, observes Patanjali, one is to supply either Prakrti or Pratyaya, as the case may be.

The Naiyāyikas have classified Nāmans into four classes, namely, rūdha, laksaka, pogarūdha, and yaugika. The rūdha or samināsabda is a Naman the meaning of which is fixed by sanketa or divine convention. The words belonging to this class are generally found to be restricted in their particular meanings, which are somewhat different from their derivative significance. The word gault, for instance, though derived from the root gamto go, dees not mean 'one that meves,' but restricted to a particular sense (an animal possessing dewlap, hoofs, herns, etc.). Jagadisa has made a further classification of Samijaa, such as, naimittikī, pāribhūsikī and aupādhikī, Words, when they are used in a secondary significance distinct from the primary or natural ene, are called laksaka. Generally, we have

recourse to laksanā or assume a special significance when the import of a sentence seems to be inconsistent with the primary significance (mukhyārtha). The usual meaning of the word Gangā, as in the expression gangāyām ghoṣaḥ, is practically incompatible with that of ghosa, for the current of water is not likely to be the habitation of people. The word is, therefore, not used in its literal sense in the above in-- stance. The word is necessarily taken to indicate the bunk so as to render the import perfectly consistent with our experience. It must be carefully noted here that there is not a distinct class of words that are always used as lakṣaka and enumerated as such either by the grammarians or rhetoricians, the same word being used as vācaka in one expression and as lakṣaka in the other. There are certain words, as we have pointed out elsewhere, like praving. kuśala, etc., which are seldom used in their primary or original sense (skilful in playing on lyre and one who takes the kuśa-grass), but have acquired a more generalised meaning (i.e., expert). The yoga-rūdha words are those that possess in themselves two-fold significance -derivative and conventional. The word pankaja, taken as a whole (samudāya-sakti), means a lotus; by the force of grammatical derivation (avayava-śakti) it means almost the same thing i.e., 'anything growing in the mud' (pankajani-kartṛtva). Though substances other than lotuses are also found to grow in mud, the force

of convention has so restricted the sense of the word nankara as to mean a lotus and not the aquatic moss. The uquaila words are so called because their meanings are the sime as is expressed by their constituents, i.e. prabrit and Pratuana The naugika words, such as kāraka, pathaka, etc. denote the same meaning as is usually signified by their component parts to which they might be dissolved by means of grammatical analysis In view of the words' like mandana, mahararata, etc., some have recognised another class of Naman called a udhayaugika The word mandapa, unlike pankaja, has got two distinct meanings When dissolved into parts, the word means one who drinks seum, and when taken as a whole (vudha). it means 'a house ' Here the derivative meaning is materially different from the conventional In treatises on poetics we find a special class of words known as vyanjaka, viz, sugges tive The Naivavikas as well as the older school of grammarians have not recognised vyanjana as a separate vrtti

There is another way of classifying Nāmans, i.e., according as they are restricted in their use in regard to numbers. There are some words in Sanskiit which are never used in the singular number, there are some having neither singular nor plural forms, again, there are others that have neither singular nor plural forms. Thus, number also has been made a criterion for the classification of words. Jagadisa

has already shown the five 1 different varieties of Nāmāns (according to their numbers), as suggested by Patanjali: (1) There are words like eka, vimšati, etc., which are always used in the singular number. (2) Words like ubha, dvi, puṣpavant (which means both the sun and the moon), aśvin (heavenly physicians), rodasī (meaning both earth and heaven) are used to denote dual number only. (3) Words like prāṇa, tri, kati, etc., are found in plural number only. (4) The word ubhaya is used in both singular and plural. (5) Words like ghaṭa, paṭa, vṛkṣa, etc., are allowed to have all the three numbers.

Having shown that all words are expressive of Pratibhā or ultimately serve to bring out intuition, Bhartrhari proceeds to discuss the meaning of words and refers to more than one philosophical view in this connection. The utterance of a word, some hold, brings out the sense of a thing only and not its particular form and inherent properties. No qualified cognition is possibly derivable from a word, i.e., what is signified by a word is only a thing without any qualifications. Just as certain words, namely, dharma, svarga, devatā, etc., fail to present

¹ एकैंकेन तथा हाथां वचनैस्तिसिरेव च। साकाङ्क्लप्रयुक्तन्तु नाम पञ्चविधं सृतम्॥—Sabdasaktiprakasikā, Kār. 35.

² अभ्यासात् प्रतिक्षाहितु: शब्द: सर्व्वीं (परे: सृत: I—Vākyapadiya, 2. 119.

[ै] अपूर्वदेवताखर्गै: समसाहर्गवादिषु (-Ibid.

before us any material form, so words like gauh, asvah, etc., do not convey the idea of any particular forms. But difficulty arises when we actually consider the meaning of words like nauh. and asvah which, as we know, denote objects along with their respective forms. The upholder of the view says in defence that the idea of a being having hump, hoofs and horns does not really follow from the word gaul itself. but cognition of the particular form is drawn from some other sources, viz., common experience obtained from the use of words. The qualified knowledge (i.e., knowledge of the form) is far from being the meaning of a word. Some, again, hold the opposite view. As in some cases words are found to denote a class and sometimes individuals, it is only plausible to maintain that the meaning of a word cannot be an unqualified one. This view, however plausible, is rejected on the following grounds. There are no words that denote only a class, because the idea of individuals invariably comes in, as a class is inconceivable without a substratum (individuals). Again, a word denoting a class alone is not competent to convey the sense of individuals. The word gauh, for instance, is capable of denoting a class (gotva), but fails to bring out the particular

प्रशोगदर्भनाभ्यासादाकारावयहस्य थः।
म स ग्रन्टस्य विषयः स हि बङ्गालरात्रयः ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2.

form of a cow-individual. Similarly, the word ghațul 2 signifies only a thing (a pot) and does not imply the particular form with which the object generally comes to our cognition. Some hold, on the contrary, that the meaning of a word comprises in itself all possible cognitions about the thing denoted.3 According to this view, the meaning of a word is savikalpaka. The particular knowledge (viśiṣṭa-jñāna) of a thing presupposes a knowledge of its qualifications. Some philosophers have tried to show that knowledge of all descriptions is likely to be more or less qualified. Finally, a way is made out of these conflicting views. Some words are really found to be denotative of objects having particular forms and some (words like devatā, svarga, etc.) producing only formless or immaterial notions.4 Another point is then raised. There is no fixed meaning that is always signified by a word. The meaning of a word is so variant that we are hardly allowed to say this is exactly the meaning of this word.5 Just as a thing, though retaining its form unmodified, appears to be a different one owing to the defective organs through which it is perceived,

न तान् व्यक्तिगतान् भेदाञ्जातिश्ट्दोऽवलस्वते।—Vākyapadiya, 2.

² घटादीनां न चाकारान् प्रत्याययित वाचका: I—Ibid.

⁸ ससुदायोऽभिष्ठेय: स्याद्विवाल्पससुचय: ।—Ibid.

⁴ श्रानारवन्तः संवेद्या व्यक्तसृतिनिवन्धनाः।

ये ते प्रत्यवभासन्ते संविन्मावं लतोन्यथा॥—Ibid, 2, Kār. 135.

[े] नास्ति कथिन्नियत'एक: शब्दसार्थ:-Punyarija.

so the meaning of a word seems to be variant according to the knowledge of the speaker and the person spoken to. It is not unfrequently that we meet with words which are taken in various senses by different men. The word ghafah, for instanco, might be used by the Vaisesikas in the senso of whole (avayavi).1 The Samkhyvites may tako it as implying a combination of qualities and the Buddhists and Jainas as an aggregate of atoms and so on. What should we then do under these nnomalous circumstances? Human knowledge is limited by nature. It is not possible for n man to know anything in its ontirety. To realise the ultimate essence of a thing lies practically beyond the range of human intelligence and what is almost incontestable is that our knowledge and experience, as Bhartrhari rightly observes, are in most cases liable to be inaccurate and imperfect. Arguing from an orthodox point of view one may say that the knowledge of ancient seers 2 (Rsis), who are supposed to have visualised the ultimate reality underlying all phenomena, is free from all limitations and imperfections and that we should do well to know everything according to their observations, so as to get rid of this stupendous anomaly. But this is far from being the actual state of things. One cannot possibly use words strictly in conformity to the manner

Punyarāja under the Vākyapadiya, Kār. 2 187.

[&]quot; स्पीणां दर्शनं सच तत्त्वे किं चिद्वावस्थितम्—Ibid, 2 141.

of these seers. But what experience goes to prove is that they are not even above imperfection and illusion, so far as the use of words is concerned. Puņyarāja has quoted a verse 1 which seeks to establish similarity between a child and a learned man, since both of them, depending more or less on popular usage and figurative use, are liable to reveal the same ignorance in regard to the use and knowledge of words. Human knowledge, it must be remembered, is bound to be of different types, the same object being variously perceived by different men. Truth does not reveal itself to all persons. A man's intelligence, however sharp and far-reaching, does not help him in getting into the real nature of things. If we closely examine our experience, drawn from personal observations, we do not fail to see how often we are deceived by it. Knowledge, as it comes from experience (cf. Locke), is subject to error. Some concrete, examples are put forward by Bhartrhari to show a number of striking inaccuracies involved in our observations or experience.2 To give one of them. Even those who are gifted with clear vision are found to say 'nīlam gaganatalam,' though the idea of tala or lower surface is not at all compatible with an entity like sky that pervades the entire sphere.

फपण-व्यवदेशास्यां लीकिके वर्कान स्थिती। जाने प्रत्यभिलापे च सहशी बालपिछती॥

त्र तलबहुम्भते व्योग खबीते ह्यवाडिव। न चेत्रासि तलं व्योक्ति न खबीते हताम्नः ॥—Vākyapadiya, 2.142.

What course should, then, be adopted? As our observations are likely to be false and defective in most of the cases we should not treat them as the basis of our experience, without examining their validity by means of reasoning.1 Thus what is perceived directly by sense-organs requires to be fully determined by reasoning. Observations unaided by reasoning are not to be relied on as evidence at all. With regard to words the meaning whereof is indeterminable (asamākhyeyatattva), we must depend on popular usage and use them accordingly. The meaning of words in general, says Punyaraja, is determined by one's own range of knowledge. The way in which he has brought this lengthy discussion to a close deserves particular notice. From an extreme Advaita point of view, Padartha has no material background and the relation in which a Sabda stands to its meaning (artha) is nothing but a false one (adhyāsa). This being the actual state of things, it is only idle to dilate upon a question like Sahdartha.3

The determination of the precise meaning of Nāman is really difficult. The sense that is usually conveyed by the utterance of a word is regarded to be the denotation of Prātipadikas. A word and its meaning seem to be inseparably connected with each other; and whenever that word is uttered, the particular meaning is at

¹ तचात् प्रत्यवमयये विदानीचेत युक्तित:—Vakyspadiya, 2.

^{&#}x27; प्रशास: सम्बन्ध: पदार्थस्त्रसम्ब एवेति निर्णय:-Punyarāja.

[ै] इत्यलं निवेश्तवष्ट्रविकस्पप्रदर्शनेनेसि—Ibid.

once comprehended. Now, what is actually denoted by the so-called Prātipadikas? The views that are held to solve this question may be brought under three distinct classes: is class that is denoted by all words. (ii) It is individual. (iii) It is an individual qualified by the class. It should be noted here that the Mīmāmsakas are the upholder of the class theory. They maintain that all words signify class alone, the usual meaning of an individual arising on account of the mutual dependence of the class and the individuals. Among the grammarians, Vājapyāyana and Vyādi, as wei find in the Mahābhāṣya,1 held respectively class and individual as the meaning of words. The Naiyāyikas have, however, brought about a reconciliation between these two discordant views. They hold that it is neither class nor individual alone but individual qualified or conditioned by the class is what is really denoted by a word. The defect of the class theory, as pointed out by Jagadīśa² and others, lies in the fact that the cognition of an individual is not produced at all, if class alone is taken to be the meaning of all words. The individualistic theory is, on the other hand, open to such fallacies, as endlessness and vagueness.3

¹ Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, under the rule Pāṇ., 1. 2. 64.

² जातिमात्रे हि संकेताहाक्तेभीनं सुदुष्करम्—Sabdasakti, Kār. 19.

 $^{^3}$ श्रानन्याद्यभिचाराच तत सङ्केत: कर्तुं न युच्यते— $K\bar{a}vy$ aprakāśa, under $K\bar{a}r$. 10.

In view of the rules of the Astadhyayi,1 Patañjali observes, it appears that both the class and the individual were held to be the meanings of words by Pāṇini. It is further2 held by some that gender, number, and Kārakas are also signified by Pratipadikas. There are, therefore, practically six different views with regard to the meaning of Prātipadikas. Kondabhatta 3 has made reference to five different views-(i) class, (ii) class and individual, (iii) class, individual and gender, (iv) class, individual, gender and number, (v) class, individual, gender, number and Kārakas. Gadādhara has also alluded to these five views. While we take such a wide view in regard to the denotation of a Prātipadika, we cannot afford to lose sight of the fact that Pratyayas necessarily become only indicative (dyotaka), if all possible meanings were assigned to Prātipadikas alone. The second view, i.e., both the class and the individual are meant by words, is explained by Patanjali in the following way: it is not at all reasonable

फें पुनराङ्गित: पदार्थ भागेस्विह्यम् ? उभयिनचाइ । क्यं जायते ? उभयया चावार्येण स्वाणि पिठतानि । Mababbāsya, Vol. I, p. 6.

^{°.} एकं दिकं चिकं चाय चतुःचां पचकं तथा। नामार्था इति सर्वेशमी पचा: शास्त्री निक्षिता: ॥ Vaiyākaraṇabbāṣaṇa, Kār. 25,

^{*} न शाक्रतिपदार्थिकस द्र ' न पदायों द्रव्यपदार्थिकस वाक्षतिन पदार्थ:। अभगोदमर्थ पदार्थ:। कम्यचित्त विचित्त प्रधानमूर्त कि विद्रुपमृतम। पाक्षति-पदार्थिकस्राध्यक्रति: प्रधानमृता, द्रव्यं ग्रम्मृतम्। द्रव्यपदार्थिकस द्रव्यं प्रधानमृत्ताक्रति-श्वमृता | Mahabibāsya under the rule Pan. 1. 2. 64, p. 246 (Vol. I).

to maintain that words denoting a class are never found to express the sense of an individual and vice versa. But what appears to be exactly true is that both the class and the individual are signified by words. Examples are not wanting to show that a word which has a class as its meaning is also capable of denoting an individual, with this difference that in one case the sense of a class is directly obtained and that of an individual is only indirectly implied. Similar is the case with regard to words denoting individuals. Some grammarians have also explained this view from the Naiyāyika standpoint. They hold that the meaning of all words is an individual qualified by the class. There arises, however, some difficulty when one attempts to maintain gender, number and Kāraka also as the meanings of Prātipadikas themselves. It is almost like a grammatical fallacy to include gender, number and Kāraka within the Meaning of Pratipadikas. According to this view, nothing is left to be expressed by Pratyaya. If we take linga as pertaining to word and explain the rules Pan. 1.2.47. and 4.1.3. as referring to Prātipadikas denoting both masculine and feminine genders, linga also appears to be denoted by Prātipadikas. It is definitely stated in the Lingānuśāsana that Prātipadikas are expressive of linga. Nāgeśa also holds the same view. The way in which the rule Pān. 4. 1. 4. has been explained by Patanjali makes it clear that linga is also denoted

by Prātipadikas, the suffixes like tāp, nīp being only indicative. The real difficulty arises in connection with number and Karaka. Patanjali has explicitly stated elsewhere that oneness, duality, plurality, etc., as well as Kārakas are signified by case-endings. Moreover, the method of agreement and difference, as applied to the analysis of words into base and suffixes, shows that number and Kāraka should be taken as the meaning of Pratyaya. We have already pointed out the difficulty of arriving at a solution whether the entire meaning of a word is denoted by the base itself and the suffix serves only as an indicative or vice versa. Bhartrhari seems to have doubt with regard to this position. He maintains that the . case-endings are either indicative or really expressive of sense, i or the meaning is expressed by both Prakrti and Pratyava in their combination.

An examination of the grammatical treatment of gender has been made in the Linguistic Speculation of the Hindus. Prātipadikas² form the base to which Pratyayas like tāp, nīp, are added. The grammarians³ failed to make a scientific treatment with regard to the problem

¹ योतिका वाचिका वा खुई बारीना विश्वकथ:। Vākyapadiya, Kār.

⁹ प्राितपदिकप्रकृतिका: स्त्रियामिल्पनेन विश्वताष्ट्राश्चरः क्रियत् म्त्रीलं प्रकृत्यविष्येपणत्या योष्यन्ति । Vyotpattivada, p. 118.

[े] हरितका: फ्लानीति फर्सेचिप सिवा इति: 1..... गब्दानासेकार्वेऽपि लिङ्ग-वचनभेदः, दारा: कलवं भावेति । Durge Simba on the rule नीकीपचारात् यहबिति:—Kalapa, 23.

of gender. The popular conception of gender 1 had its origin in the distinctive features of sexes such as male and female. But it is very difficult to justify the grammatical use of genders simply on the evidence of physical characteristics. A vrksa or a khatvā does not rightly observes,2 such possess, as Patanjali physical features as would justify its gender. Grammar had to depend so much on popular usage with regard to the determination of gender that it failed in most cases to give a One turns to grammar scientific explanation. in vain to explain the question of sex in words like jyotsnā and nadī. The fact that accounts for such usage should be sought elsewhere. It is rather a poetical fashion, which represents all that excite pleasurable sensations and exhibit female virtues (tender less, loveliness, submissiveness, etc.) as females, that is to a certain extent responsible for attributing the female characteristics to the 'moon-beams' and 'current of water.' The word usas seems to have its gender similarly fixed by a poetical outlook of nature. The seers of the Rk Veda, 3 as they are often called kavi of krantadarsin (one who has visualised the finality of a thing), were not wanting in poetical idealism when they described

[ा] स्तानकेशवती स्त्री स्त्राज्ञीसगः। विष: सृत:। Mahābhāsya, Vol. II, p. 196.

² खट्टाइची न सिध्यत:। Ibid.

[•] सूर्यों देवीमूषसं रोचमानां मर्यो। योपामधित पशात् ! Rk Veda.

Uşas (dawn) as the beautiful wife of the Sungod. This is, however, n tontative explanation, as it does not apply to all similar cases. Though a flower appears to be tender and graceful to our sentiment, the word kusuma is used in neuter gender only. There is so much laxity of the idea of sex in the use of gender that it would be a positivo mistake to look upon grammatical genders strictly as nn indication of sex. Tho words 1 dara and kalaira form another instance of the irregularity of gender. Though denoting the same thing, viz., wife, they are so sanctioned by popular usage as to be used in masculino and noutor gondors respectively. As in respect of our knowledge of laukika linga, we are guided more by popular usage than by conception of sex, Pntanjali has repeatedly drawn our attention to the fact that the determination of gendors from a sciontific point of view lies almost beyond the jurisdiction of grammar.

Patanjali² has said it more than once that the popular use of gender is too rigid and fanciful to come under any general principle. The popular conception of sex has, therefore, very little to do with the grammatical use of gender.

¹ एकार्षे मन्दान्यताहर्ष्ट विज्ञान्यतम् ! Mahabhāsya, Vol. II, p. 196 नन्दानामिकार्षेऽपि लिङ्गचनमेदः, दाराः कवतं भाष्मित् ! Durga Sipha under 'tho role लोकोपचराह, प्रवितिः—Kalāpa, 23.

 $^{^2}$ तखाद वैयाकरणे: मकां लीकिकालिक्रमाध्यातुम्। Mababbasya on the rule Pap., 4.1.3.

Patanjali has, however, suggested two characteristic features of males and females on a more or less physiological ground. According to this view, a female being is one wherein something is developed; a male serves the agent of production; and that which represents an intermediate stage between these two aspects (development and production) is known as napumsaka. The popular conception of sex does not help us in the least when we try to explain the propriety of gender in viksa and khaţvā. 2 These criteria are not even applicable to all cases, since production and development refer to qualities and not to persons.8 Both males and females are found to be the substratum of these qualities. What, then, should be the standard of making such a distinction between sexes? Patanjali finally says that the desire of the speaker 4 is what accounts for such use, viz., when development or growth . is intended to be implied, we take it as female and so on. Gadādhara is of opinion that the suffxes like tap, etc., enjoined by the rules striyām, ajādyatastāp, etc., are sometimes found to express strītva, as an adjunct to what is denoted by the base. The grammatical use of strītva

¹ संख्यानप्रसवी जिङ्गमास्त्रेयी सक्ततान्तत:। M. Bhāsya., Vol. II. p. 197.

² खट्टाहची न सिध्यत:। Ibid.

⁵ वस्य पुन: स्थानं स्त्री प्रहत्तिर्वा पुनान ? गुणानास । Ibid.

¹ विवचात:। संस्थानविवचायां स्त्री प्रसविवचायां पुमानुभयोरविवचायां नपुंसकम्। Ibid.

does not necessarily bring out the idea of a female being. It is not logically correct to say that strītea is directly meant by such suffixes. The words khatvā and vrksa, otc., form exception to the popular conception of gendor. Tho addition of an adjective as human being 1 does not evon removo the difficulty. The word devatā (though it means divine boing-both male and female) is found to be used in feminine gender only. According to the grammarians,2 strīpratyayas are only indicative (dyotaka) and not expressive. The grammarians have comprehended gonder also in the meaning of Pratipadikas. But Gadādhara does not fully agree with the grammarians. Ho maintains on the contrary that stri-pratyayas are only expressive of stritva. It is why linga has been specially mentioned as distinct from Pratipadikartha in the rule Pan. 2, 3, 66. He is quite right when he says that the stri-protyayas in words like khatva, atavī, and devatā aro absolutely mcaningless.

Just as in the Samkhya doctrino of evolution, Prakrti is held to be the primordial substance out of which the ontire world, both material and intellectual, has sprung up, even so in grammar

प्राणिलेन विश्वपिडिप देवतादी व्यक्तिचारात । Vyutpattivāda, p. 118.

[.] भे स्त्रीपत्ययान्त योतका एव । Ibid.

मुंख्य प्राविपदिकार्यतेऽव्यननाना प्राविपदिकपदानां स्वीलार्यकले गीरवात्। लाघवनान्यीयमां स्त्रीप्रत्ययानां सदर्धकलकत्यनीचित्यात । Vyutpattivada, p 119, and प्रवासना त तहा प्रकतामा विभिन्न वैद्याकरणे कहा तह यहास । Sabdasaktı under Kār. 54.

Dhātu represents the ultimate element wherefrom all possible forms of words have evolved.
The verbal roots are the last result of grammatical analysis and form the real foundation of
all verbal structure. The roots, very much
like the atoms of the chemist, do not admit of
further division; it is to such roots or phonological types that the Nairuktas and grammarians look for the starting-point in their process
of derivation.

According to the *Root-theory*, as expounded by Śākaṭāyana, all words, even without the exception of proper names, are derivable from roots. *Dhātu* is significant by itself and is said to be the final germ of all word-forms. It denotes *Kriyā* or action (*dhātvarthaḥ kriyā*). Jagadīśa's classification of *Prakṛti* is essentially reducible to one, *i.e.*, *Dhātu*, for *Prātipadikas* or *Nāmans* too have roots as their final elements.

According to Yāska, the meaning of a verbal root is bhāva, i.e., action or becoming. Bhāva or Sattā, as we have already said, is the meaning of all roots. It is one and all-pervading, but seems to be manifold on account of its association with different upādhis. This sattā, though intrinsically one, has got such potency as to reveal itself into manifold form.²

¹ वर्गेखाखातजानि नामानि। Nirukta.

² एवं सुताससाः नाथन मन्नयो विद्यन्ते येनेकैव सती तथा तथा विचित्रेण रूपेण प्रतिभासते।.....तथाहि सर्व्वमन्त्रात्मभूतत्वाद्वन्नणोऽनेकविकारप्रदर्भनसामर्थ-जचणा अविद्याख्याः प्रक्तिः कार्यभेदादुपचिरतनानात्वा समसीत्यागमविदः।

According to the followers of the Agama, Brahman, as Helārāja says, comprises all Sahti as its own self. Aridya, which is only a Sakti of Brahman, is capable of showing innumorable modifications and appears to be manifold owing to its divorsity of nctions. The doctrino of Vārsyāyani, as olucidated by Yāska, shows clearly how bhara or maha-satta manifests itself in six different aspects, namely, jayate, asti, riparinamate, varddhate, apal siyate nad vinasyati. We must remember that every thing is liable to pass through these stages. These successive stages from production to final destruction are to be regarded as rikara or modifications of bhava which, under different upadhis, is called by se many different names. Helaraja maintains that a thing by its very nature is first produced before it is said to be existent. The question of tikāra only comes in connection with bhava or objects that are already existent. One vikāra or modification of a state into another does not rotain its naturo unchanged for a moment; parināma or modification is immediately followed by growth and growth by decay and so on. This is exactly harmonious with the Samkhya doctrine of

¹ यह भावविकास अवनीति वार्यायणि श्रीयने इनि विपरिश्वभने वर्दते इपयोशने विनश्यतीति।--Nirukts, p. 41.

अश्राह्ममाहामात् पूर्वे आयत इलवधीयते प्रशास्त्रीति। प्रशासत्तराय विकारापधिरिति विपरिचमते तथ विपरिचमत् मृह्यभागि नावतिष्ठते इति वर्दते यावदनेन वर्तितस्य ततीःपधीयते।

⁻Heläraja under Yakyspadlya, Kar. 3. 36.

parināma. The whole world is in a flux of constant changes and nothing, as Patañjali¹ observes, remains in its own form unchanged for a single moment. There is no growth that is not followed by decay and no decay that is not attended with destruction. In this way everything undergoes a series of changes and loses its nature every moment.

Patanjali has suggested two definitions of Dhātu as kriyāvacano dhātuh and bhāvavacano dhātuh which practically mean the same thing, i.e., (i), a root is expressive of action; (ii) a root denotes becoming (bhāva). He observes further that the meaning of a root, i.e., action, is invisible and is only comprehended by inference. That a root signifies action is clear from the fact that the verbal forms like pacati, gacchati, etc., are found to have co-inherence (sāmānādhikaranya) with karoti.² To be more clear, the meaning of all roots is capable of being expressed by the term karoti.

By the meaning of a root, Nāgeśa understands 'action that is attended with efforts and leads to the fruit.' In pursuance of the view of Patanjali, Kondabhatta says that

¹ न होह कशित् खिमातानि सुहत्तीनविष्ठते। वर्डते वा यावदनेन वर्डितव्यमपायेन वा युज्यते।—Mahūbhāṣya, Vol. II, p. 191.

² वर्ष पुनर्जायते क्रियावचना: पचादय इति ? यदेतेषां करीतिना सामानाधि-करण्यम्। किं करोति ? पचित । किं करिप्यति ? पच्यति।—Mahābhāṣya, under the rule Pān. 1, 3, 1.

³ फलानुक्लो यवसहितो व्यापारी धालर्थ: |—Mañjūṣā,

⁴ फलव्यापारयोधीतुरात्रये तु तिङ: सृता: (—Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa, 1, 1.

both the action (favourable to the result) and the fruit are expressed by roots and that the substratum alone is denoted by the suffix tin. The Mimamsakas hold, on the contrary, that the fruit alone is denoted by the root, the action being denoted by the suffix. But this view goes quite against that of the grammarians. The rule Pan. 3.1.69., clearly shows that the suffixes like tin have nothing to do with the action (vyāpāra), but they simply indicate the agent, the object, number, etc. The followers of the Navva-Nyava school maintain that the meaning of a root is action favourable to the fruit. According to this view, the verbal form gacchati means 'an action, i.c., movement, leading to the conjunction' (samyoga).

There is, however, certain difference in regard to the way in which the grammarians and the Naiyāyikas construe a sentence for the sake of deriving the verbal cognition (\$\bar{s}abda-bodha). Both the Mināmsakas and the grammarians arrange the words of a sentence in such a way as to render the action (\$kriy\bar{a}\$) principal in a \$\bar{v}aky\bar{w}rtha\$, with this difference that the former take action to be the meaning of suffixes, while the latter comprehend action as the signification of roots. The grammarians are expected to put the expression Caitrastandulam pacati in the form of a logical

proposition which will run thus: Caitra-kartṛka-taṇḍula-karmaka-pākaḥ, viz., 'the act of cooking which has Caitra as the subject and rice as the object.' The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, will bring out the meaning of the expression by such an arrangement of words as would make the meaning of prathamānta-śabda (words having first case-ending after them) as the principal one. According to their construction, the sentence will mean: taṇḍula-karmāka-pākānukūla-kṛtimān Caitraḥ: viz., 'Caitra is the substratum of action that is favourable for cooking rice or which has rice as its object.'

Pratyayas are held to be significant by the grammarians, though their expressiveness depends on their association with the base. Pratyayas are of different kinds and numerous. Jagadīša has classified them under four heads: '(i) vibhakti (sup and tin), (ii) pratyayas like nic, san, yan, etc., that form part of the root, (iii) taddhita, (iv) kṛt--suffixes. Of these, the vibhaktis, viz., sup and tin, are primary suffixes and the rest are only secondary, the former being added to Prātipadikas and roots to denote number, whereas the latter, though coming after Prātipadikas and roots, have special signification. Both sup and tin generally denote

विमित्तारीव धालंगसितः हादिति प्रमात्। चतुर्घा प्रत्ययः ग्रीताः कादिभिः पश्चभाषवा। number. Sup is, again, of two kinds¹—(i) sup as denoting Kārakas; (ii) sup as specially enjoined in conjunction with certain words (Upapada-vibhakti).

The author of the Varttika has expressly stated that subject, object, instrumental, etc., as well as number (singular, dual and plural) are denoted by sup-terminations.2 Patanjali has also lent his support to this view which is directly based upon such rules of the Astadhyayi as Pan, 2.3.2, and Pan 2.3.18. The author of the Vaiyākaraņabhūṣaṇa * enumerates substratum, limit, object, relation or efficiency alone as the meanings of sup. It must be, however, remembered that the expressions current in a language are so varying and numerous that the above enumeration of meanings is found to be far from being accurate and exhaustive. The Naiyāyikas and the grammarians have tried their utmost in forming the definitions of karmatva, kartriva, etc., so as to render them applicable to all possible instances. But they could not sucessfully cope with the immensity of the task. A careful examination of some

कर्मलादयी विभन्नयथी: (and एकलादयी विभन्नयथी:)।

² कारकार्थेतरार्था च सुप् दिधा च विभज्यते।—Sabdasaktı, Kar. 67.

[°] सुपा कर्माद्वीऽप्यर्था: संख्या चैव तथा तिल्डाम् ≀—Mahâbhāṣya, Vol. 11, p. 58. सुपा सख्या चैवार्थ: कर्माद्वयय ।

चाययोऽवधिनदेखः सम्बन्धः मित्रदेवना । यथायथै विभक्तयर्थाः सुपां नर्सेति भाष्यतः ॥

[—]Vaiyākaraņabhūşaņa, Kār. 24.

instances will make it clear that the meanings of the sup-terminations are manifold. We may hold without going into minute details that the substratum is the meaning of the accusative, the instrumental and the locative. Karman is the substratum of the fruit resulting from action. In connection with Kriyā and Kāraka two things are to be specially noticed—action (vyāpāra) and the fruit resulting from it (धात्पात्तव्यापार-जन्यफलस).

In an expression like 'Devadatta is going to the village', the action, i.e., movement, resides in Devadatta, while the fruit produced by such action, viz. conjunction, accrues to the village. In the same way Karana and Adhi-karana may also be shown as what denote the substratum of action. Now what we like to impress is that the second case-ending, as shown above, does not only denote substratum but has manifold significance. In the Vyutpattivāda, Gadādhara has elaborately dealt with the meaning of vibhaktis. We propose to give here only a few instances from the Sabdaśaktiprakāsikā and the Vyutpattivāda.

On the strength of the rule $P\bar{a}n$. 2.3.2., Gadādhara observes that the second case-termination signifies karmatva, i.e., the state or quality of possessing the fruit resulting from an action $(kriy\bar{a}janyaphalaśālitvam)$. Generally speaking, $\bar{a}dheyatva$ or the state of being the subsistent is the meaning of the second case-termination, as shown in the foregoing examples,

but it has other mennings alse. In the scatence quatam janati, visayatra or 'the state of being the object of cognition' is directly implied by the second case-termination, while limit is denoted by the same case-ending in arabhya tasyam dasamim ca yavat. Again, the second case-ending is also found to signify vidheyatva or uddesyatea in connection with roots meaning 'to infer,' as is evident from the example rabnimanuminomi,2 In tarum tyajatı khaqah, the driftyavibhakti means soparation (vibhāga), and adhikaranging in an justines like Kakimanuracati. Thus we find that adheyatea, uddesyatea, avadhitea, vidheyatva, nirūpitatva, (as in māmantareya"), pratigogitea, anugogitea (as in dandam vinā) are all denoted by the second ense-ending.

It should be also noticed that vibhallis fall under two classes in grammar. Kāraha er case-terminatiens and Upopada-vibhalli, the former denoting Kāraha and the latter coming only when certain words are added and have no cennection with Kriyā. When these two classes of vibhallis are simultaneously applicable in regard to an instance like namasharoti devān, the Paribhāsā' enjoins that case-terminations will have preference to Upapada-vibhallis.

¹ घटं जानातीत्यव विषयलं विवयिता वा दितीयांच:-- Sabdasaktı.

अनुमित्यर्थकथातुयीगे विधियत्वसुद्देश्यत्वं वा दिशीयार्थः—Vyotpattivāda, p 55.

चलरालरेण-युक्ते इति दिवीयाया निद्धिपतलम्बै:—Ibid p.77.

सप्रवास्त्रभेते: कारकविमार्तिर्श्वनीयसी /

The rule $P\bar{a}n$. 2.3.18. implies that both the agent and the instrumental having relation to Kriyā are primarily denoted by the third case-ending. Durgasinha observes that sentences like *prakṛtyā cāru* (beautiful nature) the word prakṛti may be taken denoting the instrumental (karana) in connection with such a verbal form, as bhavati 1 that is to be supplied to make the sense complete. In dandena ghatah (which is admittedly an instance of hetu) the third case-ending, Jagadīša² maintains, indicates karanatva, though it is not regarded as a Kāraka on the ground of its having no relation with action. In ghațatvena jānāti, tṛtīyā implies prakāratā or the state of being an adjective. As both subordination 8 to the action of the agent as well as a cause 4 associated with action are denoted by the third case-ending, Gadadhara arrives at the conclusion that it has a two-fold signification. This view is quite analogous to the statement of Bhartrhari.

Substratum or recipient is said to be the general meaning of the third and seventh

तथा ह्यभिरूपभवने प्रकृति: करणम्—Ibid.

प्रकलादीनामपि करणलमिक भवतेर्गस्यमानलात् (— गृष्टि under the rule येन क्रियते तत करणम्— Kalāpa, 218:

² दर्छेन घट दल्यनापि त्रतीयार्थ: करणलम्। परन्तु तन्न कारकं क्रियानन्विय-लात्।—Sabdasaktiprakāsikā.

[े] व्यापारे कर्तृव्यापाराधीनलं निवेशनीयम्।-Vyutpattivāda, p. 85.

⁴ करणलं हतीयार्थः, तच व्यापारवत्कारणलम् (—Ibid.

[ै] वस्ततः समिर्ध्याहतकर्तृव्यापाराधीनले व्यापारवत्कारणले च ततीयायाः शितदयम ।—Vyutpattivada, p. 86.

case-endings. From the very definition of kartytva and adhikarana are, as a rule, regarded as the substratum of action (kriyāśrayatva). The difference between them lies in the fact that the agent is directly connected with a Kriyā, while Adhikarana connects itself with a Kriyā only indirectly, i.e., through the medium of either the subject or the object. This is quite clear from the definition of Adhikarana as suggested by Bhartrhari.

The fourth case ending denotes Sampradāna, i.e., implies the purpose (uddesya). This sense is obtained from the expression yamabhipraiti in the rule Pāṇ. 1. 4. 32. The fourth case-ending also indicates ādheyatva, as in maitrāya rocate and vişayitva in such instances as Caitrāya kupyati, puspebhyah sprhayati.

The fifth case-ending denotes avadhi or limit of separation. It also means janyatva or the state of being a product, as in dharmādutpadyate sukham. Here virtue is the cause that produces happiness as its effect. Sometimes it implies substratum and place of origination as, in valmākāgrāt prabhavati and himavato Gangā prabhavati. It is not grammatically correct to use the word dhruva in its literal sense, i.e. 'motionless,' as in that case one fails to support Apādāna-kāraka in the example

कर्तृकर्मन्यवीहतामसाचादधारयत् कियाम्।
 चपकुर्ञत् क्रियासिदी मान्तेऽधिकरणं सृतम्॥—Väkyapadiya.

dhāvato aśvāt patitaḥ where the limit of separation is far from being motionless. But Patañjali has taken a peculiar position. He maintains that in dhāvato aśvāt patitaḥ (fallen from a running horse) 'the state of being a horse' and the swift motion are to be considered as dhruva.

The genitive implies sambandha; it is said to have various meanings. The relation is of various kinds. It is to be particularly noticed here that sambandha, as is donoted by the genitive, is excluded from the category of $K\bar{a}raka^2$ and $sasth\bar{a}$ is not treated as a casetermination (as it has no direct connection with the action).

After showing the different meaings of case-terminations, the grammarians have finally arrived at the conclusion that efficiency or Sakti alone is denoted by all case-endings. It has already been pointed out in these pages that all objects of thought, as are denoted by words, represent but different manifestations of Sakti, and that time, space, action, and Kārakas are only various forms of Sakti which pervades the entire world of thought. The inconceivable

यदचेऽचलमाग्रगामिलं तद्भुवं तच विविचितम्—Mahābhāsya, Vol. I.

² सम्बन्धो न कारकं, न वा तदर्धिकापि षष्टी कारकविभिन्न:—Sabdasaktiprakāsikā, under Kār. 67.

[।] শ্রিনি মরিবাভা। — Helārāja on the Vākyapadīya, Kār. 3. 13.

⁴ निमित्तमेदादिकेव भिन्ना शक्ति: प्रतीयति। पौढ़ा कर्तृत्वमेवाइसात्प्रहत्ति-निगन्धनम्॥—Vākyapadīya, 3. 37, p. 199.

force that brought this universe into existence and whereby everything is being regulated is considered to be an inexhaustible and perpetual reservoir of Sakti or efficiency revealing itself through diverse objects. What is called life or conscious principle is ultimately an emblem of this all-pervading force. According to this view, therefore, everything is made up of Sakti or essentially a congregate of officiency. This Sakti is, again, said to be either identical with, or different from, the object wherein it inheres.

Substratum 1 (i.e., the agent and the object) is said to be ordinarily meant by ākhuātaterminations. We have already said that action as well as fruit are expressed by roots (phalavyāpārayordhātuh). Udayana2 maintains that effort (yatna) favourable to action is the meaning of all ākhvātas. A root, some hold, signifies only effort and akhyata denotes the favourable action, the sense of effort being derivable by means of inference. Some hold that tinterminations express action (vyāpāra) and do not actually signify the agent. The grammarians, however, do not agree with them: for whenever a verbal form is used, the subject is at once comprehended. The

¹ धातुप्रकृतिकतिङां कर्तृकर्तस्य चाद्ययोऽयः। तच कर्ततः व्यापाराययः, कर्माण फलाययः। धात्ययेनावातुत्रात्कम् भाषे तिङ्—Мабұйға (तिङ्यंनिक्पण) again चादये तृ तिङः खूताः—Vaiyākuraņabhūşaņa.

[ै] भावनैव हि यवाका सर्वाच्यातस्य गोचर:।—Kusumshjali, 5. 9.

[ै] धातुना यव: प्रतीयते, भाष्यातस्य चातुक्लव्यापारमावाधैकलमा दिपादेव च यवलाभ: !—Ibid, गृष्कः.

Mīmāmsakas hold that bhāvanā or action is practically denoted by tin-suffixes, 2 the subject being cognisable by means of arthāpatti. grammarians have rejected this view on following ground:—if action or $bh\bar{a}van\bar{a}$ is to be regarded as the meaning of terminations, there would be no idea of action in bhoktavyam which has got no ākhyāta suffix immediately following it. The rule Pan. 1.3.9. is also an indication that roots are expressive of action. According to Kātyāyana, it is the root that expresses action and not the termination; for in pacati and apākṣīt the meanings of the suffixes are varying, whereas the root pac with its significance repractically the same. By the application of the method of agreement and difference it is possible to determine the distinct signification of both bases and suffixes. 8 further held that number, time, Kārakas and action are generally denoted by ākhuātas. expression 4 'Caitra is going to the village' means accordingly an action favourable for the present conjunction of the agent who is one and non-different from Caitra with the object that is non-different from (or identical with) the village.

[े] नण्डनिमया:--फलमातं घालधः व्यापारः, प्रत्ययार्थः।

² संख्यायां कारने वीधी विभन्नया हि प्रवत्ते । उभयं चाच तत् सिर्ड भावना तिङ्-विभिन्नतः॥ (Kartradhikarana).

³ सिडं लन्वयन्यतिरैकाभ्यास—Vār.

प्रतलाविक्तविदाभित्रवार्षेको वर्त्तमानकालिको ग्रामाभिक्रकमैनिष्ठो यः
 संयोगसदनुक्लो व्यापारः।

According to the Naivavikas. lakaras imply the agent, time and number. Lat means present time (vartamana). There is also doubt whether the sense of lakāras is expressed (vācva) or suggested only. Bhattoii seems to be in favour the expressiveness of lakāras. Lit is used to denote pāroksua, viz., the state of being invisible, or imperceptibility of action. When lit is used in the first person, sometimes we have a peculiar meaning. The expressions HHIST कि विजलाय. नाई कलिङ्गं जगाम, etc., are intended to show that the speaker was oither in a sleeping mood or in a state of oblivion. Lot means almost the same as lin, that is, injunction, invitation, etc., or, in one word, inducement (praparttana).

There are certain suffixes like kyac, kyan, kāmyac, san, yan, which appear to be the last part of a root. These are called secondary suffixes; they have either Nāman¹ or Dhātu as their bases. The suffixes like kyac, kyan are added to Nāmans (nāmadhātu), while san, yan, etc., come after roots (dhātvantāvayavarāpah).

It is not correct to say that the taddhitasuffixes, as a rule, have Nāman² as their bases, because case-endings as well as suffixes like kyac, etc., are also added to Nāmans. By taddhita, ³ Jagadīša understands those suffixes

[ा] नामप्रकृतिकथारं धातुप्रकृतिकस्तया—Sabdasakti, Kar. 109.

² नामप्रकृतिको नैवसतिव्यासम्बद्धियत:- Ibid. 110.

विभित्तिधालंगकार्रीऽन्यः प्रत्यक्षचित्रम्— Ibid.

that are distinguished from vibhaktis (sup and. tin), suffixes that form the last part of roots and krt-suffixes. The taddhita suffixes are of different kinds. We give below only a few specimens of these suffixes:—(i) some of them are patronymic suffixes (apatyārtha-pratyaya), as, an, in, etc. (kaurava, aupagava); (ii) express modification as, (modification of stone); (iii) some express colouring; (iv) some denote one's (sāsya' devatā) as, Saiva (one who has Siva as his adorable deity); (v) some denote one's place of residence; (vi) some express one's possession, as, gomān (one having cows); (vii) some denote a collection, as youvatam (an assemblage of young ladies); (viii) some are expressive of time, as māsika (continued for a month). From a grammatical point of view, the taddhita-termination an in aindram havih is used to express (sāsya devatā) the clarified butter which is offered to Indra as the deity. Kondabhatta says that the suffix an in such a case means 'what is to be offered to a deity " (devatā-višistam deyam). In the above instance, deyam or what is to be offered is used substantively and the deity to whom such an offering is made appears to be attributive.2 According another view, both the deity and the substance to be offered are the meanings of the suffix.

[ं] देवनाविधिष्टं हेंद्रं प्रस्यदाये: (—Vaiyākarapabhūgaņa,

म् प्रवाहेर्नेकरेशि प्रहायदी विशेष्यम्—Vsiybkaranabbüçana, Kār. 52.

It is also held that the base denotes the deity and the suffix expresses the offering.

Bhāva (Sattā) or oxistenco is what is expressed by all Pratinadikas. This satta is the same as summum genns (mahāsāmānua 2) which permeates through the world, only eggaisable as differentiated in different individuals. It is expressed by all words; it is signified by all Pratipadikas, roots and suffixes like tra and tal. These two suffixes generally express the idea of a class and sometimes indicate existence or the ultimate reality of things. Patañiali has clearly shown what is precisely denoted by the suffixes tra and tal while commenting on the two Vārttikas on the rule Pān. 5. 1. 119. Kendabhatta says in the beginning that the signification of the two taddhita suffixes, i.e., tva and tal (expressing 'the state of becoming,' or quality, or property) has been fully discussed by Bhartrhari in his commentary on the Mahabhasya (which is no longer available). The drift of his statement is as follows: the suffixes too and tal are added to krdanta, samāsānta and taddhitānta as expressive of relation.8 'The expression of relation' is the sole purpose that is served by the addition of these two suffixes. The following

¹ देवतायां प्रदेये च खण्डमः मित्रस्तु बाा-Vaiyākaraņabbūsaņa.

[॰] सम्बन्धिसेदात् यस्त्रैन सिद्साना ग्वादिषु । जातिरत्युचते तस्यं सव प्रव्य व्यवस्थिताः । तां प्रातिपदिकार्यं च भावस्यं च प्रवचते । सा निश्य सा सहानासा तानाइस्ततलादयः स—Vākyapadlya, 3. 34.

क्षादितसमासिथः सन्त्रशामधानं भावप्रयोगास्त्र ६व्यभित्रः
 इपाद्यभिष्टितसन्त्रस्थः !—Vsiyākarapabhūşapa. ander Kār. 49.

instances will make the point clear. rājapuruṣatva a relation between the king and the servant; in pācakatva a relation between action and the agent: in aupagavatva a relation between the father and the son is denoted and so on. Kaiyata observes that when the word gauh is used to denote only a class (gotva), these suffixes would then imply only 'the form of a word' (Sabda-svarūpe bhāva-pratyaya), but when it is used to express only an individual, the suffixes would then necessarily imply a class that would serve as an attributive. The terminations denoting an abstract idea, as in sato bhāvah sattā, 2 are generally used to indicate a class. that satta Kaiyata³ finally concludes existence is the only meaning of such suffixes (bhāva-pratyaya).

There are two Vārttikas which throw much light on the meaning of bhāva. The first Vārttika is intended to imply that the suffixes tva and tal are used to express that outstanding property (guṇa, jāti) or the ultimate reality of a thing) by virtue of the possession of which a thing generally gets its particular designation or name. According to this interpretation, what accounts for the use of a word in a particular

गवादय: ग्रब्दा यदा जातिमात्रवाचिनस्तदा तेभ्य: शब्दखरूपे भावप्रत्यय:। —Kaiyata.

² सत्तेति जातावेव भावप्रत्यय:।

तसात् सर्वेषु पदार्थेषु नित्यसम्वायिनी सत्तेव भावप्रत्ययवाच्या ।

किं तु यस गुणस्य भावाद्रव्ये प्रब्दिनिवेशसदिभिधाने त्व-तत्ती।
— Vār, under the rule Pāņ., 5. 1. 119.

sense is the inherent properties (auna. nati. ete) of the object deneted (pravrttmimitta). The Naivāvikas hold that these suffixes are added to words (ns ahatatva, manusuatra, etc.) to express the idea of nelass. As the Naivavikas usually comprehend the individual with direct reference to the class to which it belongs, they are ant to speak of a ahata as ahatatiaracchinna. i.c., the cencept of abata as conditioned or qualified by that of the genus (ahatatva). It is almost evident that the meaning expressed by tre and tal seems to be as good as a qualifying attribute in relation to the meaning of the base to which they are added. This is exactly what is meant by Kondabhatta whon he states prakrtuarthanrahāratām 1 According to the second Vārttiha,2 the meaning of a word is exactly what it signifies by the force of its untural expressiveness. The word gauh, for instance, has gotva as its pravrttinimitta, or the object for which it is used. Hero šabda itself, with its meaning as denoted by the suffixes tva and tal, acts as an attributive. The sense denoted by a word serves as an instrument so far as the use of that word (for the purpose of expressing the sense) is concerned. That it is the same with the knowledge of the meaning is also sufficiently clear from

[ा] प्रकृतिजन्यविधि प्रकारी भाव: |--Bhatton under the rule Pan, 5 1

³ यहा सूर्व भावा स्त्रेन भावेन भवित स्त्र तीषां भावसदिभिधाने !-- Vār. under Pān. 5 1. 119

Gangesa's definition of Sabdaprāmānya or the trustworthiness of Sabda.

Krt-suffixes have roots as their bases. Those that are used in the active and passive voices denote respectively the agent and the object.2 The suffixes like ghan, ktin, etc., generally express $bh\bar{a}va$ (action). $Bh\bar{a}va$ denoted by a suffix like ghañ is accomplished (siddha). The word pākaḥ is found to require a verbal form as bhavati and has both number and gender. Patañjali³ has shown two-fold bhāva—bāhya and ābhyantara. Bhāva denoted by suffixes like ghañ is called bāhya and that denoted by suffixes as tumun, etc., is denominated as ābhyantara. Kriyā or action manifests itself in two different forms, namely, siddha or accomplished and asiddha or unaccomplished; the former means an action like gamana that is accomplished, i.e., cessation of movement, and the latter indicates the continuity of action as gacchati. A bhāva when accomplished and followed by a krt-suffix seems to be as good as a substance and in consequence of such materialisation it comes to have gender

प्रयोगहेतुभृतार्थतत्त्वज्ञानजन्य: शब्द: प्रमाणम्—Tattvacintāmaņi— Sabdakhanda, Vol. I, p. 1.

कार्तृकामेविह्तिकातां कार्तृकामेणी वाची-Mañjūṣā, क्रदर्थान्छपणम्, p. 108.

Mahābhāşya, Vol. II, p. 177.

क्रियायाः सिद्धतावस्था साञ्चावस्था च कीर्तिता। सिद्धतां द्रव्यमिच्छन्ति तवैदेच्छन्ति घञ्-विधिम ॥—-Vākyapadīya. साध्यलेन क्रिया तत धातुरूपनिवन्धना। सिद्धभावन्तु यस्त्रया: स घञादिनिवन्धन: ॥—Vaiyākaraņabhūṣaṇa.

and number and is finally treated as a Kāraka in relation to some other verbal forms, as gamanam karoti. This is the import of the grammatical dictum ' (सदिभिष्टितो भावी द्रव्यवत वसामते) which clearly states that an action (bhāta) expressed by krt suffixes appears to be just like n substance and thus desorves nll the functions of n Pratinadika. Krtua (tavua, aning, etc.) and Lhalartha-pratuguas, when used to express bhaia, denote an netien that is unaccomplished. Similar is the case with the suffix hta when used to denote bhara only. In an instance like edhilavyam, it must be borne in mind that there is no desire for any other verb te make the sense complete. Patanuli 2 has clearly shown the difference between bhava as expressed by tin and ket suffixes, the former suggesting the idea of time and person and the latter preducing the sense of a thing. There is another way of distinguishing them, ns bhava denoted by tin is generally connected with the ngent, while bhava, as expressed by krt, is not similarly related to the agont (pacati gives the idea of an agent but pākah simply means the action, t. e., cooking). Words formed by a number of krt suffixes such as, tumun, htvac.

¹ Mahabh sya under Ibe rule Pan., মার্বধানুর অক্-3.1.67

भिन् विशेष, इन्द्रोशिहतस भावण विङ्गिहितस सः। तिङ्गिहितन भावन कालपुरुषीयण्डा स्थानण्यन्ते, इन्द्रीबिहतन प्रवनं क्रव्याने...तिङ्गिहितो भाव. क्रवा मंग्रवृत्र्यते, इन्द्रीभिहतो भाव. क्रवा मंग्रवृत्र्यते, इन्द्रीभिहता पुनर्ने स्पयुव्यते।—Mababbays, Vol II, p 67, and (क्रयाभिहित्रो यदा त्यान्।

क्ष्याविभक्तःव्यय्धिइयुक्ती भावनादा द्रव्यमिनीपल्त्य: ॥---Brhaddevata

namul, etc., are grammatically treated as indeclinable (avyaya). These forms, better known as avyaya-kṛt, denote bhāva as distinct from substance (asattvabhūta·bhāva) and have no regular number and gender. The verbal forms having ktvā and tumun are generally used as adjunct in relation to those that follow them. So far as the suffix $ktv\bar{a}$ is concerned, the two kriyās are related to each other, as both of them have got the same subject and stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority. On the authority of the rule Pān., 3. 3. 10, Nāgeśa holds that tādarthya as implying a purpose is also indicated by tumun. In accordance with this view, the expression Kṛṣṇam draṣṭum yāti will mean one's movement for the purpose of seeing Krsna.

Mañjūṣā, Kṛdarthanirūpaṇam, pp. 1083-84.

CHAPTER VII

Kāraka

Kāraka—its definition—Éakts manifested as Kārakas—
different forms of Kārakas.

Closely connected with the meaning of case-terminations is the function of $K\bar{u}rakas$. $K\bar{u}raka$, as the very term implies, is intimately related to $Kriy\bar{u}$ or action. The idea of $K\bar{u}raka$ is dependent on that of $Kriy\bar{u}$. It is its relation with $Kriy\bar{u}$ that determines the nature of a $K\bar{u}raka$. $Kriy\bar{u}$, which plays so important a part in the determination of $K\bar{u}rakas$, is, as Patanjali observes, denoted by roots and is invisible, formless and only comprehensible by means of inference.

Generally speaking, Kriyā means action (vyāpāra). Kriyā implies, some hold, action, effort (kṛti or yatna) and result (phala). There is a peculiar combination of these three in the grammatical conception of Kriyā. Kriyā is, after the grammarians, an action accompanied with effort and leading to the result. According to Udayana,3 the meaning of a root is

- 1 कियां करोतीति कारकम् and कियानियलं कारकलम्।
- ² चालथे: क्रिया। क्रियावचनी चातु:। क्रिया नामयमव्यनापरिष्टशः । सामावनुमानगर्याः - Mahābhāgya under the role Pāņ., 1 B. 1.
 - ं यह एवं कृति: पूर्वा, प्रवित्त हैंद भावना !-- Kusumālijali, Kār. 5. 8.

effort (yatna) producing an action. When this exertion is directed towards the production of the result, it is called bharana, as is denoted by the ākhyāta-suffix. Durga 1 has defined kriyā as what appears to possess both prior and posterior parts. The process of inference whereby $Kriy\bar{a}$ is usually comprehended has been clearly illustrated by Patanjali.2 Sometimes, when all the requisites of cooking, such as pot, fuel and fire, are actually present, we are not allowed to say pacati, until there is a particular effort indispensably necessary for the purpose. This sort of effort (sādhana) without which nothing is accomplished is called Kriyā.8 A Kriyā, like pacati, consists of many parts all of which, viewed as an undifferentiated whole, tend to produce the same result.2 From a grammatical point of view, pacati means a group of actions, namely, to place a pot on the fire-place, to set fire to, to throw fuel on and the like. As synonymous with īhā, yatna, etc., Kriyā comes within the scope of

There are various agents (sādhana) whereby actions are generally performed; these agents, whether directly or indirectly related to action

quality and as such pertains to things.

[े] जियत इति जिया सा च पूर्वोपरीस्तावयदेव !—Under the rule Kalapa, १ (akbyats).

[ं] दूह स्वेषु साधनेष्ठ सितिहितेषु सदासित् एसतीलेत्रदति सदाचित्र भवति। —Mahābhāṣys under Pāṇ.. 1. 4. 23.

⁸ टिस्त् चाइने चिहिहिते पचतीत्वेतहवीत सा नू किया।—Ibid.

^{*} गरम्तेरच्छडे: चस्इ: बमजदानाम् । इडा प्रचल्कितासेद: सा जिल्लेलिकीयते ॥—Vākyapadīya.

(Krivā), are grammatically called Kārakas. There are, therefore, as many Karakas as there are sidhanas in relation to a particular action. In conformity with the interpretation of Durga,1 Krivā is immaterial and formless: it comes under our comprehension only through the medium of Karalas Kriva. like gung, is an inherent property lying dormant in all things, but gets itself manifested when objects are in operation to produce some sort of result. As the action denoted by the verbal form patati comprehends four things. namely, tree, leaf, ground and wind, we have ın such a eise us royuna erksüt parnam patatı bhuman precisely four Karakas, according to their relation to the particular netion (falling). The tree, for instance, which indicates the limit wherefrom the leaf falls down is called Apadana-Larala, the leaf that fulls down and is thus primarily associated with the action is named hartr-loraka; the ground which forms the substratum of action is known as Adhikarana Laraka, the wind that causes the leaf to fall is termed Karana-kāraka, or instrumental The namo of each Kāraha, as shown above, is thus suggestive of the relation in which a Karaka stands to a Kriyā. Nāgesa * has dwelt at longth on the definition of Kriya as suggested by

चम्ला इिकास निद्याणा सा इिकासकैरियक्समाना कारकमरीरे वसनी महाने निद्यम् (--Nicokto p 88

[ं] सवकारकाको धालध इन्द्रम्. (—Laghamalijüst p 514

Bhartrhari. He begins with the statement that all $K\bar{a}rakas$, as a rule, get themselves connected with $Kriy\bar{a}$.

Turning to the definition of the term $K\bar{a}raka$, we meet with considerable difficulty owing to the difference of views on the subject. First, the term Kāraka seems to have been too popular to deserve any definition; Pānini accordingly speaks of Kārake as only an adhikāra-sūtra. Patañjali takes the word Kārake as indicating a samiñā 1 and goes on to say that grammatical samijnās are generally made by such words as are popularly found to be denotative of sense.2 With the object of pointing out that the term Kāraka serves to indicate both samiñā and samiñī, he has defined it in the following way: ' sādhakam nirvartakam kāraka-samjñam bhavati,' which means that an agent gets the designation of Kāraka by virtue of performing some action. He has clearly shown the difficulty that becomes almost unavoidable, if the samifins not specifically indicated by the samiñā. Patañjali takes Kāraka as a mahā-samjñā with a view to show that the derivative meaning of the word (karotiti kārakam) is exactly harmonious

¹ विभिदं कारक इति ? संज्ञानिहेंश: |--Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., 1. 4. 23.

³ इह हि व्याकरणे ये वेते लोके प्रतीतपदार्थका: श्रव्हास्तीर्नेदशा: क्रियन्ते।— *Ibid*.

[े] इतर्षा चानिष्टं प्रसन्धेत । श्रकारकस्याप्यपादानसंज्ञा । ग्रामस्य समीपादा-गच्छतीत ।—Ibid.

with what it usually signifies. But we cannot take karotiti kārakam as an accurate definition of Kāraka from a grammatical point of view. To define Kāraka simply as 'what performs an action' will serve to exclude all Kārakas, excepting kartī-kāraka, from the category. As a matter of fact, it is kartā alone that acts as the direct agent, so far as the performance of action is concerned; but Kārakas like Karana and Adhikarana are only indirectly (i.e., through the agency of kartī) related to kriyā.

Patanjali next proceeds to show how Karana 2 and Adhikarana may also be used as kartī-kāraka consistently with the etymological signification of the word Kāraka. The meaning of the roots like pac seems to be different in relation to different Kārakas. We say Devadatah pacati when Devadatta is found to pour water in the pot, to throw fuel into the fire-place and so on. This is, so to speak, the instance where the main agent of action is treated as kartā. But kartītva is sometimes transferred to Karana and Adhikarana, as in kāshāni pacanti and sthālī pacati, respectively.

¹ महत्या: संजाया: करण एतत् प्रयोजनभनवंशंत्रा यथा विजायते, करोतीति कारकमिति |---Mababbayya under the rule 'Kātake '

^{*} सिद्ध. करणाधिकरणयी: कर्त्तभाव: I—Ibid.

s पचादीनां हि प्रतिकारक किया सिद्यते।-Ibid

^{*} एतत् प्रधानकर्त्तुः कर्तृत्वम् ।--Ibid.

Under the rule Kalāpa, 221 (kār.), Durgasimha is found to have given a definition 1 (kriyānimittam Kārakam) which means 'Kāraka is the cause of action.' This definition, we are told, is sanctioned by the popular usage. We have other definitions as well—kriyājanakatvam kārakatvam, kriyānvayitvam kārakatvam and so on. There is, however, some difficulty with regard to the definition as suggested by Durga, because the word nimitta, as synonymous with kārana, means cause and, consequently, it must have antecedence to kriyā.2 But in an instance of nirvarttya-karman such as, ghatam karoti 3 (making a pot), the pot is not logically supposed to have existence prior to the action, and, therefore, it is not strictly correct to take ghata as an example of karma-kāraka. Having raised this objection, Susena proceeds to support it by holding that the antecedence of the knowledge of pot is here attributed to the pot itself by a process of transference (upacāra).

Sambandha, though indirectly connected with $kriy\bar{a}$ as a remote cause of action, is grammatically excluded from the category of $K\bar{a}raka$, inasmuch as the term $K\bar{a}raka$ is used by the

¹ क्रियानिमित्तं कारकं लीकतः सिङ्म ।

² श्रन्यथा सिद्धिय्चले सति नियतपूर्ववित्तिलम्।

[े] घटं करोतीत्वन निर्वत्यंकर्मणः कथं क्रियानिमित्तत्वन् ? क्रियासिडी घटस्य नियतपूर्ववर्त्तित्वाभावात् । सत्यम् । क्रियासिडी घटज्ञानस्य पूर्ववर्त्तित्वसिद्धतात्, घटस्यापि पूर्ववर्त्तित्वमुपचयंति इत्यदीपः।— Kāraka, Kavirāja on the rule 221.

grammarians as a technical name 1 (rūdha-kabda) applicable only to six cases. Tho way in which Jagndisa has discussed the definition of Karaka and specially the nature of sambandha deserves special consideration for logical accuracy. He defines Kāraka 2 ns what is denoted by sup or caso-ondings and is apparently used as a qualifying attribute in relation to kriyā. As to the exclusion of sambandha from the entogory of Kāraka, ho observes that noither sasthis (ns expressive of relation) is regarded as a casotermination (Karaka-vibhakti), ner is sambandha grammatically treated as a form of Kāraka. simply for the reason that sambandha dees never directly qualify the action. Censequently, an expression like tandulasya pacati, directly connecting the verbal form with a werd indicating sambandha, is not at all sanctioned by the pepular usage. The word sesa, which is n grammatical name denoting sambandha, is an indication that sambandha is excluded from Kārakas as such. Instances like (i) durgatānām pratikurvīta, (ii) padmasyanukaroti. (iii) Laksmīrupakurute pareşām, etc., where the gonitive is directly connected with Kriyā, present, so to speak, an

¹ सम्बन्धस्य क्रियानिमित्तलेऽपि पट्मु कारकशस्य दहलात् न कारकलिसि संचिद:—Kavisāja (Kalāpa).

[&]quot; धालवांग्री प्रकारी य: सुवय: सीइच कारकम्--Sabdasakti., Kar. 67. and कियाप्रकारीभृतीइप: कारकम् !--Ibid.

[ै] सन्तर्भी न कारल न वा तद्रधिकापि पष्टी कारकविभक्ति: 1-Ibid.

anomaly. Jagadīśa makes his way out by holding that the above instances, like $m\bar{a}tuh$ smarati, caurasya hinasti, are special cases where the genitive is optionally used (in place of $dvit\bar{\imath}y\bar{a}$) in connection with some particular verb, viz, the accusative of the verbal form karoti preceded by the Upasargas as prati, anu, upa getting $sasth\bar{\imath}$ instead of $dvit\bar{\imath}y\bar{a}$.

Reference is further made to such instances as dandena ghatah and bhūtale ghatah 2 in order to show that the instrumental and the locative in these cases are not, from a strictly grammatical point of view, indicative of Kārakas, since they have no relation to $Kriy\bar{a}$. The primary condition of a Kāraka in general is to have a direct connection with $Kriy\bar{a}$. Karana, as a class of $K\bar{a}raka$, is thus differentiated from hetu, for it has no necessary or indispensable connection with the action. But what has proved a stumbling block to Jagadiśa is an instance like mama pratibhāti,3 where the genitive seems to be irreconcilable with the verb. On the strength of such popular usage as sā me pratibhāti, we hold that the plausible view in support of these expressions and the like to comprehend certain words (idam or is

¹ क्रियाविभेषयोगे कारकार्थेव षष्ठी । प्रयोगदृष्या प्रत्यनूपेग्यः करोतेः कर्मण्यपि वैकल्पिकस्य षष्ठीविभेवेत्तव्यत्वात् ।—Sabdasakti.

² दाखेन घट दत्यादी तु तृतीयादार्थ: करणलादिकं न कारकं धालर्थान-नितत्वात्।—Ibid.

³ प्रतिभादिक्रियायामस्तरादे: सन्तन्तः षष्ठ्या कथं वीध्यतामकारकविभक्तित्वादिति । प्रवनीयम्—Sabda≨akti., under the Kār. 67. घटस्य.

etad) agreeing with the verbal form pratibhāti and to explain the genitive in mama with reference to such words as sannidhau or sakāse understood.

While considering the different manifestations of Sakti or efficiency, we have seen that Sādhana which means an active agent in relation to an action also comes within the domain of Sakti,1 Having taken an extreme view of Sakti,2 some have tried to show that the entire universe is intrinsically made up of Sakti. 'How are we to know that it is Sakti and not dravua that is to be regarded as Sadhana? A thing is composed of a collection of Sakti. A ghata, for instance, is essentially a combination of such Sakti as the capacity for fetching water; a seed has the power of producing a sprout and so on. Thus, all objects are found to be efficient for performing some actions. As Sakti is sometimes discriminated from dravya, as a distinct entity, Bhartrhari understands Sādhana by Sakti, which is perceived to have direct association with actions. A thing, on the other hand, is not identified with Sadhana in accordance with this point of view, because a thing, limited as it is by its form, is not practically competent to perform all those diverse actions which naturally presuppose some kind of Sakti as the real active principle. Every

क्रियाणामभिनिष्यत्ती सामव्य साधनं विदु:—Vākyapadīya, 3. 1.

यक्तिनातासमुच्य विषयानेक्थमंगः—Ibid.

thing has its inborn Sakti that is manifested when it is at work. Sakti always comprehends things as its substratum, and consequently, it cannot have its existence independently of things. The relation in which Sakti stands to objects is one of co-inherence (samavāya). Having thus shown Sādhana as a form of all-pervading Sakti, Bhartrhari continues that Sakti is said to have six distinct but permanent divisions or forms corresponding to six Kārakas.2 A question may, however, arise here as to the precise number of Sakti, since Sakti appears to be numerous in its aspects, according and diverse inheres things wherein it are manifold and seem to be different from one another in several aspects. Bhartrhari takes recourse to the argument that a close examination of the various activities is sure to prove the reducibility of Sakti to six only. As an alternate view, it further suggested on the analogy of Kārakas, which, having either direct or indirect connection with actions, express but kartrtva in its different aspects, that one and the same Sakti 3 may be said to have six different forms just in proportion to the number of causes that serve to manifest it. The point

¹ सर्वत्र सहजा शक्तियांबद्दव्यमवस्थिता |—Vākyapadiya. प्राययसम्बेताम्त शक्तय: |—Helārāja.

[्]रै नित्या: षट् शक्तय:—Vākyapadīya, and इव्याकारादिभेदेन तायापरिमिता इव।

दृग्यन्ते तत्त्वमासां तु पट् शक्ती नांतिवर्तते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 3. 86.

⁵ निमित्तभेदादेनेव भिन्ना गत्ति: प्रतीयते ।—Vākyapadiya, 3. 37.

that deserves particular notice in this connexion is that the term $K\bar{a}raka$ is, strictly speaking, applicable to $kartr-k\bar{u}raka$ alone, the other $K\bar{u}rakas$ (such as Karana, etc.) getting their particular designation only as indicative of the different aspects of kartrtva.

After dealing with the views with regard to both unity and diversity of Sakti, Bhartphari next takes up the question whether Sakti2 is undifferentiated from things or has a distinct character of its own apart from tho object. The grammarians, as Helārāja observes, are in favour of the latter point of view, as it is supported by both popular usago and grammar. Referring to the method of agreement and difference. Hari further attempts to strengthen his standpoint that Sakti, as represented by Kārakas, is virtually distinct from things. The burden of his arguments is as follows: as the meanings of caseterminations indicating Kārakas (Karana and -Adhikarana) in forms like vyksena and vykse are actually different from those of the stem (vrksa), it is but reasonable to take Sakti as a distinct object of thought to which the grammatical term Kāraka is generally applied. It is almost incontestable that the standpoint

[े] नियमिमार्थे कर्मश्च सर्वेतैदासि कारके। and शदधोनश्वधित्वात् श्वनानां निवर्तमात् ।—Vakyapadiya, 3, 99, again—धोटा कर्मृत्वमेवाङ्गलामृहश्विनिवश्यनम्।
—Ibid, 3, 37, कर्मृत्वमेवान्तरत्वापारिववचया करणादित्वपदेशच्याते अञ्चलHelārāja,

² तत्त्वे वा व्यतिरेके वा व्यतिरिक्तं तदुचते—Vākyapadiya, 3. 38.

thing has its inborn Sakti that is manifested when it is at work. Sakti always comprehends things as its substratum, and consequently, it cannot have its existence independently of things. The relation in which Sakti stands to objects is one of co-inherence (samavāya). Having thus shown Sādhana as a form of all-pervading Sakti, Bhartrhari continues that Sakti is said to have six distinct but permanent divisions or forms corresponding to six Kārakas.2 A question may, however, arise here as to the precise number of Sakti, since Sakti appears to be numerous and diverse in its aspects, according as things wherein it inheres are manifold and seem to be different from one another in several aspects. Bhartrhari takes recourse to the argument that a close examination of the various activities is sure to prove the reducibility of Sakti to six only. As an alternate view, further suggested on the is analogy of Kārakas, which, having either direct or indirect connection with actions, express but kartriva in its different aspects, that one and the same Śakti may be said to have six different forms just in proportion to the number of

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¹ सर्वेच सहजा शक्तियांबद्दव्यमवस्थिता।—Vākyapadīya. धाययसम्वेताम्तु शक्तयः।—Helārāja.

[ै] नित्या: पट् शक्तय: — Vākyapadīya, and द्रव्याकारादिभेदेन ताशापरिमिता इव।

हम्यने तत्त्वनासां तु पट् शक्ती नीतिवर्तते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 3. 36.

[ै] निमित्तभेदादेनेव भिन्ना ग्ता:. प्रतीयते !—Vakyapadiya, 3. 37.

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¹ निष्पत्तिमाने कर्रुल सर्वेत्रेशांचि कारके। and नदधीनप्रश्नितान् प्रश्नानां निवर्तनान् |-Vakyapadiya, 3, 99, again-बोटा कर्नुलसेनाह्मत्वश्रातिवस्त्रनत्। —1613, 3, 37, कर्नुलसेवात्तरवापारिविवष्या कर्वादिध्यपदेशस्यतां सन्तत-Helasia

तन्ते वा व्यक्तिके वा व्यक्तिक तद्वाते—Vakyapadiya, 3. 88.

taken by the grammarians goes directly against that of the Naiyāyikas who refuse to take Sakti as a separate entity. According to the Naiyāyikas, fire and the power of producing burning sensation (dāhikā-śakti) are not materially two distinct objects. They do not recognise any Sakti and the difference between possessing it (śaktimān). What we practically learn from a careful study of the various aspects of Sakti as such and what proves to be of vital importance from the grammatical point of view may be thus briefly summarised: Sādhana, which is only a name for Kāraka, is nothing but a form of Śakti, and, accordingly, Kārakas like Karman, Karana, etc., so far as they are denoted by particular caseendings, are only indicative of Sakti, or the power of performing actions as we may call it. Moreover, a mere grammatical derivation of the Sādhana and Kāraka is sufficient to terms show that they are synonymous for all practical purposes and are expressive of Sakti, viz., efficiency or efficient object (if efficiency is held to be undifferentiated from the efficient object).

Gopīnātha, the well known commentator on the Kātantra-pariśiṣṭa, has also elaborately dealt with the grammatical aspect of the problem. He seems to have arrived at the same conclusion, *i.e.*, identity of $\hat{S}akti$ with $K\bar{a}raka$. The question 1 is first

अय द्रव्यादयो वा द्रव्याद्यक्तियो वा शक्तिमन्ती वा कार्वाणि।--Parisista, Karakaprakaranam.

raised whether substance, quality, action, class, etc., or the potency inherent in them, or, 'things pessessing such potency are to be taken as Karakas. Next, he proceeds to show that none of these standpoints are free from objections. The defect underlying the first view is as follows: if substance,1 quality, etc., which have their essential character, as is represented by the class, unalterable by nature, are identified with Karakes as such, we cannot possibly justify the instances2 like sthātī pacati, sthālyā pacati, sthālyām pacati, and sthallm pecati where one and the same substance (*thall) appears to be different so far as its connection with the action is concerned. Sthall paceti, for example, where sthatt is used as the direct active agent, is distinguished from *thalua pacati where sthali is no longer karta but only an instrument of action (ecoking). But as a matter of faet, sthall, as is conditioned by its essential aspect (sthalltra), is eac and knows no diversity at all. The second view is also untenable, for if it were so (i.c., if only netivities of things were Karakas), it would be unjustifiable te use the term Karaka with direct reference to things * (as we take vrksa te be an instance of Apādana-kāraka in vīksāt parņam patati),

ดด

सद्यभेदामाबादेकव्याप्यपादानादि-नानागैजाप्रग्रज्ञात्—Parisința.

चपादानादिकारकव्यपदियो नोपपयति सर्वकारकाचौ परभ्यस्यावतैकलान्-Ibid.

न दितीय:। ष्टपादावपादानादि-कारकथ्यवद्यादिशीपापती:—Parisista,

Kāraka.

The third one is also open to criticism on the ground that Sakti can neither be taken as an attributive (višesaņa), nor as an upalaksaņa (characteristic) with regard to things, the former giving rise to mere prolixity and the latter rendering the assumption of Sakti entirely futile. Having thus shown the untenable features of the above-mentioned standpoints, Gopinātha then puts forward his own views. Kāraka,2 he holds, is the same as Sakti, which is supposed to have different forms; substance, etc., are to be understood as the substratum of such divergent Sakti. As to the application of the term kāraka to a thing like vṛkṣa, etc., Gopinatha explicitly states that it is simply to imply the non-difference between Sakti and the object possessing Sakti that things are popularly comprehended by Kārakas.

He has further raised an important point. There is, strictly speaking, no such rigid principle as to restrict the use of certain $K\bar{a}rakas$ to particular things, because the subjective element, such as the intention of the speaker, appears to be a prominent factor that often regulates the use of $K\bar{a}rakas$. Thus one and the same thing, such as asi (sword) may be either used as $kart\bar{a}$ or karana, according as the

¹ न हतीय:। विकल्पासहत्वात्। तथा हि श्रांतमतः कारकत्वे श्रांतिविशेषण-सुपलचणं वा।—Parisispea.

² शक्ति: कारकम्। भिद्राय भवन्ति शक्तयः। भिद्रानां शक्तीनांमाधारी द्रव्यादयः।—Ibid.

येन येन खरूपेण या या मितिरिवन्यते । तेन तेन खरूपेण सैव मितिस्तु कारकम्॥
—Ibid.

speaker intends to imply by the operation of the active agent or that of the instrumental (asischinatti and asinā chinatti) with regard to the action (cutting).

A word is only needed to ascertain the precise number of Kārakas. Hari has referred to six manifestations of Sakti corresponding to the six Kārakas. Sakti is essentially one and indivisible. It is aviduā or falsity that makes it look like different. The ultimate unity of Sakti 1 is only eognisable on the disappearance of avidyā. The whole world with all its diversities is only a materialised image of the infinito cit-šakti. Viewed from a transcendental standpoint, the se-called division of the world as external and internal has no real meaning. The word Kāraka, as used in grammar, seems to be an underivable one (avyutpanna-ŝabda) 2 that is restricted to the neuter gender only. That Kārakas are six in number requires ne further explanation. But Gopinatha seems to have shown some ingenuity in pointing out the possibility of reducing this number to five and ultimately to two only. Kārakas, he suggests, may be divided into five classes, according as

¹ षवियायवहारदगाया प्रयक्तीन प्रकाशते, षवियाविषये लेखलेन प्रकाशते इति नोजयम् ।—Helārāja, under the Vākyapadiya, Kar. 8. 89.

कारकरान्द्रायमञ्जूपती निमित्तपराय: सभावातप्रभक्तिक्रय—Panjl (Kajāpa) on the rule 221 (Kārska).

^{़ै} कारकं पुनद्रे यगुणितयानातिख इपमेदात् पश्चिषम्। भूयय् हिनिधं स्वग्रद्धवायं पुरग्रद्धनायं च—Parisisja, Kāraka.

they are represented by substance, quality, action, class and the essential property. They may, again, fall under two categories, viz. svašabdavācya and parašabda-vācya, as they are denoted by their respective technical terms or by some other words.

Of all Sādhanas, kartr-kāraka or the nominative case is taken up first, as one having direct connection with the action. Considering all those qualities that go to constitute a Kāraka, kartṛkāraka alone seems to be primarily connected with kriyā, and as such, is the kāraka par excellence. The aphorism of Panini defining kartykāraka lays much stress on the independent character (svātantrya) of kartr by virtue of which the agent is distinguished from the rest. Patanjali expressly takes the word svatantra as an equivalent of pradhana and explains such prādhānya with reference to the characteristic non-dependence of the agent on any accessories, so far as the performance of an action is concerned. It is to be particularly noticed 1 that cases like Karana and Adhikarana are but auxiliaries that bring about the completion of the action under the direct operation of the subject. The agent, on the other hand, is not similarly subservient to those instruments of actions in the strict sense of the term. This is why $kart\bar{a}$ is called svatantraor self-dependent in opposition to the rest, that

[🚶] करणादीनां तु कर्नुविनियोगादेव खव्यापारे खातन्त्राम्।—Helārāja on Vakya., 3, 99.

are mere or less paratantra or dependent on the agent. Patanjali has referred to both svatantra and paratantra and rightly observes that the entire question of dependence and independence is practically based upon the intention of the speaker.1 Thus, as a matter of fact, one and the same object may be treated either as the limit of separation (avadhi. i.c., Apādāna) or as the agent of action (valāhakāt viduotate and valāhako viduotate2). We new draw an example from common experience. Just as the representatives of a king appear te be subordinate in the presence of their king, though they are independent for all purposes when they werk independently of the king in their respective spheres of activities, so sthall may be taken either as svatantra er paratantra according as it is intended to be speken of either as pradhona or merely as an auxiliary in relation to the action. Vivaksa or the intention of the speaker being thus an important factor that determines the naturo ef a Kāraka, we are allowed to use the word sthālī, for instanço, as Kartā, Karma, Karana, and Adhikarana. From what we have seen above, it is sufficiently clear that in view of the prependerance of rivaksā, the word svatantra in the rule svatantrah kartā should be taken as

मुंबंग्नेवाच खातल्या' पारतल्या' च विविध्यतम्-Mahābbāşya, Vol I, p. 825.

Mahabbaşya, Vol I, p. 325.

भनावादीनां राजा सड समवाये पारतना, व्यवाये खातन्तान्—Ibid, p
 326.

in, then, lies the superiority of the subject?3 The

[े] यदा चौकर्यातिशयं योतिवतं कर्तिर कर्तृत्यापारी न विवस्यते तदा कारकाना-राण्यपि कर्त्र संज्ञां लभने खव्यापारे खतन्त्रलात्—Siddhanta Kaumudī. Bhāsya has—खाली पचतीति अधिकरणस्य कर्त्र लम्, काष्ट्रानि पचन्तीति करणस्य कर्त्र लम्— Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 825, and पर्याप्तं करणाधिकरणयी: कर्तृभावः— Mahābhāṣya.

कर्ण पुनर्जायते कर्ता प्रधानमिति ? यत् सर्वेषु साधनेषु सिन्निष्ठ कर्ता प्रवेतियता भवति—Mabābhāsya, Vol. I., p. 826.

[ै] करणादीनामि खव्यापारे खातन्त्रात् कीऽतिशयः कर्तुः ?—Helārāja.

subject has certain special features or properties, as are clearly shown by Hari, which serve to distinguish it from other Karakas. As an efficient cause of action by itself, the agent does not derive its specific function from any other accessories whatsoever, but ronders such instruments only subscryient to its operation. The socalled indopendence of cases like Karana and Adhikarana is only borrowed from that of the agent; the accessories are employed by the agent desirous of attaining the accomplishment of action, and their functions are liable to be stopped as soon as the agent ceases to work. The supreme independence of the agent is also clear from the fact that the agont, like Karana, etc., cannot have a substitute without a change of action. Moreover, the agent is allowed to have its operation unimpaired even whon no other instrument of action is sought for, but the reverso of the case is impossible, that is to say, Karana, etc., are not competent to accomplish the action independently of the agent. Helārāja 3 makes an important observation here. He says that the independence of the agent is

[े] प्रान्यतः प्रक्रिलामात् व्यत्भाक्षापादनादपि । तदधीनप्रकृतिलात् प्रकृतीनां निवतनात् । श्रद्धलात् प्रतिनिधः प्रविधेके च दर्धनात् । धारादच्युपलास्ति स्तातन्त्राः कर्तस्थति :—Vākyapadiya, 3, 99-100.

[ँ] करणादीनां प्रतिनिधिषकः। कर्तुः समास्य— Uelārāja and सम्यूकारियो विशिष्यते कर्ता ।

प्रतेम श्तुकलापेन कर्तः करणापेच्या क्रियाधिकी विश्वक्रधेपकारकलेऽपि— स्वातका प्राधायिक्यमनसुखरी इति तस्य करस्या गतु करणार्थः स्वयापरि स्वतन्त्रसायीवयः—Helaraja on the Vakyapadiya 3. 90-100.

so prominent that the instrumental or *Karana*, though more closely connected with the action than the agent itself, is not popularly designated as such.

While independence (svātantrya) is explained with such a breadth of implication and the agent made a repository of so many properties,1 we can hardly preclude the apprehension as to how inanimate objects such as agni and ratha in agnih dahati, ratho gacchati, etc., can legitimately be taken as the agents. Bhartrhari seems to have his answer ready. It does not necessarily follow, he says, that possessing those properties are only capable of being regarded as agents, but what is plausible from a grammatical point of view is that anything, whether animate or inanimate. may be used as the agent, only if such properties are verbally attributed to the object in question.2 It is from the use of words that the agent is comprehended. It does not matter much if such grammatical agents are found to have no innate relation with those properties which are usually ascribed to them. Further, as a system of study entirely devoted to words, and their popular signification, grammar does not care so much for strict adherence to reality or

¹ धर्मरभ्य दितै: शब्दे नियमी न तु वस्तुनि। कर्तुर्धर्मविवचायां शब्दात् कर्ता प्रतीयते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 3. 101.

शब्देन यखैते घर्ना: प्रत्याय्यने स कर्ता—Helārāja.

agreement of thought with truth, but takes words and then mornings as they are popularly used The real factor that accounts for such transference of properties to minimate objects, is, as we have already pointed out, the desire of the speaker himself. As the independence of the agent is a matter of ittalea, one and the same thing (as the soul) may be used, as in the example atmanamatmana hanti, either as tho subject, the object, or the instrumental. Under the Varttika, alma-samyoge las malartuh larmadarkanāt, Patanjalı has clearly shown how one mid the same soul may become both the subject and the object (atmatmanam hanti) according to the desno of the speaker The differentiation of the soul, as in such a easo, is far from being real, but is only comprehended by different forms of the word (ātmānam, ātmanā und ātmā) As thero is hardly nny contontion regarding the unity of the soul, of course from the Vedanta standpoint, we are justified to jaise the aucstion what destroys the soul and what is really destroyed by tho soul 2 It is curious to note how Patanjali has advanced arguments in support of the duality of the soul Solf has, he holds, two distinct forms.8 namely, corporal soul (farratmā) and natellectual

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[ं] न तु बस्तिवयतया घर्माणामियां सक्षादीऽत्येषणीय । येनाचेतनविषयेऽ ग्रिट्टैइति नदी बहतीत्यादी च कर्तुं न स्थात् !—IIclārāja

² C/ शाय एकि न इन्यते |--Gita

क पुनराकान शन्त की बाक्सना इन्येत श्वानाकानवनामा अरीराक्षा च। —Mahābhhāsya, Vol II p 68

soul (antarātmā); the corporal soul performs those actions whereby the intellectual soul enjoys either pleasure or pain and vice versa. Kaiyaṭa's observation on this point: difference of souls is here actually meant and not the agency and objectivity of one and the same soul. According to the Sāṃkhya system, antarātman is the same as (antaḥkaraṇa) intellect, which is said to be active; the Naiyāyikas, on the contrary, take puruṣa to be antarātmā on account of its being the active agent, unlike the puruṣa of the Sāṃkhyaites.

The instance ankuro jāyate (a sprout is growing) presents another difficulty. There is much controversy regarding the question whether it is really existent (sat) or non-existent (asat) that comes into being. This question, as is well known, embodies the first philosophical enquiry about the genesis of the universe that had early engaged the attention of the Vedic Rsis in the remotest period of the intellectual history of mankind.

The reference is to the well-known $Sat-v\bar{a}da$ and $Asat-v\bar{a}da$. According to the $Sat-v\bar{a}dins$, it is sat or something having existence that is produced $(sadeva\ j\bar{a}yate)$; the $Asat-v\bar{a}dins$ hold, on the contrary, that it is asat

¹ वस्त एवानात्मभेदो न लेकस्वैव कर्मलं कर्तृतं च। सांस्थपचे अन्तः करणः मन्तरात्मा तस्वैव कर्तृत्वात्। पुरुषस्य कर्तृत्वात्। पुरुषस्य कर्तृत्वात् स एवान्तरात्मिति विविच्चतः।—Kaiyaṭa on the Bhāṣya.

[े] चहा इदमग त्रामीत्, त्रसहा इदमग त्रामीत्।—(Cf. Nasadiya Sūkta) Taittirīyopanişad, 2. 7.

that comes into existence. A thing scome to be non-existent before it is aethally produced. This kind of non-existence is called prāgabhāra by the Naiyāyikas. Again, what is sat is not liable to destruction, and it is equally true that nothing comes out of nothing. Sat is one of the three aspects with which Brahman is usually conceived by the Vedāntins. Asat or abhāra is also maintained to be the ultimate cause or final principle by a section of the Buddhist philosophers.

The sprout is found to have no existence before it grows; 3 and it is not therefore strictly correct to assume a non-existent thing as the agent of the verb jayate. To get rid ef this difficulty we should oithor explain the produotion of the sprout on the assumption of existence however unreal, or depend entirely en the desiro of the speaker as what accounts for such transference of existence. Moreover, the word 'sprout' is used in like instances by the speaker, as if the sprout were already existent, The order in which the six bhavanikaras havo been arranged by Vārsyāyaņi evidently shows that asti presupposes jayate, i.e., a thing cannot be said to be existent before it is produced. But it does not strictly represent a correct view.

[·] नासती विद्यति भावी नाभावी विद्यते सतः (—Gits, 2. 16.

अभावाहावीत्पचिनांतृपच्य प्रादुर्भावात् ।—Nyāya Būtra, 4.1.14. प्रभावाहावी लायत रति कस्वचिद्दर्भनम् ।—Nyāya-vārttika.

[°] उत्पत्तिः प्रागस्त्रावी बृद्धार्वस्थानिवसनः। प्रविशिष्टः सतानेन कर्ता भवति स्वातः — Vakyapadiya, 8. 103.

[•] न द्यजातीऽसीताचते !- Dorga. under Nirukta, p. 45.

In course of explaining the expression $j\bar{a}yata$ iti pūrvabhāvasyādimācaṣṭe, Durga does not fail to observe that jāyate also comprehends existence.1 The reason is quite obvious. A thing that is nonexistent is not capable of being produced. We can, however, assume a causal connection that bhāva with another. serially links one ultimate reality $(bh\bar{a}va)$ is the final cause of which these vikāras are only different manifestations. There is only one bhava or satta that permeates through the entire sphere of existence. Kriyā implies an action having both prior and posterior stages. Paurvāparya is to be understood with relation to time and space. Prajati means accordingly a collection of actions all tending to produce the same result (conjunction with a particular space). Jāyate and asti, viparinamate and vardhate and the like are all related to each other. A thing first comes into being and is then said to be existent and so forth. Having shown their mutual relation, Durga concludes with the remark that jāyate means only production 2 and not the next stage (existence), which invariably comes in association with the idea of jayate.

According to the Buddhist philosophers," a kāraņa has to destroy itself before it can bring into existence a kārya. The sprout is

[ं] न स्वियमाना जायते ।—Durga, under Nirukte, p. 45

[े] कायम इत्येष शब्दी सभीव वेशनं अवेति।—ILIA-

^{ें} र विकाशिसदी कार्यो कार्तमृत्याम प्रति।—Nyhya-varttika uneer

found to grow only when the seed is destreyed. As long as a seed remains a seed, there does not grow a sprent as such. The destruction of the seed is, therefore, the immediate cause that gives rise to a sprent. What we gather from this trend of arguments is that a sprent grows from non-existence of the seed a (abhāva). As it seeks to trace the origin of all things to a huge nothingness or nihilism, this view was rejected by all orthodox teachers.

The Naiyavikas argue in the following way: it is really out of a seed and not out of its final destruction that a sprout is produced.3 A change of physical composition is brought about in a seed when it is about to give birth to a sprout, The seed is not essentially destroyed but some cells are developed in it wherefrom the sprent is fermed.4 The seed is, therefore, to be considored as the material cause of a spreut. Horo the agency is to be understood as pertaining to Larya, i.e., what is preduced (sprout). sprout is supposed to have intellectual existence before it is actually produced. As a matter of fact, the material existence of the sprout before it is actually preduced is contrary to all experience; but it must be admitted that the

¹ वीजविनाणोऽदुरकारणमिति (--- Nyaya.varttika

च्यावाहावो नायते (—Ibid

एवं च थीजीपादान युक्तम्।—Ibid.

वीजावयवानां पूर्वव्युद्धनिवनी व्युद्धान्तरसृत्पयते इति व्युद्धान्तराहजुर
 भाविभवतीति।—Ibid

solution suggested by the grammarians refers more to the use of words than to the actual state of things. The grammarians 1 have repeatedly drawn our attention to the fact that they unhesitatingly take the meaning usually denoted by a word as its real signification and do not insist upon the material validity of such meanings. Here the science of grammar bears close comparison with the deductive logic which, as we know, is more or less concerned with the formal side of the proposition (as opposed to the material truth). An expression like golden mountain, though the material existence of what it denotes is really questionable, does not practically lie beyond the scope of the deductive logic.

Bhartrhari seems to have approached this question from a different point of view. shown with reference to the Vrttacaryā how the cause is changed into the effect and is said to be $j\bar{a}yate$ in the shape of $k\bar{a}rya$. He seeks to establish the non-difference 2 between the cause and the effect as well as between prakrti and vikrti (substance and its modification). This is another problem of much philosophical importance to decide whether it is the cause or the effect that is to be considered as sat. Some hold, as the

¹ व्याकरणे हि शब्दार्थोऽर्थ:—Helārāja.

² कारणं कार्यभावेन यदा वा व्यवतिष्ठते। कार्यशब्दं तदा लक्ष्मा कार्येलेनाथ जायते ॥ Vākyapadīya, 3. 104. Helārāja has the following :--परिणाम-दर्भने लमेदपच इदं मध्यते। कार्यकारणयोः प्रक्ततिविकारकपतया चौरं दिघ सन्पद्यते, वीजमङ्गरो जायते दलमेटेन व्यवहाराटेकस्थाप्यवस्थातरवस्थाविशेषस्वीकरणमावं खतन्त्रभिति ।

Naivāvikas, the cause to be sat and look upon the effect as essentially different from it (asat). The Samkhyaites take the effect to be real (sat), i.e., as what represents the cause only in a changed form. According to this view, kārana and kārva are the same as prakrti and vikrti. In contradiction with the view that an effect is virtually different from its cause. Hari maintains identity hetween karva and karana and prakrti and vikrti on the ground of such instances as 'milk is turned into hutter,' and 'the seed is transformed into a sprout' in order to show that the cause and the effect are not distinct entities. hut represent only different phases of one and the same object. In accordance with this standpoint, the expression 'a sprout is growing' should necessarily imply that the cause which has existence is what gets transformed (in the form of $k\bar{a}rva$) at a later time. This explanation seems to be based on the so-called parinama-vada as expounded by the Samkhyaites.

Referring to the difference of the cause and the effect, Bhartphari has attempted to show how ankura may be viewed as the agent. It is an indisputable fact that the sprout, as an individual (vyakti), cannot be supposed to have existence before it is produced; but it is equally true, we must admit, that the sprout,

—Helaraja.

¹ बार्रकारपर्योभेदवाद्शपि बास्त्वेन घरेष श्रानिक हैलाए। — Heisraja, विभक्तियोगि यत् कापि कारचेश्यः प्रवर्तते । खा जातियौतिकपेण तशापि व्यवतिष्ठते ॥—Våkyapadya, 106, and जातिकपेण कत्ते सं व्यक्तिद्वेप जनक्तिति।

viewed as a class, is comprehended to have perpetual existence (cf. the Nyāya conception an eternal entity). What we of class as learn from Bhartrhari and Helārāja regarding this point is that the sprout (a sprout is growing) appears to be the agent when taken as a class, and that it is said to be a product when it is viewed as an individual. The agent and the object that grows are, according to this interpretation, not different from each other, the former representing a class, and the latter representing an individual. The seed develops into a sprout or assumes a formal change in the shape of an effect. Moreover, the class and the individual being mutually dependent, we are not justified in taking one as distinct from the other.

The discussion on such a nice point does not, however, end here, but has practically given rise to a far more complicated question. It is really difficult to say whether prakrti or vikṛti should be taken as the agent of production, because there is no consensus of opinions with regard to this problem. A careful examination of facts, it must be remembered, goes to show that both the cause and the effect might be treated as the agent according to the nature of vivakṣā. In an instance like 'milk is turned

प्रज्ञति-विक्ततिविषयपर्यायतः कर्तृत्वं कार्रकारणयोः प्रयोगमेदिन ।

विकारो जन्मन: वार्ता प्रकृतिवैति संभ्यो। भिद्यते प्रतिपत्तृणां दर्भनं जिङ्ग-दर्भनै: ॥—Уākyapadīya, 3. 112.

into curd ' (ksīram dadhi sampadyate) we find that the relation in which prakṛti stands to vikṛti is one of co-inherence (sāmānādhikaranya). An expression like bijamankuro jāyate is sanctioned only to show the non-difference between kārana and kārya or prakrti and vikrti A sprout is not materially different from the seed wherefrom it grows; it is only an aspect of the seed or development from a crude form into a bulky one. Ankuro idvate, therefore, means that the cause (seed) which is sat gets a new life (janman) or reveals itself in the form of a sprout, Now there arises a doubt as to which of them is predominant in relation to the other. It is necessary to find out the dominant one, as it is dominant or pradhāna alone that is to be regarded as the agent in connection with the verbal form. There are practically two different views, namely, one supporting the agency or kartytva in favour of vikrti, and the other upholding the agency of prakrti. Vikrti1 comes to be regarded as the agent, when there is absence of co-inherence and the words denoting prakrti and · vikrti are found to have different case-endings (as in bijāt ankuro jāyate). The rule janikartuh prakrtih, Pan. 1.4. 30, which undoubtedly ascribes the agency to vikrti, may he explained here to show not only the formal but also the material difference between prakrti and

[े] सेदिविवचाया तु जानिकर्तुः प्रकृतिरित्वप्रोदानपचम्पेवान कारकविमक्तिः। चभेदिविवचाया तु चतुर्था चवकामः...विकारस्य कर्तृत्वावसाग्रः—Helārāja.

The agency of vikāra is also clearly out by such expression as mūtrāya sampadyate yavāgūļi, i.e., mūtram jāyate. What is deducible from these popular instances of grammar 1 is that vikāra is directly connected with the action, and, consequently, treated as the agent; and that prakrti has only indirect connection with the action and is generally used in the ablative case in order to prominently bring The expression 2 out its difference from vikāra. suvarnapindah kundale bhavatah, where number of the verbal form agrees with that of vikāra, serves to strengthen the view that vikāra alone should be used as the agent. But examples are not, however, wanting to show also the agency of prakrti. The expressions sanghībhavanti Brāhmaņāh and atvam tvam sampadyate clearly indicate how prakrti is used as the subject. Now is almost clear that both praketi and vikāra are entitled to be regarded as the subject, according to the nature of the examples.3

The discussion on Kārakas in general, and kartṛ-kāraka in particular, will be hardly complete and exhaustive without an adequate reference to the logical method of interpretation. The Naiyāyikas, specially the followers of the Navya-nyāya, such as Jagadīśa and Gadādhara, have supplemented the study of grammar in a

¹ यवागूर्मूवं जायते—प्रक्षतेरव विकारद्वारेण क्रियासमन्वयी न साचात्। Helarāja.

² Mahābhāṣya, 1. 1. 1, Vol. I, p. 7.

³ Vākyapadīya, Kārikās, 3. 114-115.

largo measure; they have dealt with the problems of grammar in their characteristic fashion with the result that niceties of an incomprehensible nature were sometimes allowed in mar the perspicuity of the subject to such a degree that the study of grammar ultimately passed through a completely different channel at their hands.

To do full justice to their labour, it must be said, however, that they have practically given, as it were, the finishing touch to the interpretation of certain problems of grammar and have undnubtedly shown a new line of thinking and approaching a problem. The advent of the Navya-nyaya, with its characteristic tondency to abstructies and a peculiar stock of technical terms, opened the portal of a new realm of thought which has mero or less influonced all later philosophical speculations. This influence, as is quite evident, is nowhere so prominent, as in the case of later commontaries on philosophical treatises and grammar. The last phase of grammatical literature, both in language and mode of interpretation, seems to have been monlded by this process of thinking. Such woll-known grammarians, as Nāgeša, Bhattoji, Kondabhatta, Durgasinha, Gopmathn, Sasona and others. are supposed to have been thoroughly acquainted with the Navya-nyaya line of arguments.

As the logical method of definition is free from all defects and scientifically accurate, the grammarians have conveniently followed it in forming the definitions of grammatical categories and concepts with the obvious object of getting rid of the so-called ativyāpti and avyāpti. How far the grammarians have assimilated and absorbed this particular process of thinking and the line of arguments is borne testimony to by the fact that if any modern grammarian is asked to give an accurate definition of Karma-kāraka, he would not possibly say karturīpsitatamam karma or yat kriyate tat karma, but would give his answer in the strictly logical form, i.e., kriyājanya-phala-śālitvam karmatvam and so on. Jagadīśa's Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā and Gadādhara's Vyutpattivāda are two inportant works that give us purely logical interpretation of the grammatical problems; Durga and Sușena (two well-known commentators on the Kātantra system) have also dealt with the problems of grammar from a strictly logical point of view.

The logical definition of $kartrtva^{-1}$ is $kriy\bar{a}$ śrayatvam kartrtvam, i.e., the agent is the substratum of action. This is based on the assumption that the action is generally denoted by the root, and the idea of a substratum follows from the suffix tip. As this definition is likely to prove the agency of time also which is the final substratum of the world $(k\bar{a}lo\ hi\ jagad\bar{a}-dh\bar{a}rah)$, Suṣeṇa has made some improvement

¹ प्राधान्येन धातुवाच्यव्यापारवत्त्वम्—Durga (Kalāpa-Ṭikā) and धातूपात्त-व्यापारायय: कर्ता।

² कालसापि कर्तृतं सात् तस्य सर्वाश्ययतेन क्रियाया अप्याश्ययतात्— Kavirāja under the rule 220 (Kalāpa).

oy adding prādhānyena to the afoiosaid definition. The state of being a substratum of action is not a correct definition from a grammatical point of view. If so, the objective case, affected as it is by the action, may also be treated as kartā. The definition finally suggested by Susena is as follows: pradhanyena dhatuvācyavyāpār avattvam (karta is the main substratum of action as is denoted by a root)

To show an instance how the logical process of arguments has its application in grammar, we give below the summary of a discussion on the definition of Kartr-Lurala There arises some difficulty with regard to the definition of kartriva as given by Sarvavarman (yah karoti sa karta, Kalapa 220), because this rule is strictly speaking, applicable to such instances as ghato bhavati, etc. (the not does not do anything but is simply brought into existence by the agency of the potter) The logical definition is not even sufficient to solve this anomaly, masmuch as the adjunct kn mass anatvam is equally applicable to Kartr and Adhihar and It is, therefore, necessary to add the expression saksat sambandhena (by dnect association) to the above definition in order to differentiate Kartr kāraka from Adhikarana The reason is that both the agent and Adhikarana are used as the substra tum of the action (kr vyāsi aya), the difference lies in the fact that the subject is directly or primari ly connected with the action, while Adhikarana has only indirect association with the action

(through the operation of the agent). But the train of arguments and counter-arguments does not end here. The additions of sāksāt sambandhena is not, however, sufficient to make the point clear, because in an instance like gale baddhvā gaurnīyate, the locative is found to have been the direct substratum of action (binding). Now it is necessary to make further addition to the definition (ananya-prayojyatva) for the purpose of eliminating both ativyāpti and avyāpti. The special characteristic, which serves to distinguish the subject from the cognate cases, like Karana and Adhikarana, is the super-independence 2 of the agent, i.e., the agent is capable of accomplishing the action without depending on the so-called accessories.3 agent presents itself in three forms, namely, śuddha, prayojaka or hetu, and karmakartā.

Both Karana and Adhikarana are intimately related to the agent; they help the agent in the accomplishment of the action. In accordance with the definition of Pāṇini, Karana is held to be the most important or indispensable of all accessories that help the agent in bringing about a completion of the action.

[े] वर्ता लनन्यप्रयोज्य: खतन्त इत्युच्यते... फालकासी हि नर्ता करणादीनुपार्जयते, तथा च पूर्वसेव शक्तिमान् खतन्त्र:, करणादीनां तु कर्तृविनियोगादेव खातन्त्र्यम् — Helārāja.

² कारकचक्रव्यापारप्रतिवन्धकीभृतव्यापाराभाववन्तं खतन्त्रत्विमिति।—Kavi-rāja (Kalāpa).

³ खतन्त्रलं च कारकान्तरानघीनले सति कारकल्स।—Ibid.

Pataŭiali in lus characteristic fashion has anticipated certain objections against the desirability of retaining the suffix taman after the word sadhila m sādhalataman laranam If Karana is said to be, Patanjah argues, merely an accessory and not the most unpertint enc. the undesirable consequence will be that all Rarahas, by virtue of their direct or indirect association with the action, will be entitled to receive the designation of Karana 1 It needs haldly be peinted out that all Karakas, as the very term implies, are practically se many accessories (sadhahas) with reference to the accomplishment of the action The use of tamap (superlative degree) is not therefore meaningless, because it serves to differentiate Karana from other Karakas Again, it may be further argued that the senso usually convoyed by the suffix (atisayya) ic. oxcessiveness, is also comprehensible even in the absence of that werd We can justify this point of view by an illustratien drawn frem popular experience As, for instance, when one says 'a daughter' should be given in marriage to a handsome person, what we accessarily understand is that the person spoken of should be 'perfectly handseme' (abhir upatama), though the word denoting excess or super-excellence is not explicitly montioned Similarly, the word sadhaha

¹ सर्वेषां कारकाणां करणसभा प्रसन्धेत And सर्वोष कि कारकाणि भाषकानि-Mahabbaşya under the rule Pan 1 4 42

प्रसिद्धपाय कम्या देया वत्रासिद्धपतमापेति गम्यते — Ibid

might be alone sufficient to denote as much meaning as is usually expressed by sādhakatama. Now what follows from this discussion is that the suffix tamap is redundant. The rule sādhakatamam karanam might be reduced to sādhakam karanam without any alteration of the meaning. But it cannot be denied that Pāṇini had some particular object in view so far as the use of this suffix is concerned. What Pāṇini 1 likes to indicate by the use of tamap is that the suffixes (denoting degrees of excellence) tarap and tamap should have no application in the rules defining Kāraka-samjñās, or, in other words, the Paribhāsā (gauņa-mukhyayormukhye kāryasampratyayah) should have its application restricted to this rule and not to any other rules belonging to the section of Kāraka. This is why the grammarians do not insist upon apāya or physical separation alone (according to the strict interpretation of the rule), but also acknowledge the validity of intellectual separation (buddhikṛtāpāya) in the determination of Apādāna.2 Similarly, the rule ādhāro'dhikaraṇam is not only applicable to tilesu tailam, but comprises such instances also where the entire substratum is not pervaded by the thing inherent.3

¹ कारकसंज्ञायां तर-तसयोगो न भवतीत्यचापि सिर्ड भवति—Mahabhasya, under the rule Pāṇ., 1. 4. 42.

⁵ सांकाध्यक्तेभ्य: पाटलीपुतका श्रिमकपत्रा:।

⁸ गङ्गायां घोष:, कूपे गर्भकुलम्।

यव क्षत्त आधारात्मा व्याशी भवति। तिनेहिव म्यात् तिलेषु तैलं दिशि सिर्पिति। गङ्गायां गाव:, कूपे गर्भकुलिसित्यव न स्वात्।—Mahābhāṣya, under the rule 1.4.42.

Wherein lies the superiority or relative importance of Karana? Those that help the agent in the accomplishment of the action are grammatically called upakāraka; of all such upakārahas, Karana is decidedly the most indispensable accessory that comes in close contact with the agent (sannipatyopakāri) in course of operation. The relative superiority of Karana is mainly due to the fact, says Bhartrhari,2 that the accomplishment of the action actually takes place immediately after the operation of Karana. The part played by vivaksā or the desire of the speaker in the use and determination of Kārakas in general has already been referred to. Bhartrhari 3 emphatically lays down with special reference to the Instrumental case that it is not possible to say (with regard to a thing) that this is always Karana and this is not, as if it were fixed by the rules of grammar. It is the desire of the speaker that practically accounts for the use; as, for instance, one and the same thing (as sthali) might he used both as the substratum (sthālyām pacati), and as the instrumental (sthālyā pacati) according to the desire of the speaker.

यद्यपि क्रिशिसिडौ बहूनि साधनानि व्याप्रियले तथापि यत् प्रक्षष्टोपकारक-सन्तरद्वे विविधतं तदेव करणिसव्ययं ।

क्षियायाः परिनियाभिर्धद्वापारादननारम्। विवन्त्यते यदा तत्र करणल तदा स्मृतम्।—Vākyapadiya, 3.89

[°] वस्ततक्षदिन्देंग्य न हि बस्तु व्यवस्थितन्। स्थान्या पर्यत द्रव्येषा विवचा इग्यते यत: ॥—Vākyapadīya, 8 90.

In accordance with the definition as suggested by the Naiyāyikas, Karaņa is the same as $K\bar{a}raņa$ (vyāpāravat kāraņam karaņam) only with this difference that karana is closely associated with the action, i.e., cause, when it is actually in operation to bring about the accomplishment of the action, is what is called karana in grammar. Gadādhara maintains that the words kartyvyāpārādhīnatva should be added to the above definition (vyāpāravat kāraņam karaņam) so as to clearly indicate the subserviency of Karana to the agent. An accessory (as Karana), as we find, cannot accomplish the action unless and until it is set to work by the agent (kartyviniyoga). This being the actual state of things, one may possibly bring forward the argument that it is more plausible to attribute the adjunct sādhakatama to the agent itself in preference to Karana.1 Bhartrhari 2 meets this objection by saying that the primary function of the agent is to employ the accessories to operation 3 which, thus engaged, immediately accomplish the action. This is to show how Karana comes between the agent and the action, and, consequently, has greater proximity to theoperation than the agent itself.

² कर्त्विनियोगोत्तरकाले साधनानां प्रहत्तेसदपेचया कर्त्रेव साधकतमलं न्यायमिति—Helaraja.

² खातन्त्रेऽपि प्रयोक्तारसारादिवीपक्तवति। करणेन हि सर्वेषां व्यापारी व्यवभीयति ॥—Vākyapadīya, 3. 93.

⁸ विनियोगी हि कर्तृत्यापार:।

Now it is sufficiently clear why Karana is said to be sādhakatama in relation to other accessories. Bhartrhari has again alluded to the preponderance of vivakṣā and the difference between the agent and Karana by referring to the example asischinatti (where the function of the agent has been attributed to the instrumental, viz., sword, with a view to indicate the independent activity or excessive power for accomplishing the action on the part of Karana). In the above example, it should be noted, the sharpness of the sword comes to be regarded as Karana when the sword itself is used as the agent.

Though apparently synonymous, hetu and Karana are, however, distinguished by the grammarians, the criterion of such difference being 'the invariable association with the action' on the part of Karana. The first and foremost thing necessary for a Karaha is to have close relation with the action. Hetu generally gives the idea of a substance and has practically no invariable connection with the action. A substance unconnected with action is called hetu, but Karana, as a form of Kāraha, is

[े] प्रसादीनां तु कर्तृत्वे तैष्यादि कर्प विद:--Vakyapadiya, 8. 94.

द्रव्यादिविषयी हेतु: कारके नियतिक्रयम्—Ibid.

द्रव्यादिवाधारणं निर्व्यापारसाधारणं च इनुतन् । करवलं तु क्रियामाविषयं व्यापारनियतं च ॥—Bhattoji under the rule Pap. 2, 9, 29.

necessarily found to have connection with the action. Hetu, to speak the truth, is the cause (samavāyikāraņa) pure and simple, and continues to be so as long as it does not come in close touch with the action, but the moment it does so, it ceases to be a hetu and becomes a Karana. Naiyāyikas have agreement with grammarians on this point. Gadādhara takes dhanena kulam, vidyayā yaśah, etc., as instances of hetu, since dhana and vidyā have no direct association with the action $(kriy\bar{a}yog\bar{a}bh\bar{a}v\bar{a}t)$. Jagadiśa has, however, taken a slightly different view. He insists that even the third ending in dandena ghatah is really indicative of Karana, though dandena is not grammatically regarded to be a Kāraka as such, obviously for the absence of relation with the action. On the ground of having close proximity with the action, Karana is virtually the same as cause (ianaka).2

Under the rule hetvarthe, Durgasiriha has clearly shown what is meant by hetu in an instance like annena vasati. So far as the popular usage is concerned, Durga maintains, a thing, though not actually connected with an action that leads to the final result, is called hetu simply on account of its having capacity for the accomplishment of action (phalamanispādayannapi kriyāyogyatayā heturucyate). Hetu is of

[े] द्रम्हेन घट द्रत्यचापि वतीयार्थ: करणतं, परन्तु तन्न कारकं क्रियानन्वियलात्। न्यवभ — Sabdafaktiprakasikā under Kār. 71.

विकरणगन्दन्त व्यापारप्रवासच्या ननवस्य वाचकः—Sabdasaktiprakāsikā.

various kinds. One that intinately connects itself with the accomplishment of the action is termed Karana. Susem has referred to two-fold helu—grammatical as well as popular. The nominative case of a verb used in a causal form (as Lārayali) is an instance of grammatical helu (Lārayali yah sa helušca—Kalāpa). A helu, in its popular sense, is an object that is capable of performing the action favourable to the result (phalasādhananogya-padārtha). Helu means capacity and not actual connection with Lriyā

Adhilarana is the substratum of action, What is popularly known as ādhāra or substratum of action is technically called Adhil, arana ia grammar. There is, however, come differonce between the popular and grammatical conception of Adhilarana According to the popular usage, substance, quality and action are all comprehended by Adhikarana, but in grammar the word is often used in n specific sense, 10, Adhikarana is suid to be an necessory (that indirectly helps the accomplishment of the action) that forms the substratum of action only indirectly. Bhartrhari lays much stress on the dependence of Adhiharana upon both the agent and the object and defines Adhikarana 2 as an upakāraka or accessory that becomes the substratum of netion only

वोनिऽधिकरणनविभीयण द्रव्यगुणकियाविष्यमसिधीयते—Helatēja

कर्तकसंध्यविद्यासमाचाद धारवत् क्रियाम् । चपक्रवेत् क्रियासिरी मान्ये ऽधिकरण सृतम् ॥—Vākyapadiya

through the intervention of the agent or the object, and serves, though indirectly, to accomplish the action.

We actually find that the effort or the action principally inheres in the agent and partially in the object; consequently they form the real substratum of action in the strict sense of the term. This is why Bhartrhari 1 has used the expression 'through the medium of the agent and the object,' and has thus made it sufficiently clear that Adhikarana is only indirectly related to the action. Intimately related to ādhāra is ādheya or what inheres in the substratum. The relation in which the inherent stands to the substratum is manifold, such as conjunction, inherence and so on. But Gadādhara 2 has here raised his voice of objection so far as 'conjunction, is concerned. He argues in the following strain:—the relation between ādhāra and ādheya cannot be one of conjunction (samyoga), for, if it were so, there would be no criterion to distinguish the one from the other, that is say, ādheya 8 also might be treated as $\bar{a}dh\bar{a}ra$, as the very idea of conjunction comprehends two things (samyogasya dvişthatvāt).

Patañjali has divided Adhikaraṇa into three classes, namely, vyāpaka, aupaśleṣika, and vaiṣayika. Of these, vyāpaka is the principal

¹ कर्तुवर्सन्यवहिताम्-क्रिया कर्तिर कर्मणि वावतिष्ठते-Helarāja. Vākyapadiya, 3. 1. अधिकरणाधिकार:।

² श्राधारावियभावश्र न संयोगादिकपसन्वभात्मकः—Vyutpattivāda.

⁸ कुष्डग्रदिसंयोगिनो वदरादेरिप कुष्डग्राधारताप्रसङ्गात्—Ibid.

form of Adhiharana An expression like tilesu tailam constitutes an example of vyapaka The special feature of this class of Adhiharana is not only that the inherent (adheya) and the substratum are related to each other by co-inherence (samavaya), but also that the entire space of the substratum is periaded by the inhorent Devadatta is sitting on a mit' is an instance of aupaslesika, because here the agent sits only on a part of the mat and does not occupy the whole space. Here the relation between the inherent and the substratum is one of simple conjunction Varsayika is expressed by such example as molse ecchāste (there is a desite for salvation) Helarali has cited the salungyah as an instance of vaisayiha, and observes that it does not strictly come under aupasiesika. because the sky being one and indivisible cannot pos ibly have any parts. The so-ealled division of Adhilarana as sāmīpika denoting proximity does not ically form an additional class Helaraja has explained the sentence Gangayam ghosah as an instance of aupaslesika that indicates the residence of ghosa in contain parts of the bank having close proximity with the current of the river

Adhikar ana is generally denoted in grammar by the seventh case ending Both Jagadisa and Gadadhara' hold that saptami indicates adheyatva (as is implied by the Adhikarana) or

पाधारसप्तया पाधियतमर्थ —Vyutpattivada

the state of being the inherent. Saptamī has more than one meaning in grammar. In an instance of bhave saptami, the seventh case-termination precisely signifies 'contemporaneousness of action' (samakālīnatva); in carmaņi dvīpinam hanti, saptamī denotes nimittatva or 'the state of being the cause' and so on. however, some inconsistency with regard to such examples as vīnāyām śabdah and karne śabdah, etc., because there is no verbal form so as to clearly give the idea of a Kāraka. Gadādhara rightly observes that in cases like these, where the verbal forms denoting an action are not explicitly used, we are forced to understand such verbs as bhavali,2 etc., in order to explain the Kārakavibhakti. But the grammarians also seem to have the same answer, as they have taken recourse to the dictum according to which a verb, though not expressly mentioned but only understood, is even said to be competent to account for the case-ending.

From a grammatical point of view, Kārakas are denoted by sup. A question is, however, raised by Bhartrhari, if vibhaktis have any signification of their own so as to indicate the nature

¹ वाधियलं सप्तम्यानुभाव्यते ।—Vyutpattivāda.

[ै] एषु कारकतानिर्वाहाय भवतीलध्याहार: । त्रवच्छेटाताविशेषीऽष्याधारसप्तययै:। —Vyutpattivāda.

गन्यमानापि द्रिया कारकिभती प्रवीनिका।

⁴ हचादांवाल्यम्साहिभक्तव्येऽन्य इप्यते ।—Vākyapediya, Kār. 3. 43.

of Kārakas. The meaning is expressed by a word taken as a whole and not as a composite of two parts, i.e., Prakrti and Pratyaya. Attention has already been drawn to the fact that the meaning of Prakrti, as in triese and vrksena, remains the same, while the sense usually denoted by the ease-endings, i.e., substratum and instrumentality, only seems to be different. But the decision of the grammarians is of a peculiar nature. Since they hold that the meaning is expressed by a word as an indivisible whole (akhanda), the grammarians have given their verdiet in support of the unreality of pratyayārtha, as distinct from prakrtyartha. It is, however, contrary to the usual principle of grammar, because we find that the meaning of a Pratyaya is related to that of a Pratipadika in order to determine the nature of a Karaka. What is, therefore, plausible is that the meaning of Pratuavas, as distinguished from these of Pratipadikas, is a fact that can hardly be denied. As the whole discussion on Kūrakas depends on the assumption of meanings on the part of the case-endings, tho meaning of each vibhakti has been specifically shown by the grammarians. Pāṇini defines Karman as what is seught to

be obtained by the agent as the most desirable

¹ पभेदेशिव प्रक्रयदेश इते इत्यायेवादी विभक्तायेश्य साधनस्वचयः व्यतिरेकः। तया तत च विभक्तायेश्यास्यत्वम्। येन प्रातिविद्यार्थे श्रुत्याने इटसती मन्यामदेशिक कविदातिरिक्तः प्रस्यायेम्बीजगद्रवनीयः साधनस्वचयप्रक्षित्रस्य-वाचोदयं दित साधनस्तितः॥—Helátāja under tho Vālyapadiya, Kdr. 3.43.

thing. According to the logical conception, Karman forms the substratum of the result as is produced by the action (kriyājanyaphalaśālitvam). As it is not always the most desirable thing alone that the agent likes to obtain, Pāṇini had to, frame another rule (Pāṇ., 2.4.50) to make provision for such cases as visam bhunkte, where an undesirable thing like poison is even used as the object. But Patanjali thinks that this rule might be done away with, as the preceding rule is capable of being interpreted in such a way as to apply to all these instances. His arguments stand on the following facts: 1 sometimes swallowing of poison also happens to be desirable on the part of a certain man. It is not unlikely that a man suffering from various kinds of distress (as poverty, bereavement, etc.) may be compelled to take to poison as a desideratum or relief; the swallowing of poison is as desirable to him as other eatables. Patanjali has finally arrived at the conclusion that the negative particle 2 in anīpsita does not indicate simply the opposite, viz., undesirable, but denotes anything other than the desirable.

In the Katantra system, Karman is defined as what is done by the agent (yat kriyate tat

¹ विषभचणमपि कस्यचिदीिभतं रु।त्। क्यम् १ इह य एव मनुष्यो दु:खार्ची भवति सोऽन्यानि दु:खान्यनुनिश्रस्य विषभचणमेव न्यायो मन्यते।—-Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., 1. 4. 50.

² पर्युदासीऽयं यद्खदीिपातात्तद्नीिपातम्।—Ibid,

karma), and noither Survavarman nor Durgn spoken of such divisions of Karman us desirable and undesirable. Susena has mudo some important observations in connection with the interpretation of Karman. Following the met hod of the Nniyayikas, he defines Karman as forming the substratum of the fruit produced by the netion (kriyājanyaphalabhāgitvam). A caroful exmination of examples will, however, show that this definition is only a tentative one. and is not absolutely free from defeots (alivyanti). According to the strict wording of the definition, the extent of the objective case would be so wide as to comprise even the agent, for, in an instance like 'Devadattn is going to the village.' we find that the fruit of the netion, i.e., conjunction, does not accrue only to the object (village), but goos to the subject also as equally partaking of the fruit. It is, then, necessary to make further addition to the definition so as to render it applicable exclusively to the object. The additional words parasamavetatva would serve to distinguish the object from the agent in this respect that the former is the recipient of the fruit of the action that rolatos to others, viz., the agent (that is to say, the notion is first brought into existence by the agent, the fruit

[े] गामं गन्दित देवदण हवादी गतिक्रियाणयभूगीगद्रपक्षभागितात् यदा गामल कर्मनं तथा कर्तुरिंग लात् । कित चेत् परसम्वेगिक्षणणयकार्गातिसमिति इस: i—Kavitāja (Kārakā) on 219.

परसम्वेत्राज्ञयाज्ञयाज्ञभागितं कर्मलिगितः 1—Ibid.

whereof next accrues to the object). This is, however, not sufficient to preclude possible vagueness and misinterpretation, for, if the word para in parasamaveta is taken to imply something different from the substratum of the fruit (phalāśrayābhinnatva), the village, as in the above example, would not have legitimate claim to be treated as the object. When this definition also proves insufficient for reasons stated above, Susena at once suggests another which runs thus: 1 Karman, though it does not directly form the substratum of the action (like the agent), comes to partake of the result produced by that action. But the example parvatādavarohati (descending from a mountain) furnishes an obstacle in the way of accepting this definition as the most accurate one. Because in the above example (i.e., descending from a mountain) the mountain, though unaffected by the act of moving, is practically found to be the substratum of the fruit of the action $(vibh\bar{a}ga)$, i.e., separation. Consequently, it should be treated as the object and not as Apādāna.2 But grammar does not sanction such an usage.

Prompted by a strong desire to suggest a definition that would not involve any defect whatsoever, and aided by his intimate acquaintance with the logical method of argument,

¹ तत्क्रियानाश्रयते सति तत्क्रियाजन्यफालभागितमिति।—Kaviraja.

पवैतस्यापि स्पन्दनित्रयानात्रयत्वेन स्पन्दनित्रयाजन्यविभागरूपफलात्र्यत्वात् कसैलं स्यादिति ।—Ibid.

Susena has afterwards said the last word on the subject.1 He says that though it does not comprise in itself the action, Karman is the recipient of the fruit of that action as it is qualified by the meaning of the root. Here qualified by the meaning of the root is to be taken as an adjunct of the 'fruit.' Avaechedaka means something like attribute or the object for which the action is resorted to (yaduddisya kriyā pravartate). The act of desconding has conjunction with the posterior place as its result, which does not pertain to the mountain (uttaradesasamyogastu parvate na viduate eva) so as to make it the object of the verb avarohati. The mountain, so to speak, is the substratum of separation (vibhāgāsraya), and is not consequently entitled to get the designation of Karman. This is, therefore, the most accurate definition conceivable, from both the logical and grammatical points of view, that applies to all examples of Karman.

The association with the fruit is the criterion whereby roots are divided into two classes, namely, sakarmaka and akarmaka or transitive and intransitive. A root is said to he sakarmaka, when it denotes an action leading to the fruit, and akarmaka, when it denotes

तियावच्यद्व यस्य भण कवा विवाचतम्। तदेव वर्भषातुस्त फ्लानुकावक्रमेकः ॥—Kavirāja.

तत्क्षियानात्रयते सति भात्यांवच्छेदवीभृत-तत्क्षियाजन्यभलमागिलं कमैलमिति !—Kavirāja.

भ धातूना फलाविक्तव्यापारवाचिले स्ति स्वभैकता, केवलयापारवाचिले सत्यक्रमेकता। and क्रियावच्छेदकं यस्य फलं क्यों विविध्तम।

only an unqualified action. Thus, when we minutely follow the line of thinking, as revealed here, and consider the cogency of those arguments whereby definitions after definitions were rejected till one was found acceptable, our wonder is really excited to a great extent for what has been done by the Indian logico-grammarians.

Karman, it must be remembered, has got the widest and most varied applications in. grammar. Just as sasthī is allowed to be used as a substitute for most of the vibhaktis, so Karman is the only case that may grammatically replace all the rest. It is expressly enjoined by the rules of grammar that Karman should have the preference to other cases (when it is so intended by the speaker). The examples of the so-called dvikarmaka-dhātu (viz., roots having double objects) furnish evidence how Karman might be used in the place of Apādāna, Sampradāna, and Adhikaraņa.2 The indirect objects in such cases as $g\bar{a}m$ dogdhi payal. might be treated quite as good as an Apādānakāraka and so on.

There are, broadly speaking, seven different forms of karman, namely, nirvartya, vikārya,

¹ प्रकथितं च-Pāṇ., 1. 4. 51.

² गां दोग्धि पयः, कथिताच पूर्वीपादानसंज्ञा। पुतं बूते धर्मम्, कथिताव पूर्वो संप्रदानसंज्ञा। अन्ववरुणिख गां अजम्, कथिताच पूर्वीधिकरणसंज्ञा। -Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pān., 1. 4. 51.

³ निर्वेत्तें च विकार्यं च प्राप्यं च चिविधं सतम्। तनिभिततमं नर्म चतुर्घाऽन्यत् नाल्पितम् ॥— Vākyapadīya, Kār., 3. 45.

prāpya, audāsīnya, anīpsita, samjāāntarānākhyāta and anyapārvaka. According to Bhartrhari, the first three are to be regarded as principal varieties and the rest are more or less fanciful (kalpita). (i) Nirvartya generally means what is brought into existence by an action. We have a nirvartya-karman when the word deneting prakrti or material cause.1 whether existent or non-existent, is not expressly mentioned. Ghatam kareti is an example of nirvartya-karman. Here we find that praktti or material cause, whether existent or non-existent, is not expressly mentioned. We notice that Prakrti er material cause (i.e., carth) of the pot is net expressly said to have assumed the shape of a pet (as mrdo ghafam kareti) by way of medification, so as to show the non-difference (abheda) between the cause (earth) and the preduct 2 (pot). Now, what is desired by the speaker is to show as if clay and pot woro different (as in mṛdā ghaṭam karoti) or the product were not a medification of the causo. Prakrti is existent, but is not actually said to have undergone any change so as to re-appear in the

मती वा विद्यमाना वा प्रकृतिः परिणासिनी। यस नायीयते तस निवैधानं प्रवचते ॥—Yākyapadiya.

यस्य निर्वेश्यस घटार्ट: प्रकृति: चती वा यद्या पदादिका चित्रधाना वा परिवासमापादिता चमेरेन नाष्ट्रीयते, यदो घटं करोतीलेवंडपतथा न विविचता; किंतिष्टं? यदा घटं करोतीलादिभेदेनेव ॥— Helâtāja.

of kārya. When the modification (parināma) of prakṛti or cause is intended to be expressed, we have vikārya-karman, as in mṛdā ghaṭam karoti, kāśān katam karoti, angārān bhasma karoti and so on. It should be, however, remembered that ghatam karoti may also prove to be an example of vikāryakarman to those who take the product or the effect only as a transformation of prakrti or the material cause. It is difficult to determine what really comes in existence (sat or asat). The question of production and existence with particular reference to their mutual dependence has already been discussed. What is now produced, some hold, was non-existent previous to its production (asat). Again, some that it is really existent (sat) that is produced (sadeva jāyate).

According 2 to both these views, Karman, as manifested or brought into existence by the activity of the agent, might be regarded as nirvartya. Those who are satkāryavādins like the Samkhyaites are likely to support nirvartyakarman. A thing that comes into being by some sort of action or is simply manifested by its brith (janmanā yat prakāsate) is called

प्रवाधिक प्राचित्र प्राचित्र प्राचित्र विविद्यायां विकार्य्यमेव। —Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa.

² यदसञ्जायते सहा जन्मना यत् प्रकाशते । तिविवैत्ते विकार्ये च कर्भ देधा व्यवस्थितम् ॥—Vākyapadīya, 3. 49.

nirvartya. Hore janman implies the manifestation of something that was previously existont, as putram prasūte (giving hirth to a sen) necessarily means the hirth of a sen that was oxistent before delivery in an ombryonic stage. But when prakṛti is intended to be expressed by the term janman, what is produced may be looked upen as vikūra or modification in relation to prakṛti.

Vikārya-karman is so called because it appears to be a modification of prakțti or material cause. Vikāra means a change frem one state te anether and presupposes existence, i.e., medification pertains to things that are already existent (labdhāsattākamevāvasthāntaramāpadyate). It is principally of twe kinds,¹ namely, (i) as produced by the entire annihilation of the material cause (prakṛtyucchedasambhūtam), as in kāṣtham bhasma karoti (reducing the fuel to ashes); and (ii) as characterised by some different properties or qualities (distinct from those of prakṛti), as suvarṇam kaṇḍatam karoti (carrings are made out of gold).

Quite in agreement with the definition of nirvartya, the expression bhasma karoti is to be taken as an instance of nirvartya, since prakrti or material cause (fuel), of which ashes are only modification, is not expressly

¹ प्रज्ञत्युच्छे दशभूतं किंचित् काष्ट्रादिमध्यत् । किंचिद गुणासरोत्पच्या सवर्षोहितकारवत् ६—Vākyapadiya, 8. 50.

mentioned. In the first case prakṛti is found to have entirely lost its own self in course of modification. That the difference between prakṛti and vikṛti is only formal and not material is made clear by the example suvarṇam kuṇḍalām karoti. Those who support the view that product or vikāra has its existence in the cause (fuel) in the shape of efficiency are not likely to differentiate prakṛti from vikṛti, assuming ashes to be already existent in the fuel.

From a strictly Vedāntin point of view, kuṇḍala is vivarta, as opposed to vikāra, because it differs from gold only in form but not in essence. From what we have seen above, it is clear that there is, strictly speaking, no remarkable difference between nirvartya and vikārya, as the instance ghaṭam karoti has been explained in both the ways; the difference is mainly created by the desire of the speaker. A Karman, as Helārāja clearly points out, is called nirvartya when prakṛti is not directly mentioned (by the speaker), and the same is called vikārya when prakṛti is expressly mentioned.

¹ काचिन् प्रक्षतिरत्यजन्ती खरूपं संस्थानान्तरापत्था विक्षतित्युचते ।—Helārāja.

² मांख्यमते काष्ठावस्थायासिप शिक्तक्षेण भसान: समावात्। ते हि कारणेषु शिक्तक्षेण कार्य्यावस्थितिरित्याषु: I—Kavirāja (Kalāpa).

³ काष्ठानि भस्म करोति, निर्वर्त्तप्रमितत् कर्म प्रकृतिरिववचया। विवचायां तृ विकार्थम् |---Helārāja.

(3) Prāpya, i.e., prāpya-karmau' is that whorein the action of the agent does not produce or give rise to any special feature or quality. Usually we have a prāpya-karman whon tho action does not produce any visesa or change comprehensible oither by direct observation or inference. A karman in its ordinary grammatical sense is known as prāpya. In ādityam pasyati, 2 mere perception serves only to suggest a relation between the action and the object observed, and nothing like visesa is cognisable. In the case of a nirvartya-karman as ghatam karoti, the speciality that is (kriyākrta-višeşa) perceptibly brought about by the action is the production of the pot. But sometimes inference also helps us to got a specific cognition. as one can easily dotermine through the help of inference whether a man is enjoying pleasure or not only by observing his facial features. But in an instance of prapya-karman, such as ādityam pašyati, we find that the action (seeing) does not bring about any change or special feature in the sun.

Some, however, do not recognise anything like prāpya-karman on the ground

¹ क्रियाक्तवित्रीयाणां सिद्धियेव न मध्यते । दर्भनादनुमानाहा तस् प्राध्यमिति कथ्यते ॥—Vākyapadiya, 3. 51.

 $^{^{2}}$ निर्वेत्तीयर्मीण निर्वात्तरात्मात्मा एवं क्रियाङ्गती विशेष, विकार एवं क्रियाङ्गती विशेष, |—Helöräja.

[े] कर्तुः कियाविषयभावनादिचे शिवतमत्वात् प्राप्यं कर्मः प्रमाणाध्यां क्रियाः सम्बन्धमातं तुलत्यते, न च स एव विजयः ।—Ibid.

that the action is invariably followed by some sort of changes, whether directly perceptible or comprehensible by inference only. Even the simple act of seeing is sometimes attended with $vik\bar{a}ra$. Snakes 2 are proverbially said to have poisonous look; whoever is eagerly seen by them, though not actually bitten, is sometimes found to be in an agony of pain.

- (4) Audāsīnya.—It is what is done by the agent through indifference; as, for instance, a man while going to a village may happen to touch a straw on his way (grāmam gacchan tṛṇam spṛśati), though in so doing (touching) he has got no particular object in view. The author of the Mahābhāṣya has illustrated this class of Karman.
- (5) Anīpsita or undesirable karman.—This has been explained in connection with such examples ^B as viṣam bhunkte (taking poison).
- (6) Anākhyāta.—This, too, has been explained with reference to the rule akathitam ca.
- (7) Anyapūrvakam.—This refers to those cases where karma-kārakas are specially sanctioned by the rules of grammar in the place of other kārakas, as in krūramabhikrudhyati, etc.

The objective case also admits of other divisions, such as direct and indirect, in

¹ नास्येव प्राप्यकर्म सर्वेच क्रियाक्षतविश्रेषावधारणात्।—Helārāja.

इष्टिबिषैरिहिसिनिरीचितो विषयो व्यलनञ्चालालीढो लक्त्यते।—Ibid.

⁸ Pāņ., 1. 4. 50.

connection with those roots that comprehend two objects. We have already alluded to the condition (the desire of the speaker) under which Karana and Adhikarana might be used as the subject. There are instances like pacyate odanah, lüyate kedärah, etc. where the objects are found to have practically changed into the agent. The so-called agent is known in grammar as karmakartā.

Helārāja has spoken of two more divisions of karman, namely, antaranga, as denoting things, and bahiranga as prehending such objects as time. intransitive verbs 1 (aste, svapiti) are allowed to be governed by only such objects as denote particular time, country, path and action. Therefore, in grammar 2 intransitive verbs are those that can have no other objects excepting time, country, etc. Bhatrhari is not prepared to take these as regular objects; his contention is that it is impossible to conceive of any objects in connection with the intransitive verb. What appears to be reasonable on a minute examination of such examples as māsamāste, kurun svapiti, etc., is that their karmatva is.

¹ कालभावाध्यमन्त्रा: कर्मचंद्रा द्वाकर्मचान्।—Mahābhāşya, Vol. I, p. 336.

^{*} येषां देशकालादिभिन्नं कर्म न संभवति तेऽवाकर्मकाः, न लविविचितः कर्माणोऽपि ।—Siddhāntakaumadi under 1.4. 52.

अ क्रियान्तरापेत्रण तथा कम लम्।—Helārāja. व्यातगादिक्रिययात् निष्यमाथ-लात् कालादीनां कुटनेव कमल्लम्।—Helārāja.

strictly speaking, due to their implied relation with some other verbs as $vy\bar{a}pya$ meaning lasting for (understood). According to this interpretation, the expression $m\bar{a}sam\bar{a}ste$ really means $m\bar{a}sam\ vy\bar{a}py\bar{a}ste$ (staying for a month).

Patañjali has referred to another form of Karman, namely, kalma,¹ which means 'an unaccomplished object' (aparisamāptam karma). These irregular Karmans (as are illustrated by the rule akathitam ca) take dvitīyā as their only characteristic feature, but do dot generally receive all those grammatical operations which are applied to the regular objects alone.² Kaiyaṭa observes that the term kalma was used by the ancient grammarians as a technical name for those objects that are sanc tioned and recognised as such by the rule Pān., 1.4.51.

Apādāna is that form of $K\bar{a}raka$ which denotes the limit of separation. The definition of Pāṇini ($P\bar{a}n$., 1.4.24) deserves careful examination, specially with regard to the word dhruva as occurring in the $s\bar{u}tra$. The word dhruva generally means 'motionless,' but this sense is hardly compatible when the limit of separation is also found to be in motion,³

¹ विपरीत तु यत् कार्म तत् काच्य कावयो विदु: |-Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 336.

न वास्मिन् सर्वाणि कर्म कार्याणि क्रियन्ते, किं तर्हि, दितीयैव।

³ गतियुक्तीष्वपादान संज्ञा नीपपदातेऽभ्रवत्वात।—Vār. on the rule Pāṇ., 1. 4. 24.

as we say 'fallen from a running horse.' Hore both the horse and the rider are equally in motion and, consequently, it is not possible to have the cognition of a fixed limit so far as the act of separation is concorned. How, then, are we justified in taking the word asca in a sentence like 'fallen from a running horse' as an instance of Apādāna-kāraka? Patañjali 1 holds that there are also some stationary or permauent elements in the horse, such as the genus (asvatva) or the state of being a horse and 'the swift motion' which are said to be the implication of the speaker in a sentence like dhāvato'svāt patitali. He thus makes it clear that in like cases what the speaker desires to indicate refers really to dhruvatva or motionlessness and not to the opposite.

The word dhruva should not be taken in its strictly literal sense, 2 i.e., motionless. Of two things, namely, the limit and the object that is actually separated, the former, i.e., tree, as in $v_I k_s \bar{u}t$ parnam patati, is more or less unaffected by the act of separation; consequently, it is grammatically called dhruva in relation to the leaf that falls down as the result of separation.

Bhartrhari has stated clearly that Apādāna forms the limit of separation, whether movable

¹ इड ताबदयाप्रसात् पतित:—इति यचदये ऽयलमाग्रगामिलं तद धुवं तस्र विवित्तितम् !—Mababbaya, Vol. I, p. 327.

[•] द्रव्यखभाषो न भीव्यमिति एते प्रतीवते । प्रायतिवयं भीव्यं यत्तु ताबहित-चितम् ।—Vakyapadiya, 3 8. भूवं क्टाप्यं निश्चियमिति द्रव्यखभाषी भीव्यमिति न सुत्रे प्रवेतव्यम् ।—Helārāja

or fixed (calam vā yadi vācalam) and that the limit, though the substratum of separation, is not practically affected by the operation of the wind which is the direct cause of separation. example kudyāt patato'śvāt patitah both the wall and the horse are to be regarded as dhruva, the former constitutes the limit of separation in regard to the falling of the horse, and the latter in regard to the man who falls down from the falling horse. The word dhruva is thus used as a relative one: it does not necessarily mean an absolutely motionless thing, but generally what remains more or less unaffected in the course of separation. When separation is brought about by the reciprocal action of the two, as in apasarato meṣādapasarati meṣaḥ, each of them is to be considered as dhruva in regard to the action of the other.

It is necessary to make one point perfectly clear. In the oft-quoted instance of $Ap\bar{a}d\bar{a}na$, viz., 'a leaf is falling from a tree,' the relation, it must be remembered, between the tree and the leaf is one of simple conjunction and not of co-inherence (samavāya), that is, we have $Ap\bar{a}d\bar{a}na$ only when the leaf happens to be brought over the tree either by the wind or by birds, but not when the leaf stands in an inseparable connection with the tree.

¹ नियानरिक्तयापेचनविधतं पृथक् पृथक्। सेषयोः खिक्रयापेचं कर्तृतं च पृथ पृथकक्।—Vākyapadiya, 3. 6.

When, on the other hand, co-inherence is intended to be expressed, we got sasthi instead of pañcami, as in vrl. sasya parnam patati.

As the net of separation equally affects the tree as well as the leaf (the very idea of separation comprehending two objects), Susena argues that the leaf also may have the designation of Apādāna in such a case. But it is against the desire of the speaker. Moreover, paūcamī in yalah is indicative of limit, which, in the fitness of things, applies to the tree and not to the leaf. Susena then suggests a logical definition of limit—though practically unaffected by the operation (of the wind) that relaxes the connection, the limit or Apādāna forms the substratum of separation.'

Separation may be either physical or intellectual. Patanjali has recognised the desirability of acknowledging the intellectual separation and has, consequently, rejected some autras and varttikas, such as Pan, 1.4.25, 1.4. 26, 1.4.27, 1.4 28, as superfluous. In accordance

[ै] हचन्य पर्के पतनीत्वैषं भाषी शिद्धितम् (—Vākyspadiya हचसम्बन्धिन: पर्केन्य पातो बाक्तार्थी विवधित , इति हचन्याविधनः विवधात्र नास्ति (—Helātā)a

² यतीऽपैति भयमादचे वा तदपादानम् ।- Kolapa, Karaka, 214

 ^{80.}ºen.» has the lollowing — मन्यपायो विशेष, विभाग इति यावत ।
 म च पर्वतिष्ठो स्वितिस्थ, तती यथा स्वस्थापादानसभा तथा पर्वव्यापि कर्य न स्थात् ?
 इति चेत्र, भिमायापरिभागत ।

with his view, the rule dhruvamapāye pādānam is quite sufficient to explain all those instances that are usually supported by the additional rules.

Bhartrhari speaks of three kinds of $Ap\bar{a}d\bar{a}na$, namely, nirdiṣṭaviṣayam—when the limit of separation is fixed, or, where the sense of separation is directly denoted by the verbal form, as in $gr\bar{a}m\bar{a}d\bar{a}gaechati$ (coming from a village) and $a\bar{s}v\bar{a}t$ patitaḥ (fallen from a horse); $up\bar{a}ttaviṣayam$ —when the sense of another verb appears to be either principal or subordinate, as in $val\bar{a}hak\bar{a}t$ vidyotate (lightning flashes forth from the cloud); apekṣitakriyam—when the act of separation is to be understood, as in $kuto\ bhav\bar{a}n$ (wherefrom do you come)? Here the verb like $\bar{a}gaechati$ is to be supplied.

Sampradāna is that form of Kāraka which is desired (by the agent) to be the recipient of the fruit of ownership (svalva) pertaining to the object of the root dā (to give). Suṣeṇa explains yamabhipraiti as what is connected with the action (dadāti) by the instrumentality of the objective case. Abhipraiti gives the idea of a relation which is, in the logical terms, thus expressed: a recipient of the fruit, i.e., ownership pertaining to the object of the action (kriyājanya-karmaniṣṭha-svalvaphalabhāgitvam).

[े] य एव मनुष्यः प्रेचापूर्वकारी भवति च प्रस्ति दु:त्वीऽधर्मी नानेन झत्यम-भीति । म दृशा गंपाच निवति । तम भूवमपायिऽपादानमित्येव सिद्यम्। —Mahabhasya under the rule Pan., 1, 4, 21,

^{ै (}र्रार्टेडिनिषय' कि'विद्यात्तविषय' कथा । इधेदिस्त्रिय' विनि पिधापादानसूधान p—Vākyapadlys, 3, p. 183.

According to the interpretation of the Vyutpattivāda, the example viprāya gām dadāti
(giving a cow to a Brahmin) will mean 'a Brahmin who is the object (uddesya) of the desire for
gift which is made with the intention of making
him the recipient of the ownership of the cow, as
is effected by the act of giving. Sampradāna
is, therefore, the same as uddesya, i.e., a person
to whom something is made over. This is
clear from the language of the rule yasmai
ditsā, etc. (Kalāpa, 216).

The word sampradāna is treated as an anvarthasamjñā, i.e., it means exactly the same thing as is denoted by its derivative meaning (sampradīyate yasmai). It is a gift 3 (dāna) by which the previous owner transfers his legal right to another. Prayer, acceptance and inducement are considered to he the causes that persuade a man to make a gift of his own right. A gift 5 in the religious sense of the term should proceed from a desire for either worship or favour as in devatāyai puspam dadāti (offering flowers to a deity) and bhrtyāya vastram dadāti (giving clothes to a servant), when in so doing the person to whom something is made over is entitled to the actual ownership.

- व्यागरूपिकयाजन्यगीनिष्ठखलभागितया दातुनिन्छाविषयो ब्राह्मणः।
- व्यक्तम्बन्धमानद्रन्यस्य संस्थानिस्तिनिद्विरात्रं संप्रदानस्विति।
- ³ ससलभ्यं सपूर्वकपरसलापादानं ददातेरथे: :-- Kavırāja.
- भनुमलनिराक्तेप्रेरक ल्यागकार्यम्।
- े संग्रहान तहें व खात पूजानुगङ्काव्या । दीयमानेन संयोगात सामिल समते गृहि ॥—Kārikās quoted by the Pauifkāra.

The word Karman, as in Pan, 1.4.32, is used to exclude the objective case getting the designation of Apādāna, what is desired by the agent (yamabhipraiti) is a qualification that also applies to the object. It is generally explained as particularly implying the object the root $d\bar{a}$ (to give), but the author of the Bhāsya has taken it in the sense of action (kriyā) in general. He has also cited popular instances to show that the word karman is used with the same signification as kriyā. Kriyā is sometimes called karman. As there is difference of meaning between the two expressions, namely, kām kriyām karişyasi (what action will you do?) and kim karma karişyasi, one is allowed to use the word karman in place of kriyā. Patanjali calls it a kind of artificial (kṛtrima) karman. It is called artificial 2 because its use in this particular sense is not sanctioned by the grammarians in general. If karman is taken to be synonymous with kriyā, one may apprehend some difficulty in explaining the rule Pāņ., 1.4.49, since it is impossible for one $kriy\bar{a}$ to render another as the most desirable one (katham ca nāma kriyayā kriyepsitatamā syāt).

¹ मियापि लिचिनं नर्स-Mahābhāşya.

[ै] जियापि अविमं कभ। न सिध्यति। कर्तुरीपिततमं कर्म द्रव्युचित। क्यं च नाम क्रियया क्रियेपिततमा स्थात् क्षियापि क्रिययेपिततमा भवति। क्या जियया ? द्रह य एव मनुष्य: प्रेचापूर्वकारी भवति स बुद्धा तावत् किंचिद्य संप्रयति संहरे: प्रार्थना प्रार्थनायामध्यवसायोऽध्यवसाय श्रारमा श्रारमो निवृत्ति निवृत्ती फलावाक्षि: |—Mahābhāṣya, under the rule 1. 4. 32.

How minutely Patanjali used to observe the logical sequence of facts is clearly seen from the way in which he has shown the successive stages through which one hrigā or action may become the most desirable by means of another action. The usual order is as follows: a man first conceives something by his intellect, then he feels a desire to have it, next comes the effort which is followed by the actual commencement of action, then the completion or accomplishment of the action, and finally the attainment of the desired end.

As it is not always the case that Sampradāna should be invariably connected with the object of the root dā alone, Kātyāyana has added a Vārttika? obviously to widen the scope of Sampradāna. On the strength of this supplementary Vārttika we are allowed to explain Sampradāna even in the case of an intransitive verb like patye sete, where the root being an intransitive one, we cannot grammatically expect to have an object that might be connected with Sampradāna as such.

Patañjali scems to have minutely scrutinised every part of the $s\bar{u}tru$, $P\bar{u}v$, 2.4.32. He does not take the root $d\bar{u}$ in its strictly literal sense (to give), nor does he lay much stress on

¹ Mahābhāşya, Vol. I, p. 330.

⁹ क्रियया यनिभिन्नैति सीऽपि शंप्रदानम् । Patalipali has क्रियायष्ट्रपमिप् कर्तव्यम्, दशिषि यथा स्थात्—श्राद्राय निगर्देने, युद्धाय सनद्यते (—Mahabhasya, Vol. I, p. 330.

the derivative meaning (sampradīyate yasmai iti), but considers Sampradāna to be one to whom something is actually given. The instance siṣyāya capeṭam dadāti (gives a slap to the pupil), as cited by Patañjali, is a clear indication that he held a far wider view of Sampradāna. It is not evidently the use of the root dā that always gives the idea of Sampradāna, because in the example rajakasya vastram dadāti (where the genitive is intended by the speaker) the explicit mention of dadāti is not even attended with caturthī (Sampradāna-kāraka).

Susena explains the rule Pan. 2.4.32 the following way: -Sampradana is what is desired by the agent through the instrumentality of the object. It is neither 1 the object of the verb in general, nor virtually the object of dadāti in particular wherewith Sampradāna is really connected; for, according to the first view, the village, as in ajām grāmam nayati ('brings a goat to the village') would be quite as good as Sampradana; according to the latter, the designation Sampradāna might be applied to the 'washerman in the example clothes are given to a washerman.' The anomaly presented by the above instances received an ingenious solution at the hands of Susena. The drift of his follows: argument is as as the sense naturally follows \mathbf{from} the

[े] क्रियामात्रस्य कर्मणा यं उंबधाति, दहाते: कर्मणा वा ? नादाः, श्रनां ग्रामं नयति—इत्यादी ग्रामस्यापि संप्रदानत्वप्रसङ्गात । नापि द्वितीयः, रजकस्य वस्त्रं दहाती-त्यादावित्रसङ्गात्—Kavirāja (Kāraka).

construction of the word Sampradana (anvarthasamjāā), the definition is not vitiated by the fallacy, viz., ativuapti,1 that is to say, the village cannot grammatically have the designation of Apadana owing to the absence of any connecwith the root da. Similarly, as the tion proposition sam in Sampradana serves to indicate that dadati does not mean merely giving. but signifies gift in its legal sense, i.e., the waiving of one's own right (in regard to a thing) so as te allere another to enjoy the same as his ewn nossessien, the washerman cannet he treated as Apādāna oven in cennexien with the verbal form dadāti (dadāti means here te make ever' [arpaya], and not actual giving [dana].

Susena, therefere, explains dāna as a kind of 'desire' to transfer one's right to another after the entire cessation of ene's ewn right, and gives the accurate definition of Sampradāna in the following terms—tyāgajanyasvatvaphalabhāgitvam, i.e., Sampradāna is the recipient of the result of right or ownership that is transferred to one by formal gift. He further asserts that the principal' or direct instances of Sampradāna are

च्चिन, संप्रदानिम्बलयेसंज्ञायां दा-भातीः प्रवणाह्दातिलंभते... तथा सस्प-सर्गेय सम्बल्धः प्रदीयते यस्ये तत् संप्रदानिभित स्पृत्यास्य सम्बल्धः सप्यंतपरस्रतापादार्थः उटातर्राशं स्वयते ।—Kovirala.

[•] खबलभ्यं गदारा परखलजनकोमृतः संकलनिमेयो दामम्।—Kavirāja,

एतत् सवै यत्र वालविक तव सुख्यनिव संगदानम्। भवालविक तु विवचामानेष प्रयोगस्य साधुलम्।—Ksavirājo.

those where the transference of right actually takes place, and that in regard to other cases, it is generally the desire of the speaker $(vivak s\bar{a})$ that accounts for the use.

The validity of Sampradāna in pradīyatām Dāśarathāya Maithilī (as Rāvaṇa had no legal right over Sītā so that he might be entitled to make a gift of her to Rāma) depends upon the desire of the speaker, i.e., it is said as if Rāvaṇa had transferable right over Sītā. The fact is that one cannot give anything to another in the legal sense of the term, if he does not own it actually.

Bhartrhari has spoken of three kinds of Sampradāna:—(i) anirākartr—it means a kind of Sampradāna that does neither accept nor refuse what might be offered to it; as, for instance, Sūryāya argham dadāti; the sun neither solicits worship nor is likely to refuse it; (ii) prerakam—i.e., what induces others to make over something to him, as in viprāya gām dadāti. Here the Brahmin is supposed to have induced the man to make a gift of the cow to him; (iii) anumantr—who approves of a gift, i.e., permits a man to make over something (though he does not actually request him to do so) as in upādhyāyāya gām dadāti (presenting a cow to the teacher).

¹ दत्वच रावणम मैथिल्यां खलाभावेऽपि खलविवचया प्रयोगमः साधुलम्।— Kavirāja.

CHAPTER VIII

SARTASA

Samasa-definition—The meaning of samartha, ekarthibhara and tyapekel—Classification of Samasa—Power of expressing the additional sense.

The psychological principle underlying the formation of compounds and the unity of sense denoted by Samāsa has been censidered in my "Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus." An attempt will be made here to shew the grammatical side of the problem with particular reference to the conflicting views held by the Naiyāyikas and the grammarians on the question of the additional denotating power of Samāsa.

The word Samāsa literally means brevity, i. e., condensed or concise expression. This grammatical device has the advantage of condensing a sentence without any change of signification. It must be, however, remembered that it is not only words, or more properly nāmans, that combine with each other in a compound, but their meanings, too, are so consistently related to each other (as noun and

adjective) as to give rise to one qualified idea. Though composed of two or more padas, a Samāsa produces only one idea in the mind.

According to the rule samarthah padavidhih, $P\bar{a}n$. 2.1.1, which is quite as good as a $Paribh\bar{a}s\bar{a}$, words are allowed to form a compound when they are found to be mutually expectant and their meanings compatible with each other. Sarvavarman has nāmnām samāso yuktārthah, which means that a compound represents the 'consistent unification of the meanings of two or more nāmans.' A combination of nāmans expressing a united sense is what is grammatically called Samāsa. The meanings are consistently united when the words forming a compound are related to each other as substantive and attributive. The kārikā 1 quoted by Durga goes to show that visesya and visesana in their harmonious association are only competent to form a compound. Samāsa, holds Durga,2 is distinct from a sentence. But it is generally expressed by a sentence (vigraha) only to help the understanding of unintelligent people. The word samartha, as used in the sūtra, is of considerable importance and has given rise to various interpretations.

Patañjali has explained sāmarthya from two different standpoints, namely, vyapekṣā or mutual

[े] विशिष्यस विशेषेण निलित' युक्तसुच्यते । समासाख्य' तदेव साप्तिस्तित्पत्ति-

स पुन: सभावादाक्याद्वित: तत्तुल्यकूपावयव इति क्रत्वा श्रवुधबोधनाय नानां युक्तार्थ इत्युचते ।---Kalāpa, Tikā,

oonnection and ekārthibhāva or the oneness of meanings. Ho has made it abundantly olear with reference to all ferms of compounds that no Samāsa whatseever is grammatically admissible in the absence of such sāmarthya or competency. He has also suggested various meanings of the word samartha in order to show how the word might correctly be used to imply both vyapekṣā and ekārthībhāva.

According to his interprotation,1 the word samartha may be used in the fellowing senses, namely, consistent or mixed up (sangatārtha), united (samsrstartha), visible (samprekşitārtha) and cennected (sambaddhārtha); the first two meanings indicating united into one (ckibhūtam) are agreeable with the ekārthībhāva point of view, and the last two indicating connection of meanings being harmonieus with the vyapekşā standpoint. Se . far as the ekārthībhāva2 view is concerned, the word samartha should be taken as implying united meanings (ekībhūtam), and it brings sense of 'connected meanings' out the (sambaddhartha) or 'reciprocally expectant meanings,' when vyapekṣā is considered to be the essential condition of Samāsa. The word samartha indicates that words are not allowed

Mahābhāşya under the rule Pāņ., 2. 1, 1.

[ै] तर यदा ताबदैकार्योभावः सामध्ये तदेव विषदः करियाने संगताये: समये: संस्टाये: समये इति । एकीभूतिमिति गयते !—Mahābbāsya under the rule Pan, 2. 1. 1.

to form a compound unless they are samartha, i.e., have either mutual connection or compatibility of meanings.

Patanjali then proceeds to bring out the full import of sāmarthya and clearly shows why Samāsa 1 does not usually take place in expressions like bhāryā rājāah puruso devadattasya and mahat kastam śritah. What means to say is this: no compound is possible between two words when one of them is grammatically connected with another word that does not form a part of the compound; in mahat kastam śritah the form kastam is asamartha (incompetent) to be compounded or consistently united with the word śritah on account of its having relation with the word mahat that qualifies it. Here asāmarthya for a regular combination in order to form a Samāsa is due to the fact that the words mahat and kastam are mutually expectant as noun and adjective.2 To use the logical phraseology, sapeksatva implies the state of having relation with a word that is not a member of the compound.3

The grammarians, as a rule, are not prepared to allow the formation of compounds in cases of such sāpekṣatva. This is what is actually meant by the dictum saviśeṣaṇānām

¹ वसामर्थात्।—Mahābbāşya under the rule Pāņ., 2. 1. 1.

² सापेचनसमधं भवतीति !--Ibid.

युक्तार्थघटकीसूतपदातिरिक्तपदसन्वन्धतं सापेचलम ।

^{*} न सापेचे क्रचित्रसमासाः।—Mahābhāsya.

crittirua, that is, a word cannot enter into combination with another word (in a Samasa) if it happens to have an adjunct. A question may arise at this stage as to how compounds aro admissiblo in instances liko rājapuruso abhirapatarah and rajapuruso darsaniyah (a beantiful officer of the king), because the word purusa is hero compounded with the word rajan inspite of its relation with the adjective abhirupa. Now Patanjali comes forward with his argument to justify the formation of a compound in such cases. Whon the principal member not the subordinate one, he happens to be sapeksa or connected with some other word (as adjective), there is practically no restriction for the formation of a a compound. What we actually find in rajapurusah abhirupah is that the principal member, i.e., purusali, is connected with the adjunct abhirupa and, therefore, Samusa is grammatically admissible.

But sentences like Devadattasya gurukulam ond caitrasya dāsabhāryā (the wife of the servant of Caitra), otc., which are avowedly correct in populor usage, present further difficulties. Pataŭjali first tried to get rid of this anomalous position by explaining the genitive in Devadattasya as implyiog relation with the whole and not with the

Mahābhāāya, p. 860 : प्रधानमद सापेद्धं, भवति च प्रधानस्य सापेद्धापि समास: ।

word guru alone, but this argument also proved futile, because, the sentence is really intended to express particularly Devadattasya yo gurustasya yat kulam and so on. He then finally concludes that Samāsas are admissible in these cases (even inspite of sāpekṣatva) on account of gamakatva or power of expressing the intended sense. A compound is said to be gamaka when it is capable of expressing the very same sense (no matter if there is sāpekṣatva) as is implied by the words that go to form such a compound. This is exactly what is meant by the statement sapeksatve'pi gamakatvāt samāsah. As to why Samāsa is not admissible in mahat kastam śritah, there is no denying the fact, says Patanjali,1 that the signification of the sentence in this case is not necessarily the same as is expressed by the compound. This is the way how Patanjali relaxed the rigidity of his previous statement (süpekṣamasamartham bhavatīti).

Jagadīśa ² ventures to differ from the grammarians. He has little regard for the view that a compound and its *vigraha* (the sentence to which the compound might be

[्] इष्ट समानार्थेन वाकीन समासेन च भवितव्यम्। यश्रेष्ठार्थी वाकीन गम्यते महत् कष्टं श्रितं इति न नातुचित् समासेनासी गम्यते महत्कष्टश्रित इति। यव गमको भवित भवित तव हित्तः, यथा देवदत्तस्य गुरुकुलम् ।—Mahābhāşya, Vol. I, p. 861.

[ं] विग्रहे एव समासलभ्यार्थस वोधकालं तन्तं, न तु समासे विग्रहार्थस्य, विग्रह-लभ्ययोर्लिङ्ग संस्थ्ययोर्व्यञ्जकविधुर्येण प्रायण: समासानोध्यत्वात्।—Sabdasaktiprakāsikā, under the Kār. 33.

dissolved) must have the same meaning, and holds in opposition that the vigraha, as a rule, should bring out the sense of the compound but it is not equally binding that a compound should necessarily express the entire meaning of the sentence. He has, accordingly, disjoined the compound sphuradvānī (articulate speech) as sphurantīm vānīm without having any regard to the equality of case-terminations between vyāsa and Samāsa.

The two views—ckārthībhāva and vyapekṣā—correspond respectively to jahatsvārthā vṛtti and ajahatsvārthā vṛtti: the former means that when a compound is formed, its component parts cease to retain their individual meanings, and give rise to only one united sense; and the latter implies that such constituent parts do not, as a rule, give up their meanings (as in a sentence) as a necessary condition of Samāsa.

According to the first view, samartha implies the oneness of meanings (i.e., the members of a compound having different significations are made to signify only one sense). A sentence, on the other hand, is made up of different padas that continue to retain their own meanings as rājāah puruṣah. We have to deal here with a problem of great importance.

भ्याससमासयोश्तल्यायंकलम् ।

^{*} Śabdaśaktı—Samāsaprakaraņam.

पृथ्ययौनासेवार्थीमाव: समयंवचनम् |--- Vār.
 पृथ्ययथौना पदानासेवार्थीमाव: समयेमिल् चते |--- Mahābhāāya

As a matter of fact, there is no material difference between a sentence and a compound so far as the meaning is concerned, for instance, the compound and the sentence like rājāaḥ puruṣa ānīyatām and rājapuruṣa ānīyatām grammatically mean the same thing, viz., fetch an officer of the king. It, therefore, goes against the assumption of Jagadīśa who made a distinction between Samāsa and vigraha with reference to their meanings.

Wherein, then, lies the difference between vyāsa and Samāsa? The criterion to distinguish a Samāsa from a sentence is that the former characterised by aikapadya and aikasvarya from the grammatical point of view. The prominent points of difference are as follows :- (1) there is no elision of caseendings in a sentence as in a compound; (2) in a sentence other words (adjectives) are allowed intervene between such mutually expectant words as rājāaḥ ṛddhasya puruṣa iti, but such is not the case in regard to the compound (3) in a sentence there rājapurusah: hardly any restriction as to the syntax or order of words, but one cannot possibly alter the order of a compound without substantial change of meaning; (4) in a compound

¹ इह समानार्येन वाक्येन भवितव्यं समासेन च I-Mababhaşya.

² ऐकपदासैकखर्यं मेकविभक्तिकलं च सर्वेदैकाधीं भावे द्रप्यते।—Kaiyata.

³ सुब्लीपो व्यवधानं यघेष्टमन्यतरेणाभिसम्बन्धः स्तर इति !—Mahābhāşya, Vol. I, p. 162.

there is only one necent and not two as in the sentence $r\bar{a}j\bar{n}ah$ purusah. It might be, however, observed here that those special features, as enumerated above, are not really brought about by $ek\bar{a}rth\bar{\imath}bh\bar{a}va$ or oneness of the sense, but they, strictly speaking, represent the result of Patanjali's interpretation.

Then, Patnujali continues to point out other points of difference between ruasa and Samāsa1: (i) there is difference of number in a sentonec, ns rājāaķ puruşaķ, rājāok puruşaķ, rājnām purusah, but no such disserence is eomprohensible in the compound (rajapurusah); (ii) the meaning of a sontence is clear. while that of a compound is somotimes ambiguous (the roverso of the case is also possible, viz., a compound appears to be sometimos moro cloar than a sentenco); (iii) an upasarjana or subordinate member is allowed to have a qualifying adjunct (rddhasya rainah paruşalı) in a sentenco, whoreas there is a positive restriction that a member of the compound eannot have grammatical connection with an adjective lying outside the compound. This also, to speak the truth, does not constitute a special feature of Samasa, hecause compounds in Devadattasya gurukulam, etc., havo already been declared admissible on the ground of expressiveness (gamakatva); (iv) ca is used in a sentence

मं संख्याविशेषी व्यक्तासिधानसुपसर्भनविशेषणं चयोगः (—Mahabbasya, Vol. I. p. 362.

(in the sense of collection), but not in a compound.

Some explain, on the other hand, 'mutual as the proper implication connection' sāmarthya; the expression 'mutual connection' should not be, however, misunderstood as referring to words (reciprocally expectant words), but as pertaining to their meanings.2 When, vyapeksā (mutual connection) pertaining to the meaning is thus held to be the denotation of sāmarthya, both the king and the man, as in rājñah puruṣah, seem to be related to each other. The king 3 is connected with the man as the master (mamāyamiti), and the man also gets himself related to the king on account of his being dependent on him (ahamasya). The genitive is thus indicative of the relation between them. The older grammarians are supposed to have been in favour of vyapeksā as an indispensable condition of Samāsa.

In course of interpreting the rule 2.1.1 (Pān.), Patanjali has referred to various standpoints regarding the characteristics of Samāsa. If Samāsa is considered to be a vītti (i.e., if it, as a rule, always brings out a specific signification),

परस्परव्यपेचां सामर्थंभिक्ष ।—Mahābhāşya.

² Mahābhāṣya, p. 365. का पुन: शब्दयोर्च्येपेचा ? न ब्र्म: शब्दयोरिति; किं तर्हि ? अथेयो: 1—Mahābhāṣya, p. 365.

इ इ राज्ञ: पुरुष इत्युक्ते राजा पुरुषमपेचते समायमिति, पुरुषोऽपि राजानसपेचतेऽहमस्येति। तयोरभिसन्बन्धस्य षष्ठी वाचिका भवति।—Mahābhāṣya, under the rule Pāṇ., 2. 1. 1.

these views, holds Kondabhatta, are, by minute examination, reducible to two only, namely, jahatsvārthā and ajahatsvārthā.

The three views mainly discussed in the Mahābhāṣya are as follows;²(i) ekārthībhāva or the unity of meanings takes place in a compound as the salient characteristic, but a vigraha (sentence) comprehends vyapekṣā or vyapekṣā is found to be the primary condition of a sentence; (ii) on the assumption of vṛtti, Samāsa will fall under the category of either jahatsvārthā or ajahatsvārthā; (iii) just as vyapekṣā or mutual conection is necessary in a sentence, so it is in a compound, i.e., some hold vyapekṣā (as the real meaning of sāmarthya) to be the main factor that goes to form a compound.

Kaiyata, like Patañjali, supports ekārthībhāva as the most plausible view from the standpoint of the grammarians who ascribe eternality to \$abda. He argues further that the question of vṛtti, as shown above, is absolutely immaterial to those who take a sentence as containing no parts (niravayava), and look upon \$abda as eternal. The division of vṛtti into jahatsvārthā and ajahatsvārthā represents the view of those who take \$abda to be kārya.

Vaiyākaraņabbūşaņa, Kār. 30.

² হন্ত নাৰ্য়াত দ্বন্দ্রিং স্বামন। समाश्रास्त्राधीमादः, বিষ্ট্রাই অট্ট্রেন দ্বা:। খল ই हिंच वर्तमात्र इत्यारम जहत्वार्धाजहत्वार्धा चीत प्यतिदेन मतान्तरम्। समाग्रादाविप बाकाबदापेचैन चामश्रीमिति चापर मतम्।—

Samāsa is a vrtti, that is to say, Samāsa is attended with a special significance. Vrtti is of two kinds, namely, jahatsvārthā and ajahatsvārthā. According to the standpoint of jahatsvārthā-vṛtti, the members constituting a compound generally give up their particular meanings and the compound necessarily acquires a special signification. This special sense may be produced either by śakti (denotation) or by laksanā (implication), the former helps us in getting the united meaning (ekarthibhāva) and the latter is resorted to in case of vyapeksā. Patanjali has here made use of a very well-chosen example to show the nature of jahatsvārthā. 'A carpenter,2 for instance, when engaged to perform the work of a king, is compelled to give up his own work to a certain extent.' So far as the other form of vrtti is concerned (ajahatsvārthā), the members of a compound continue to retain their respective meanings; as, for instance, 'a beggar 3 does not necessarily leave off what he procured first even when he happens to secure alms for the second time.' But there is some difficulty in accepting this standpoint as a reasonable one. The compound form should necessarily have the dual number, if each of the members

¹ परार्घाभिधानं इति:। परस्य श्रन्दस्य यीऽर्थम्बस्याभिधानं श्रन्दान्तरेण यन सा हत्तिरित्यर्थ:।—Жаіуаṭа.

[ै] तचा राजवर्भणि प्रवर्तमान: खं वर्म जहाति।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 364.

[ै] भिचुकोऽयं दितीयां भिचामासाय पूर्वां न जहाति ।—Ibid, p. 365.

(rājan nud puruṣa) were allowed to retain their respective meanings.

Pataniali has thus examined the validity of soveral views in regard to the exposition of samarthya and advanced arguments as well as counter-arguments either to support or to reject thom. But the question that still awaits solution is to determine which of these two views is really acceptable from the standpoint of grammar, and appeals more to reason. In view of the emphasis laid on the charthibhava. it is clear that Patañjali accopted it as the most correct explanation. From what we have been able to gather from his longthy discourse on the rule samarthah padavidhih, it appears that Patañjali, whose decision is held to be authoritativo on all problems of grammar, was in favour of the ekarthibhava 1 point of view (er jahatsvārthā). Tho ekārthībhāva viow, it must be remombered, is also the only reasonable explanation so far as the psychological aspect of Samusa is concorned. According to Haradatta, both nyapekşā nnd ekūrthībhāva aro necossary in a compound. In the absonce of vyapeksû or mutual connection, words are not allowed to form a compound.

Patañjali e has, howover, drawn attention to the fact that jahatsvartha does not mean

पह अपेषायां समासी न भवति, एकावीभावे वालां नीति।—Kaiyeta on वावचनानवंदान्।

जहदव्यक्षी खाये मायनाय अझति । य: परार्थविशेषी खायेन जङ्गति ।
 —Mahābhāşya under the rule Pān, 2, 1, 1.

that the constituents of a compound are liable to give up their respective meanings altogether. But only that sense which is found to be inconsistent with the specific signification $(par\bar{a}rthavirodh\bar{\imath})$ as denoted by a compound, is forsaken. This is why the expression $r\bar{a}japuruṣo \bar{a}n\bar{\imath}yat\bar{a}m^{1}$ does not simply mean the bringing of a man, but particularly the man having relation with the king.

 $S\bar{a}marthya$ has been explained by some as pertaining to vrti. According to this view, difference (bheda) as well as association (samsarga) are the meanings of $s\bar{a}marthya$.

Patañjali has raised another question which is not less important in connection with Samāsa. A compound is generally said to be optional, that is to say, we may have either a Samāsa as rājapuruṣaḥ or a sentence like rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ without any change of meaning. To form a compound, or to use the compound-form depends upon the desire of the speaker. This view does not carry much weight with Patañjali. What he means to say is this: there are practically two views, namely, vrttipakṣa, i.e., compound and avrttipakṣa, i.e., sentence. Both the sentence and the compound have their distinct characteristics fixed by nature, and there is nothing to confuse the one with the other.3

¹ राजपुरुषमानयेत्युक्ते पुरुषमाचस्यानयन' प्राप्नीति। नैष दोष:।—

Mahābhāṣya.

² भेदसंसर्गो वा सामर्थ्यमिति ऋपर श्राह।—Ibid.

s स्वभावतश्रेतद्भवति वाक्यं च समास्य।—Mahāhhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., 2. 1. 1.

Kaiyata' clearly shows the difference between a sentence and a compound by stating in clear terms that no compound is admissible in case of vyapeksā, and, therefore, a sentence is impossible when ekārthībhāva is intended to be implied.

It must be noticed that the view held by Haradatta goes against such a rigid distinction. Some hold, on the contrary, that ekarthibhava, vyapeksa and ajahatsvārthā vrtti are all that is required in the formation of a compound.2 Those who hold the non-eternality of sabda a are of opinion that compounds are capable of being formed optionally out of sentences, the formation of compounds being a matter of option with them. Those who, like the grammarians, maintain that sabda is a permanent entity 4 (naityaśabdika) opine that sentences and Samāsas are materially different, that is to say, Samāsas represent a permanent combination of words, for they are so fixed by usage that they do not admit of any decomposition. To be more clear, the drift of Patanjali's argument is that the so-called process of disjoining a compound into vyása or vigraha (whereby a compound is dissolved into its elements) is at best

¹ इह व्यपेचाया समास्रो न भवति, एकार्यीमाने वाका नैति।—Kaiyata

[°] तथारिक।धौभानीव्यपेचाइनहत्स्वायां चीत वर्ध समुचितं परिभाषाप्रहात्तहेतु,।
—Varyakaranahbuşana, under Kar. 30

कार्यग्रव्दिका बाक्यादिव दिकल्पोन हसि निष्पाद्या सन्धनाना ।—Kaiyata

[•] नैत्यमस्टिकास्त हत्तिवाक्ये नित्ये विविक्तविषये सन्धने।-Ibid.

artificial, and that recourse is taken to such a method only for the purpose of bringing out the signification of a compound which is really an indivisible unit of speech. This view is analogous to what we have already referred to in deciding the priority of samhitā to padas (padaprakṛtiḥ saṃhitā). Further light is thrown upon this view by the so-called not allowed nitya-samāsas, because we are to disjoin a compound like kṛṣṇasarpaḥ (as we cannot do so without altering the sense); this class of compounds is not capable of being broken up into parts without necessary change meanings. They do neither admit of vigraha in the usual way, nor are their meanings directly expressed by their component parts, but some other words are required to bring out their signification (avigraha or asvapadavigraha).

Bhartrhari has also shown the difference between a sentence and a compound. Samāsa is held to be an indivisible unit and the so-called vigraha is after all an artificial method that serves to bring out the meaning of a compound to unintelligent people. Durga has tato'nyat vākyamiti, which implies that a compound is distinct from a sentence by its very nature. There are, so to speak, two

¹ श्रव्यान् प्रत्यपायाश्च विचिवाः प्रतिपत्तये। श्रव्यान्तरत्वादत्यन्तं भेदी वाक्य-समासयीः।—Vakyapadiya.

different views en Samisa, 1 namely, (i) a compound is a permanent unit of speech; (ii) a compound 2 is only a condensed form of a sentence, or, in other words, a sentence is reduced to a compound-form for the sake of brevity or conciseness. Pataūjali and his followers seem to have supported the first view. Others hold that there is no material difference between a compound and a sentence, that is to say, Samāsa is a designation that may be optionally applied to a sentence under certain conditions.

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^{&#}x27; समासात् स्त्रभावादेव बाका भित्रभिति नित्रसभासवादिनी सतम्।— Durga's Tikā on the rule 'नासां समासो गुकार्यः'।

वाकामिव भभागीमवरीति मृतं द्रैयितुमाइ—मंग्रयेव वा विधिरन्वाच्यात इति ।
 —Dorga.

³ क्षचित्रियः क्षविदिक्षयः क्रचित्र स्थात्।—Ibil.

भेषज्ञदैदाद्यनिवार्थः; मुपैविशेषः ।

artificial, and that recourse is taken to such a method only for the purpose of bringing out the signification of a compound which is really an indivisible unit of speech. This view is analogous to what we have already referred to in deciding the priority of $samhit\bar{a}$ to padas (padaprakrtih samhitā). Further light is thrown upon this view by the so-called nitya-samāsas, because we are not allowed to disjoin a compound like kṛṣṇasarpaḥ (as we cannot do so without altering the sense); this class of compounds is not capable of being broken up into parts without necessary change of meanings. They do neither admit of vigraha in the usual way, nor are their meanings directly expressed by their component parts, but some other words are required to bring out their signification (avigraha or asvapadavigraha).

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different views on Samusa, 1 namely, (i) a compound is a permanent unit of speech; (ii) a compound 2 is only a condensed form of a sontence, or, in other words, a sontence is reduced to a compound-form for the sake of brevity or conciseness. Patañjali and his followers seem to have supported the first view Others hold that there is no material difference between a compound and a sentence, that is to say, Samūsa is a designation that may be optionally applied to a sontence under certain conditions.

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व वाक्यमेव भनामीभवतीति मत दर्थितिसाइ—स्त्रायेव वा विधिरन्वाख्यात इति । —Durga.

³ कचित्रित्य कचिदिकस्य किसत्र स्थात्। —Ibil

भेषज्ञवैद्याद्यनिवार्थं, स्पैविशेष.।

compound means that we are allowed to say either rājapuruṣaḥ or rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ, the former having only the advantage of concise-According to this point of view, most cases of compounds are simply dependent on option. Samāsa is grammatically inadmissible in where padas are so related to those cases each other that they cannot give rise to any special signification (parārthābhidhānā).

It should be particularly explained here what is really meant by holding Samāsa to be a vrtti. Vṛtti means, as Patanjali maintains, 'the power of expressing the sense that is different from those that are denoted by the members of a compound,' that is to say, Samāsa is expressive of some special or additional signification.

Patañjali has dealt with the problem of Samāsa with such elaboration and in minute details that his successors had no room for making further contributions to the subject. In a number of popular kārikās. Śrīpati 1 has carefully summarised all that can concerning Samāsa in general. Jagadīśa's ² definition and exposition Samāsa are such as to \mathbf{show} that followers of the Navya-nyāya considered a compound to be the same as a sentence, though

प्रतियोगिपदादन्यत् यदन्यत् कारकादपि। हत्तिग्रन्दैकदेशार्षे सन्वन्यस्तेन नेष्यते ॥-- Kāt. Pariśişţa

यादृशस्य महावाक्यसान्तव्वादि निंजार्थके । यादृशार्थस्य धीहेतु: स समासक्तद-र्धन: ॥—Sabdasakti., Kār. 31.

in a condensed form, and, unlike the grammarians, they did not necessarily recognise the special signification of Sanara

In course of showing the applicability of his definition to all cases of Samāer, and dealing particularly with certain arregular forms of compound, Jagadisa has made some important observations which one can hardly afford to pass over for an adequate knowledge of the subject. We give below only a few instances of Samīer where Jagadisa has given a stamp of his originality of exposition.

- (i) The rigidha! (the sentence whereby the meaning of a compound is usually expressed) should be such as would bring out the entire meaning of a compound, but there is no such rigid condition in the case of a compound. It is generally found that a compound-form does not contain anything to give an exact idea as to the precise number and gender of the rigidha. Huis, Jagadisa refutes the view that both vyāsa and Samāsa are exactly expressive of the same senso.
- (ii) In eases other than those of Nipātas, the meanings of two Namans (words) are related to each other as if they were identical 2
- (iii) As the genitivo (denoting relation) is dropped in a compound like rajapurusah (as a

निवातातिरिक्तव्यक्षे नामावयोरभेदान्वयसायुगुप्रवस्तु ।—Ibid

necessary condition of Samāsa in general), the Naiyāyikas 1 have taken recourse to lakṣaṇā to expressly indicate the relation of purusa with rājan.

- (iv) Though Karmadhāraya compounds having pronoun like yad and tad as their last members are not generally recognised by the grammarians,² Jagadīśa has supported the validity of such a compound as paramasah on the authority of Jumaranandi.
 - (v) If a compound is allowed to be formed by the combination of more than two padas, it should be either Dvandva or Bahuvrihi, i.e., excepting these two compounds no other compounds are generally found to consist of three or more members.
 - (vi) An anomaly is presented by the expression karmacāndālayogottham, because yogottham (resulted from the conjunction) cannot be grammatically taken here adjunct qualifying $p\bar{a}pa$ (sin) which forms a part of the compound pāpakṣayaḥ. Jagadīśa meets this position by suggesting that yogottham should be taken in the sense of yogaprayojyam (i.c., resulting from a conjunction of Rāhu with either the sun or the moon) which might be

[🛓] राजपुरुष क्यादी पूर्वपदं पष्ठार्यसंवसे जचणित सणिक्षदुक्तमि संगच्छते।— Sabdaśakti.

तदायुत्तरपदकः कर्मधारयः प्रायशो नेष्यते, तथापि नोलयद्रस आस्वाय इत्यादि प्रयोगात् क्वचिदिष्यते, प्रयुक्तं च जुमरनिन्दना 'परम: स' द्रत्यादार्थे परमस: पर्मतावित्यादि ।-Ibid.

वहपदे वहनीहिरव नेतरो बन्दान्य: समास: ।--Ibid.

censistently connected with the meaning of pāpakṣaya by the rolation of identity.

(vii) As Dvigu 2 and Karmadhāraya compounds are found to have a striking similarity botween themselves from both physical and psychological aspects (each having the first member as an adjective and both indicating the relation of identity) only with this difference that in cases of Dvigu the first pada is a numerical adjective, Jagadisa has no objection in including Dvigu within the category of Karmadhāraya.

On the evidence of the rule Pāņ. 2.1.23, Bhaţtoji also speaks of both Dvigu and Karmadhāraya as two special classes of Tatpuruşa, taking a wider view of the latter.

(viii) According to JagadIsa, a Tatpurusa compound, with an adverb as its first member, is also admissible. He recognises stokapaktā as an instance of Karmadhāraya. But there is some difficulty in explaining the compound as such, because the meaning of the adverb stoka (little) is not such as may have the relation of identity (tādātmya-sambandha) with that of

[े] योगोत्समिलाय योगप्रयोज्यमिलायः, स चामेरेन पापचयेऽस्तितः।— Sabdasakti.

² हिनो. कर्मधारयानर्गसलेडीय न चनि: :—Ibid, under the Kar, 38.

तत्पुरुपविशेष: कर्मधारय सिंहिंगेणो दिगु:।

[•] सोक्यकेत्यादी कियाबियेण्डै: क्रमेशास्य एवः। महाक्षत्रिधानिश्र इत्यादी कवित्यादावितः.....नासार्वेकदेशे प्रचनादावपत्यासार्द्रणामेदान्यवीधकात्या त्यातसम्भवात्।—Sabdaéaktiprakāhkā under Kār. 39.

paktr (one who cooks). As a matter of fact, the adverb is really connected with the action (cooking) and not with the agent. Here Jagadīsa has been compelled to admit the validity of nāmārthaikadeśānvaya, that is, the relation with a part of the meaning of a Nāman, and, accordingly, suggests on the strength of such examples as mahākavi, mahāvijña (where mahattva or greatness refers respectively to the state of being a poet and that of being wise, that the adverb stoka is related to pacana (cooking) which forms part of the meaning of paktā.

- (ix) By supporting such expressions as stokanamrā stanābhyām (as used by Kālidāsa), Jagadīśa has sought to refute the view that 'no compound whatsoever is admissible with an adverb.
- (x) Jagadisa has thoroughly rejected the grammatical definition of Avyayībhāva compound, as it involves the fallacy of avyāpti. It is not strictly correct to say that an Avyayībhāva compound has always an indeclinable as its prior member, for, in instances like śalākāpari, akṣapari,2 etc., we find an indeclinable as the last member; again, trijamunam (a collection of three Jumnas),

¹ क्रियाविशेषणै: समास एवाच्युत्पन्न इति तु न देख्यम्।—Sabdasakti under Kār. 39.

अचपरि शलाकापरि—इलायव्ययोभावेऽव्याप्तिस्त्रस्याव्ययगर्भेलेऽपि तत्पूर्वकला-भावात् ।—Sabdasakti.

lohitagangam (the country where the Ganges is red) are examples of Avyayibhara where no indeclinable is traccable.

There is evidence to believe that it was accent that determined $Sam\bar{a}sa$ in the early stage of the Sanskrit language. A slight defect in the use of accents is said to have proved fatal to the sacrificer lumself. What an important part was played by the variation of accents in the determination of $Sam\bar{a}sas$ is best illustrated by such examples as trimum(vyaharanam) which with slight difference of accents may be taken either as $Avyay\bar{v}bhava$ or $Bahuvr\bar{v}h$ compound

The ancient grammarians are said to have divided Samasas into four classes according to the predominance of the meanings of members forming the compound. The principle underlying these classifications, as we shall see later on, is connected more with the meaning than with the physical aspects of Samāsas. They are as follows (1) pūrvapadār thapradhāna as Avyayī-bhāva—in this class of compounds the meaning of the first member (indeclinable) seems to be principal in relation to that of the last, (11) uttarapadar thapradhana, 1e, Tatpunusa—it is so called because in all varieties

¹ एतेष्वयर्गाभैतसाप्यभावात् ।—Sabdafaktı p 52

दुष्ट गन्द खरती वर्णती वा निष्या प्रयुक्ती न समर्थमाइ । स बाग्वकृ यजमान हिनिह्न यथिन्द्रभन्न स्वरतीऽपराधात् ॥ ८१६७३

[ै] इड़ कथिन समास पूर्वपदायमधान, कथिदुत्तरपदाशमधान, कथिदन्यपदार्थं प्रधान, कथिद्रमयपदार्थं मधान, (--Mshabhāyya Vol I p 379

of Talpurusa compounds the meaning of the last member appears to be predominant; (iii) anyapadārthapradhāna, i.e., Bahuvrīķi—the characteristic feature of this class of compounds (anekamanyapadarthe) is that the sense of a word that does not actually enter into the combination comes to have the predominance; (iv) sarvapadārthapradhāna as Dvandva, where the meanings of all members are of equal importance. Following the classifications of earlier grammarians such as Vābhata 1 and others, Jagadīśa has made an addition (madhyapadapradhāna) to the aforesaid division of Samāsas as given by Patanjali. Tatpuruşa compounds like ghatānadhikaraņam and pratiyogitānavacchedakah, etc., are explained by instances wherein the Jagadīśa as sense middle pada (i.e., non-existenceof the denoted by the negative particle na) is accordingly, and he, predominant, them madhyapadārthapradhāna. On a examination of facts it is, however, found that these classifications of the earlier grammarians are neither sufficient to cover the entire field, nor free from the fallacies of ativyāpti and avyāpti. Bhattoji 2 has clearly pointed out how the principle underlying such divisions cannot be applied to instances like atimālaļ, unmattagangam,

पूर्वमध्यान्यसर्वान्यपदप्राधान्यतः पुनः। प्राचौः पचिविधः प्रीतः समासी नाभटादिभिः॥ Sabdasakti, Kār. 33.

² समासयतुर्विष इति तु प्रायोवाद: 1-Bhattoji.

otc., from a strictly grammatical point of viow. In conformity to the rules of grammar, atimālaļ, is taken to be an example of Tatpuruṣa, though the sense of the first member in this case appears to be the principal one. Thus, the prodominance of the sense of the first member of a compound cannot be grammatically regarded as the only criterion for determining an Avyaythhāva compound.

According to the popular divisions, Samāsas are six in number, or soven by the inclusion of the so-called Upapada compound. Some gram marians, however, interpreted the rule HE HII, Pāṇ., 2.1.4, in such a way (applying the principle of yogavibhāga) as to establish six i different kinds of Samāsas; the peculiar among these being the compound made of two verbal forms as khādatamodatā on the strength of the gaṇasūtra—ākhyātamākhyātena kriyāsātatye.

According to Jayāditya, Samāsas are capable of being divided into two well-known classes, namely, nitya and anitya. Anitya-samāsas are those where the addition of the case-terminations to the members of the compound is sufficient to bring out the sense, as, for instance, tho genitive and prathamā respectively in rājāaḥ and and puruṣaḥ are competent to express the meaning of thee ompound rājapuruṣaḥ. In the case

मुपां सुपा तिङा नावा घातुनाय तिङां तिङा। सुवन्तेनेति विज्ञेयः समासः पङ्दिधो बुधैः॥

विभक्तिमावप्रचेपात्रिजान्तर्गतनाससु ।
 स्वार्थस्थावोधवोधार्था नित्यानित्यौ समासकौ ॥

of nitya-samāsas, on the other hand, the mere addition of the case-endings to the constituent elements cannot fully bring out the sense of the compound, for by simple analysis of the compound kṛṣṇasarpaḥ as kṛṣṇaścāsau sarpaśceti (meaning any and every kind of black serpent) one cannot get into the meaning of the compound (i.e., a snake irresistible either by medicinal herbs or physicians).

The most important question that deserves to be particularly considered in connection with the problem of Samāsa is to decide whether the sense denoted by a compound is virtually the same as is expressed by the constituent members, or a compound has by nature the power of expressing a special signification distinct from those of its members. This is a problem over which the grammarians and the Naiyāyikas hold different views. Jagadīśa¹ has referred to Patañjali and his followers as samāsa śaktivādins, who do not take number to be the denotation of a compound, specially aluk-samāsa, inspite of the presence of the case-endings that indicate number (as in kanthe-kālaḥ).

Reference has already been made to the two views—ekārthibhāva and vyapekṣā; the grammarians evidently uphold the former (as it is quite clear from the interpretation of the Mahābhāṣya), while the Naiyāyikas and the

¹ व्यञ्जनसुप: सच्चेऽपि संख्या न बुध्यते इति समासग्रीतवादिन: पातञ्जला:। — Sabdaśakti.

Mīmāmsakas seem to have supported the latter. The main point at issue is that the <code>chārthf-bhāvavādins¹</code> are of opinion that a compound as a whole has the distinct power of expressing a sense in addition to the meanings usually signified by the members,² whereas the <code>vyapeksāvādins</code> have either taken recourse to <code>laksanā</code> wherever the members of a compound are not likely to bring out the full signification or have taken the sense of a compound as exactly equivalent to those of its members.

The arguments usually advanced in favour of the ekārthībhāvā view are as follows:—a compound-form like citraguh (Bahuvīhi naturally indicates 'the owner of handsome cows;' rājapurusah means 'one having relation with the king;' upakunbham gives the idea of 'proximity with a pitcher' and pānipādam expresses the sense of a 'collection of hands and feet' (samāhāru). These meanings, to speak the truth, are not directly expressed by the members of those compounds; as, for instance, the sense of the 'owner' is not denoted by either citrā or go, the idea of 'relation' is not brought out by either rājan or purusa, and 'collection' by either pāni or pāda

¹ एकार्थीमाथे समास एक संग्रहीती न व्यपेतायामिति भाषाद्वेकार्योमात एव सिहानसम्बत, । राज पुरुष इति वान्त्रात् प्रतिपदार्थम्य विज्ञिष्टद्वेष जन्ना प्रति-पादन च तत्त्वमिति समाधि इदि निधाय साम्बत्तारनत समास्त्रिऽतिरिक्ता शक्ति साध्यम् समययते (—Valyakarapabhūsana

समास खलु भिद्रेत गाल पडलगण्डत्। वहना हिस्समीण वजनेदेव साधने। न्यान्यहत् गीरवं तलादिकार्थीभाव भाष्टित ॥—Valyakaranabhüşana, Kar 31

and so on. The grammarians have, therefore, assigned the power of expressing such special or additional senses as those of 'owner,' ! relation' and 'collection,' etc., to the compounds, taking Samāsa as a whole or an indivisible unit of speech.

The word pankaja admits of double meanings—one as 'lotus' signified by samudāyašakti and the other as 'something that grows in the mud' (avayavašakti) denoted by its parts. Similar is the case with a Samāsa; it has one meaning as is denoted by its parts and the other as expressed by the whole. According to the Naiyāyikas, the word pankaja falls under the category of yoga-rūdha, that is to say, it has two-fold signification as denoted by the parts and the whole. The grammarians have recognised such a samudāyašakti in order to arrive at the additional sense of a compound.

Moreover, the ekārthībhāva view is not vitiated by prolixity or gaurava as is the case the vyapekṣāvāda. The Naiyāyikas¹ or with the vyapekṣāvādins, on the contrary, are not prepared to admit of such śakti or power of expressing the additional sense so far as compounds are concerned. They have rather taken recourse to lakṣaṇā whenever they failed to get the intended sense directly from the members of a compound. They have, for

¹ व्यपेचावादिनो नैयायिकादय:। न तावहहुनीही ग्रांतार्जचणयैवीपपत्ते:। -Vaiyākaraņabhūşaņa.

instance, resorted to laksanā in the case of citraguh so as to obtain the sonse of the 'owner.' Kondabhatta maintains that in such cases the assumption of sakti1 is almost unavoidable, sinco lahsana in regard to either citra or go is not sufficient to bring out the full signification, i.e., the owner of beautiful cows. But there is some difficulty in tho way of applying such laksanā,2 for, if the word 'citrā' were indicative (lahsaha) of 'the owner of the heautiful cows,' it would have no consistent relation with the meaning of the word go; again, if the word go were to indicate the same sense, the meaning of the word citra would not be compatible with that of 'the owner' (because it is not the owner who is citra or handsomo but his possessions-the cows). In a Tatpurusa compound such as a ājapurusah,3 Gangeša says that laksanā is to be attributed to the relation as is denoted by the genitive in rajuah. According to the Mimamsakas, the whole sentence should be taken as lakşanā or indicativo (as Gangoša has clearly pointed out).

¹ चितगुरित्यादी खाम्यादिप्रतीतये यक्तिरावग्रकी, भ च खचपया निवीद:।
—Vaiyakaranabbuşana under Kdr 31

[&]quot; न च विष्ठापट चिषतीस्त्रामिलवक, सन गीपदार्थानन्यसन्। नापि गीपट लचक गीस्त्रामिनि चित्रापदार्योगन्वशपते।—Tattvacintamanı—Sabdakhanda, n 202

राजपुरुष रत्यारी पूर्वपदि यहार्यसम्बन्धे खचणित मिणकदुक्तमाप सद्गच्छते।
 — Sabdasaktı, p. 41

^{*} तजाहालार्थविषगीसन्तिमत्तवा पुच्चस्य प्रतीतिषेहतीशी वालो एव स्वचीत।— Tattvacintamanı—Sabdakhanda, p 787.

The Naiyāyikas have, however, resorted to lakṣaṇā in regard to only one pada, either citrā or go, and taken the other as only suggestive or tātparya·grāhaka, as in rājapuruṣaḥ the word rājan is said to be indicative of the relation with the king and so on. They do not, therefore, agree with the Mīmāṃsakas so far as the indicativeness of the whole sentence is concerned.¹ It is specially in the case of Bahuvrīhi and Tatpuruṣa compounds that they have taken the help of lakṣaṇā for the purpose of getting the intended sense. It is not necessary to resort to lakṣaṇā in a Karmadhāraya compound,² where the sense of identity is derivable from the very relation of meanings.

The expressions niṣādasthapatim yājayet, varṣāsu rathakāro'gnimādadhīta have given rise to considerable difficulties. The Mīmāṃsakas do not take niṣādasthapati as an instance of Tatpuruṣa (as in that case lakṣaṇā is to be resorted to) but construe it as a Karmadhāraya compound (niṣāda eva sthapatiḥ) identifying sthapati with niṣāda (the architect who is one and the same as niṣāda).

¹ बहुत्रीही न वाक्ये लचणा, किन्तु पर्दे…समुदायशक्ती मानाभावात्।—Tattvacintāmaņi. न हि बहुत्रीही संमलपदानां लाचिणिकलम् ... एकपदमाचलचणयापि बहुत्रीहेर्व्वस्थाप्यलात्।—Sabdasaktiprakāsikā—Samāsa, p. 50.

² वर्नधारये न जचणा, पदार्थयो: पदास्थानभेदस्य संसर्गतया लाभात्।—Vaiyā-karaṇabhūṣaṇa, समासश्चितिर्णय:, p. 159.

CHAPTER IX

GRAMMAR IN OTHER SYSTEMS OF THOUGHT

Language and Grammar-problems of grammar in the Mimamad-Nyanga and treatises on Alambara.

Grammar is a popular branch of study. Consciously or unconsiously, overy one makes use of grammar or follows cortain principles in the verbal expression of his thought. Man as a speaking animal is first acquainted with grammar, though he does not know that tho way in which he combines one word with another presupposes a number of principles upon which is based the science of grammar. Grammar has its origin in the popular mode of expression, and dorives its vital essence from the popular usago. Grammar, particularly Sanskrit grammar, is indispensably necessary for an adequate knowlege of all branches of literature. Bhartrhari calls it adhividya 1 in order to point out that grammar is intimately connected with all branches of learning, and in consequence of this intimate relation it is held to be the most useful of all departments of studies.2 One

¹ प्रवितं सर्वेवियानामधिवियं प्रकाशते |-- Vākyapadīya, Kār. 1. 14.

^{*} तहैव खोकी विद्यौनासेवा विद्यापरायसम ।-- Ibid.

can hardly expect to make a profitable study of any branch of Sanskrit literature without having a thorough knowledge of grammar. Grammar, Patanjali rightly observes, is a useful companion to the study of the entire Vedic literature.

Speculations on grammar naturally presuppose the existence of language; and the relation in which the study of a language stands to that of its grammatical system is an intimate one. The grammar of a language generally makes its appearance when that language in particular has reached a certain stage of development and produced literary records comprising a vast field of knowledge. Based as it is on the strictly scientific method of generalisation (utsarga) and particularisation (apavāda) on the one hand, and that of agreement (anvaya) and difference (vyatireka) on the other, Sanskrit grammar is found to have thrown much light upon what are known as the fundamental problems of philology. Moreover, the rules of Sanskrit grammar, as they unfold the laws that regulate the growth, formation and correctness of the recognised linguistic forms, are in themselves short formulæ of the science of language. Again, the rules, such as sannikarşah samhitā (Pāṇ., 1.4.109) akah savarne dīrghah (Pān., 6.1.101), which

^{&#}x27; सर्वेवेदपारिषदं होदं शास्त्रम्।--- Mahābhāṣya. under the rule Paņ., 6.3.14.

virtually show the tendonoy of two vowels having close proximity and homogenoity to lengthening, are as much phonological as grammatical. There was, as we have already pointed out, a period in the history of the Sanskrit language whon, in the absonce of such technical devices of grammar, Samāsas had to be determined by different modulations of voice. The division of sound into udātta, anudātta and svarīta, the transformation of sounds as is illustrated by the rules of samprasārana, and the principles of ouphonic combination (sandhi) are indication how intimately grammar is related to phonology.

The study of Sanskrit from a philological basis and that of the methodology of its grammatical systems present before us problems of Semantics which, as a cognete science, deals with the psychological aspects of language. The science of meaning, though of comparatively modern growth in the domain of western philological researches, seems to have already developed into a scientific branch of study at the hands of the Nairuktas or etymologists. The antecedence of ideas to words, the relation between the sign and the object signified, the eternal 2 connection between sabda and artha,

¹ षर्वतव्य गन्दप्रयोग । वर्षे सप्तवायिष्यानीति मन्द्रः प्रयुक्यते।—Mabā. bbasya, Vol II, p 16 सर्वे हि मन्दीऽर्षप्रव्यवर्ग्य पुक्यते —Tantra-värttika, under 1, 3 8

[े] चौत्पत्तिकस्य ग्रन्थार्थेन सम्बद्ध — Mim Sütra, 1 1 5 छित्रै शस्त्राय-सम्बद्धे and नियो द्वर्यक्तामर्थे(सिसस्यः : — Mahabharya, Vol I, p 7.

the derivability of words 1 from verbal roots, the method of naming objects, the origin of certain words (as kāka, kokila, dundubhi, etc.) from an imitation of natural sound,2 and the way how words change their meanings (as kavi, mṛga, kuśala, pravīṇa, etc.) are facts that have been scientifically dealt with by the Nairuktas the grammarians. The etymological explanations of words, as they occur in the Brāhmaņa and Nirukta literature, is an evidence that investigation in the science of meaning was not only necessary for the proper understanding of the Vedic texts, but formed an important part of the study of Sanskrit grammar. Though an independent branch study mainly devoted to the psychological side of language, the Nirukta, as Yāska maintains, is materially akin to grammar, the former serving as a complement of the latter.3

In course of foregoing discussions on grammatical problems, we have had occasion to make reference to certain philosophical views, mainly from the Mīmāmsā and the Nyāya systems, having direct bearing upon problems of purely grammatical interest. As a department of study intimately connected with the process of thinking, grammar, like

¹ नामान्याख्यातजानीति शाकटायनी नैरुक्तसमय्य (—Nirukta, 1. 12.

² काक इति शब्दानुक्रतिसदिदं शक्तानिषु वहुलम्।—Ibid,

[ै] तदिरं विद्यास्थानं व्याकरणस्य कात् सार् स्वार्धसाधकं च।—Nirukta, p. 115.

logic, deals with a subject (sabda and artha) that forms the very basis of knowledge. The supremo importance of Sabda-sāstra lies in the fact that it deals with words whoreby we think, know and express our thoughts to others. Every word is a symbol of intelligence. No knowledgo whatsoever, says Bhartrhari,1 is possible without words; knowledge of all denominations is materialised through the medium of words. Punyaraja * particularly points out that the use of words (sabda-bhāranā) nots as an important factor in the manifestation of qualified knowledgo (savikalpakajāāna). An attempt is made here to show the extent to which grammar is related to other philosophical systems, specially the Mimaman and the Nyaya.

Certain Mimāmsā doetrines are found to have close relationship with those of grammar. (i) The oternality of Sabda (Sabda-nityatāvāda): The Mimāmsakas have not only accepted the eternality of words with all earnestness but have made it a fundamental tenet for defending the oternal character of the Vedas. It seems to have been on the part of the Mimāmsakas a pieus necessity to maintain the eternality of words inspite of the arguments advanced by the Naiyāyikas. Unless words are held to be eternal, it is not

[ं] न सीऽक्ति प्रव्यक्षे क्षेत्रि यः शब्दानुवसाहते । श्रनुविद्वसिव ज्ञानं सर्वे गुष्टेन भासते ॥—Vākyapadiya, Kār. 1. 121.

³ सा दि वायूपता प्रत्यवनमाँ: सविवस्पकतान तन्त्रस्पादिकेल्याँ:--Pnpyarbja under Väkyapadiya, Kar. 1. 125.

possible to establish the authoritativeness or trustworthiness of the Vedas which, as we find, consists of a huge collection of words represent-The Mim. ing the Mantras and Brahmanas. Sūtras 6-11 are those that are usually put forward by the Naiyāyikas against the eternal character of words. The Mīmāmsakas had their arguments ready to refute those attacks one after another (Mim. Sūtras 12-19) in a manner that reflects much credit on them. final conclusion is arrived at by the statement 1 darśanasya parārthatvāt which means that words are held to be nitya on account of their being used for the purpose of signifying the sense. Words 2 do not, as the Naiyāyikas hold, exist only for a moment and totally disappear after the utterance is over, but continue to exist so as to express the intended meaning.

Grammar, as we have already shown, though based on a purely analytical method, has also established the eternality of śabda. But there is some amount of difference regarding the standpoints from which the eternality (nityatva) has been conceived by the Mīmāṃsakas and the grammarians. The Mīmāṃsakas take sound to be eternal, as it is manifested by the utterance

¹ नित्यस्त साइर्भनस परार्थतात—Mīm. Sūtra, 1. 1. 18.

³ दर्भनमुचारणं तत्परार्थं परमर्थे प्रत्याययितुम्। उचरितमावि हि विनष्टे भव्दे भर्थे प्रत्याययितुं न मजुयात्—Sabara-bhāṣya.

[ै] नीचर ध्वनिव्यङ्गा वर्णात्मकं नित्यं शब्दमाहः—Kaiyata. नीचिदिति मौमांसकाः—Pradipoddyota.

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and is represented by the letters, whereas the grammarians have gone a step beyond sound as such and seught to find out the subtle olement which is exactly manifested by sound, that is to say, they realised the existence of Sphola as the final cause of sound. The grammarians understand Vālya-Sphola as representing the true type of nitya-šabda. A glance into the characteristic attributes with which nitya-šabda is comprehended by Patanjali is sufficient to corroborate the view that Sphola to the grammarians was the same as Brahman to the Vedantins.

(ii) The Mimāmsakas have agreement with the grammarians in regard to the relation of words with their meanings. The Mimāmsā Sūtra, 1.1.5, states expressly that a word (preferably those that represent the Vedie mantras) has inbern or eternal relation (relation that is permanently fixed) with its signification. The first Vārttika of Kātyāyana and the exposition of Pataūjali thereon purport to establish the very same view so far as the relation of words with their meanings is concorned. The view of Kātyāyana as incorporated in the opening Vārttika goes to show that the grammarians used to look upon words, meaning and the relation as

¹ वाकास्तीटमपरे (वैद्याकरणाः) संगिरले ।—Kaiyaja.

[ै] भू वं क्टस्यमिकाल्यनपायीपजनिकार्यसुत्पत्यकडाध्ययोगि यक्तदित्विमित्त । —Mahabhāeya, Vol. I, p. 7.

चौत्पत्तिकल् शब्दसार्थेन सम्बन्धः।

सिद्धे शब्दार्घसम्बद्धे ।

permanently fixed (siddha). Patañjali 1 has expressly stated that a significant word is permanently related to its meaning. relation of a word with its meanings is called nitya in this sense that it is found to be current in popular usage from time eternal 2 (anādi). This relation is grammatically known as śakti 3 or may be viewed as one of identity; a word is sakta, i.e., capable of denoting the sense, the ... meaning is śakya and the relation subsisting between them is called śakti or yogyatā.

(iii) The Mīmāmsakas agree with the grammarians in respect of the denotation of a word. The Mim. Sūtra, 1.3.33, lays down that all words denote a class (ākṛti), the individual being comprehensible by means of mutual dependence 4 between the class and the individual or avinābhāva. The author of the Bhāṣya has clearly pointed out the difficulty that arises, if an individual only is held to be the denotation of a word. The two well-known grammarians, Vyādi and Vājapyāyana, held opposite views, the former advocating the class-theory and the latter supporting the individualistic one. The view of Pāṇini, 5 as explained by

¹ नित्यो द्यर्घवतामर्थेरिभसम्बन्धः (—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 7.

² सन्तनस्थापि व्यवहारपरम्परयानादिलात्रित्यता।—Kaiyata.

⁸ गन्दार्थयो: सन्त्रस्य गत्तिरूपं तादात्मामिनेति |—Pradipoddyota.

^{*} श्राक्ततिर्हि व्यक्ताा नित्यसन्तना।—Sabara-bhasya.

⁵ उभयथा द्याचार्ये ण स्त्राणि पाँठतानि ।—Mahābhāşya, Vol. I, p. 6.

Pataŭjali, is that both the class and the individual are denoted by words.

- (iv) In the Ślokavārttika, Kumārila has devoted a lengthy chapter to refute the theory of Sphota as expounded by the grammarians. As the theory of Sphota is apprehended to destroy the glorious edifice of the Vedas by declaring all divisions of sentences and words as merely artificial, the Mimāmsakas could not recognise the existence of Sphota apart from sound. The assumption of Sphota is thus untenable from the Mimāmsā point of view. So far as experience goes, letters that constitute a word are found to be significant, and it is, therefore, nothing but unreasooable to acknowledge an incomprehensible thing as Sphota, which is materially distinct from letters.
 - (v) There is a distinct section in the Mīmāṇṣā Sūtras called vyākaranādhikarana dealing mainly with the problems of grammatical interest. The subject discussed in this particular section is almost the same as dealt with by Patañjali in the first āhnika of the Mahābhāṣya. The question 2 that presents itself for solution is to ascertain the reason for using words of purely Sanskrit origin. While correct forms (as qauh)

[े] दोपवडा गकारा देगैवादे: प्रतिपादक:। भ वं प्रतोयमानलात्तर्ष्व प्रतिपादनात् ॥—Slokavärttika, Kar. 186.

[ै] गोशनो यथा साखादिमति प्रसाचं, कि तथा गाळादबोऽप्यु त नेति सन्देह:।— Sabara bbāsya, under 1. 3 25.

as well as the incorrect ones (as gavī, gonī, gopotalikā, etc.) are found to be equally expressive of sense, it is really difficult to understand the import of the scriptural injunction which unconditionally prohibits the use of corrupt words (apabhramśas). This prohibition seems to have been strictly followed by Sanskritspeaking Brāhmins, particularly at the time of sacrificial performance, lest the purity of their rituals might be vitiated by the utterance of corrupt words. These incorrect words, hold the grammarians, are distorted forms Sanskrit, this distortion or mutilation of forms being due to wrong imitation or inability of pronouncing the correct words of Sanskrit origin.2 The grammarians have drawn a clear line of demarcation between these two classes of words as the first and foremost function of the science of grammar.8 As it helps the discrimination of correct words, the science of grammar has been elevated to the dignity of Smṛti by the Mīmāmsakas.

Though the meaning is equally expressed by correct and corrupt words, it is the use of correct words alone, holds Patañjali,⁴ that is attended with religious merits. It must be,

¹ ब्राह्मग्रीन न स्त्रे च्छितवै नापभाषितवै। स्त्रे च्छी ह वा एष यदपशब्द:।

² तदशतिशानुस्पलात्—Mim. Sūtra, 1. 3. 28. गोणव्दसुचारयितुकामेन केनचिदशक्ता गावीत्यचारितम्।—Śabara-bhāşya.

⁸ अनुशिष्यन्तेऽसाधुशब्दे स्यो विविच ज्ञाप्यन्तेऽनेनेति शब्दानुशासनम् ।—Nāgeśa.

^{*} समानायामर्थगती शब्देन चापशब्देन च धर्मेनियम: क्रियत शब्देनैवार्थोऽभिष्ठेयो नापशब्दे नेत्येवं क्रियमाणमस्युद्यकारि भवतीति |—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 8,

however, remembored that this principle of preferring the use of words strictly in conformity with the rules of grammar to these that do not come under the cognisance of grammar, is based on a purely religious consideration. How, then, are we to distinguish correct words from incorrect ones? According to the Mimansakas, it is grammar or Vyūkarana-smṛti that serves as the helping guide for such a discrimination. The rules of grammar are, therefore, held to be authoritative and a kind of trustworthy evidence.

(vi) Tho Mimamsa-Sutra, 1.3.28, makes it clear that the origin of corrupt forms should be traced to natural inability to pronounce the corroct words, and that the meaning is expressed by such distorted forms on account of their structural similarity 1 with correct words. This view is exactly analogous to what is held by the grammarians in regard to the origin of apabhramsas. Pataujali 2 maintains apasabdas or pervorted forms are the result of imperfect imitation and iaborn inoptitude. Bhartrhari has the following: Sanskrit is a divine tongue current from time immomorial: it has undergone distortion at the hands of those who failed to give utterance to the correct Sanskrit word by reason of their natural

^{&#}x27; चनुर्वी हि गाव्यादिगींग्न्दम 1—Sabara-bhāsya. ' भगतिजानुकर्वार्थ: (~Mabābbāsya, Vol.1, p. 19.

[ै] देवी वाग व्यवकी व्यमक्रक रिमधाविभग्न-Vakyapadiya, Kar. 1, 156.

incompetency. They are also significant like correct words, but their signification is a matter of inference, that is to say, they become significant only by recalling the corresponding correct words with which they have close resemblance.

(vii) In the bhavarthadhikarana, there is a discussion as to whether noun or verb is related to the result $(ap\bar{u}rva)$. As it is produced by the action, apūrva is connected with the word indicating the verb and not with words denoting either substance or qualities.2 The Mim. Sūtra, 2.1.1, enjoins that all verbs should signify action. This view bears close comparison with the statement of Patanjali (kriyāvacano dhātuļi and bhāvavacano dhātuh). The view of the Mīmāmsakas regarding the meaning of the root and of the suffix (result and action pectively) is different from that of the grammarians.3 The Mīm. Sūtras, 2.1.3 and 2.1.4, give the definitions of nāman and ākhyāta respectively, which 4 remind us of the definitions suggested by Yāska. The Mīm. Sūtra, 2.1.6, speaks of a twofold division of action, namely, primary and secondary, and the subsequent rules give their definitions.5

¹ ते साध्रष्वनुमानेन प्रत्ययोत्पत्तिहेतव: । तादात्मासुपगस्यैव श्व्दार्थस्य प्रकाश्काः ॥—Vākyapadīya, Kār. 1. 151.

² नर्मशब्दा एवापूर्वस्यविधायकाः, न द्रव्यगुणशब्दा इति ।—Sabara-bhāṣya.

³ मर्खनिम्या:--फलमातं घात्वर्धः, व्यापारः प्रत्ययार्धः।

⁴ सत्त्वप्रधानानि नामानि, भावप्रधानमाख्यातम् [—Nirukta.

⁶ यैद्र[°]व्यं न चिनौष्वंते तानि प्रधानभूतानि द्रव्यस्य गुणभूतलात्—and यैस्त द्रव्यं चिनौष्वंते गुणसत प्रतीयते तस्य द्रव्यप्रधानलात्।

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The Nyāya system, specially the Navyanyāya has made valuable contributions to the study of grammar. The Naiyāyikas are credited with having expounded the most scientific theory about the origin of sound. To the Naiyayikas, šabda is a quality of the sky, i.e., space (sabdaqunamākūšam). Though they have taken šabda as the product of human effort, the Naiyāyikas have included sabda or, more properly, verbal cognition, within the category of pramanas.1 In accordance with their view, sabda is liable to production and destruction 2-two important characteristics of all things that are karna or non-eternal. They have sought to explain the relation between sabda and its msaning with reference to the will of God. Sakti or primary signification of a word is not determined, hold the Naiyāyikas, by social convention, but seems to have been fixed by the volition of God (sanketa) expressed in the following strain: 'let this word be denotative of this sense ' (ayam šabdo'mumartham pratipādayatu). According to the Naiyāyikas, Sābda-bodha or verbal knowledge is derivable from a scatence s and not from individual words; and so far as verbal cognition is concerned, the knowledge of

¹ प्रत्यचातुमानीपमानशस्दाः प्रमाणानि ।--- Nyāya-Sūtra, 1. 3.

⁵ प्रागृत्पत्तिसावोषपत्त्रेय and पादिमालादेन्द्रियकलात् कृतकवदुपनाराञ्च ।— Nyāya-Sātras, 2. 2. 12 and 2. 2. 14.

वाक्यभावनवातस्य सार्थवस्यादवीधतः।
 सन्पदाते बाल्दवीधी न तक्यातस्य वीधतः ॥—Sabdasakti., Kär. 12.

viśeṣaṇa¹ (adjective) must have precedence to that of viśeṣya (noun). They have made a distinction between Upasargas and Nipātas, holding the former to be indicative (dyotaka) and the latter as directly expressive of sense (vācaka).

Gangeśa's Tattvacintāmani is an epochmaking work, remarkable throughout by its originality of thought; it ushered in a new order of thinking that was readily assimilated by the later grammarians. The Tattvacintāmani is, indeed, a valuable record marking the height of perfection which the Indian thought had reached at that time. Scholars of outstanding genius such as Raghunātha, Mathurānātha, Jagadīśa and Gadādhara tried their level best to popularise this new school of logic following in the wake of Gangeśa. This work is divided into four parts dealing with perception, analogy, inference and śabda.

The śabda-khanda deals, among other things, with all important problems of grammar:

(i) it has established the trustworthiness of śabda as a pramāṇa; (ii) it has advanced arguments in support of the non-eternal character of śabda; (iii) it has shown how to determine the śakti or primary signification of words;

गगरहीतिविशेषणा वृद्धिविशेष्येषूप्नायते and शाब्दवीधि प्राक्पतीयमानलं विशेषणत्वम् ।

(iv) it has given an adequate treatment of Dhātu, Upasarga, Nipāta and Samāsa; (r) it has elaborately dealt with expectancy, compatibility, proximity and import is important factors of verbul knowledge, and (r) it has discussed the question of the origin of corrupt words (apabhi amšas). How indispensable Jagadīša's Sibdasaktiprakāsikā and Gadādhara's Vyutpattivida are for the proper study of the philosophy of Sanskrit grammir has already heen pointed out

In Grammar lies the origin of the science of Poetics. The Alankara-&īstra is not less akin to Grammar than is the Nirukta. The contribution of grammar is nowhere so prominent is in this particular branch of study. The science of poetics may be and to have been principally based on grammar. Sabda and artha not only form the subject of grammar but have also provided the fundamental basis upon which stands the whole fabric of the Alamlara sastra. Vyakarana and Alamhara are organically connected and used to be studied in India as cognite departments of study.

The rhetoricians or Alimbarikas have extensively dealt with pocifical compositions with special reference to their merits and defects Having regard to what constitutes the essence of poetry, they have expounded the doctime of vyanjana and made an elaborate treatment of rasa

Poetry is the outcome of joy. Endowed with the power of articulating his voice and born in the midst of magnificent beauties of nature, man feels naturally inclined to clothe his emotions in a rapturous and rhythmical language, seeking proper expression for the music of his heart and tending to give a poetic touch to his thought, when he is in an ecstasy of joy. Whether it is 'a spontaneous overflow of powerful emotions' or whether it 'makes us inhabitants of a world to which the familiar world is a chaos,' poetry appears to be the living manifestation of the internal storehouse of joy. Poetry has been rightly called hlādaikamayī, that is to say, 'comprehending joy alone, rising from a source that is often represented as the sea of joy (ānandābdhi).

The three attributes generally ascribed to Brahman are Being (sattā), Consciousness (cit) and Joy (ananda). To a Vedantin, the transcendental self is an inexhaustible source of joy. The expression raso vai sah 2 is explained by the Vedantins in such a way as to identify the supreme self with rasa—the joy of all joys. A religious devotee, particularly a Vaisnava. adores a deity who is the repository of all

¹ ञ्चानन्दमयोऽभ्यासात्।—Vedānta-Sūtra, 1. 1. 12.

श्रानन्दमयं प्रमुख 'रसी वै सः' इति तस्यैव रसलमुक्कोचिते 'रसी ह्योवायं यं लब्धा श्रानन्दी भवति ।- Sankara-bhāsya.

beauty, full of joy and the bestewer of all blessings. Šrī Kṛṣṇa, as depicted in the Bhāgavata, is an incarnation of joy and love, characterised by things that are not only exceedingly beautiful but serve to excite the most pleasant emetions in a moment of deep devotion. the supreme Gedhead has any conceivable form, or, to put the idea in a different way, if the fermless is at all cognisable in any particular form, it is jey and jey alone. He is, to speak the truth, the embediment of joy. The rsis of the Upanisads have called him rasa and ampla—the fountain source of perpetual joy.1 One that dwells in us all is iov 2 itself, serene and supreme; it is the immortal (amrta) in all beings that makes us sometimes jeyful even in the midst of cares, and anxieties. What is called multi or final emancipation is only a state of everlasting jey, what the yegins yearn to attain is a screno jey that knows no bounds; what the artist designs to paint is the image of the one that is most beautiful and joyful; what the poets of all ages have been eager to depict with all their resources of imagination is the figure of perfect beauty and joy. The ultimate motive of all arts is to find out this cternal source of iov, the attainment of which quenches all thirsts and satisfies all mundanc desires. To

सर्व त्राममननं ब्रह्म and पानन्तं ब्रह्मणी विदान (—Taittirtyopanisad.
 भानन्तमध्य सर्वोत्तरकात्)—Sabkara-bhāzya.

those who have visualised the Beautiful themselves, the whole world appears dancing in an ecstasy of divine joy.

Poetry is the expression of such joy. The mission of a poet is to reveal this thrill of joy hidden in the storehouse of nature, touching those tender chords of the heart that are naturally moved by emotions. The poet is a creator in the idealistic sense of the term, his creation being a world of ideal beauty-a dreamland shining with touches of fine imagery. Rasa which forms the life of poetry is brought into existence by the genius of the poet through the suggestiveness of his composition. The imaginative pictures drawn by the poet are different those that are found in the world of experience.1

The art of poetry seems to have been cultivated in India from a very long time. hymns of the Vedas, which embody the most literary records, are specimens ancient beautiful poetry with considerable amount of rhetorical embellishment here and there. The in their simple flow represent the genuine outburst of a heart seized with extreme joy and wonder, excited by the awe-inspiring splendour of nature on all sides. More poetical

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नियतिकतिनयमरिक्तां हार्दैक मयीमनन्यपरतन्ताम् । नवरसरुचिरां निर्मितिमादधती भारती कविर्जशति॥

⁻Kāvyaprakāśa, Kār. I.

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in outlook are the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahā-bhārata—two great monumental works in Sanskrit epic poetry, written in simple but elegaot style, and preserving a brilliant record of Indian culture in all its phases. These two epoch-making works prepared the ground for the advent of a more advanced type of classical poetry as is evident from the works of Kālidāsa and others. The sweet melody and high-flown similes of Kālidāsa, the pathetic touches of Bhavahhūti and the beautiful expressions of Śrīharṣa will continue to keep the poetical horizon of India reverberated for ages to come.

Turning to the definition of $K\bar{a}vya$, we find that it is \$abda and artha that go to constitute a $K\bar{a}vya$. The body 2 of a $K\bar{a}vya$, to use the language of the rhetoricians, is composed of two elements, namely, \$abda and artha, or a combination of words capable of expressing the intended sense. A word, some hold, expressive of a beautiful sense is $K\bar{a}vya$. Visvanātha has laid greater stress on rasa, comprehending it to be the vital element of poetic compositions. To quote his definition, $K\bar{a}vya$ is a combination of words possessing rasa in an appreciable extent.

¹ तददीपी मन्दार्थी सगुणावनलङ्की पुन: कापि।—Kāvyaprakāśa.

[&]quot; शब्दार्थी वपुरस्य :---Ekāvalī.

³ शरीरं तावदिष्टार्थव्यविक्ता पदावली ।—Kavyadaréa.

^{*} रमणीयार्थप्रतिपादकः भृन्दः काश्यम् (—Rasagabgādhara. * वाकां रसासानं काश्यम् (—Sāhityadarpaṇa.

Kāvya is generally divided into two classes, namely, superior and inferior. A poetical composition,1 where the suggested sense appeals more beautifully to our sentiment than the meaning ordinarily expressed by words, is known as the best type of poetry. An inferior class of poetry is one that is characterised by only sonorous words and marked absence of suggestiveness (maximum of words with minimum of sense). Mammata has referred to the grammatical doctrine of Sphota connection with the definition of the superior class of poetry.

The Alamkārikas have divided words into three classes, namely, vācaka (expressive), lākṣaṇika (indicative) and vyañjaka (suggestive). This threefold division, it must be remembered,⁸ refers intrinsically to the designation (upādhi) and not to the object designated (upādheya), because there are no fixed classes of words as denotative, indicative and suggestive. The same word, say Gangā, as in the expression Gangāyām ghoṣah, may be taken either as denotative or indicative according to the context and propriety of sense. It should be particularly noticed here that vyanjana, as an additional vṛtti, has been accorded a prominent place only

² इदसुत्तममतिश्यिनि व्यङ्गेत्र वाचाडिनिर्दुधै: कथित: 1—Kāvyaprakāśa, 4.

² खादाचको लाचणिनः ग्रन्दोऽत व्यञ्जकस्त्रिधा ।—Kāvyaprakāša.

⁵ अत्रीपाधीनासेव त्रितं न तूपाधेयानास् ।—

in the science of Poetics and not in other systems of thought.

The grammarians have acknowledged fakti (primary signification) and laksana (secondary sense or implied signification), and, consequently, recognised both vācaka and lāksanika as two kinds of words. Lakşanû is called by other names also, such as upacara, aropa, etc., and tho senso that is indicated is often called bhakta in philosophical treatises. Gotama 1 has eaumerated the causes that give rise to upacara er transference of one's attributes to another.2 Quite in agreement with Gotama and almost in the same language, Patanjali has under the rule Pan., 4, 1, 48, clearly shown the four different circumstances under which Laksana is usually resorted to. Visyanatha's definition 4 of Lakeana is materially the same as suggested by the rhetoricians.

Bhartrhari has divided the meanings of words as gauna (secondry signification) and mukhya (primary signification) and has shown twofold upacāra (imposition) as pertaining to kabda and artha. Those who take one word as eapable of expressing several meanings, that is to say,

Nyāya-Sūtra, 2, 2, 63.

[&]quot; अतहावेऽपि तदुपचार: ।--Ibid.

[ै] चतुर्भिय प्रकारेरतिक्षन् स भवति । सातृष्याचाह्याचात्मभीष्याचनुमस्चर्यादिति ।— $Ma^{h\delta}bh^{g}yo$.

[•] जचणा ग्रामम्बम सात्पर्धानुपपत्तितः !-Bba;apariccheda,

[ं] एकमाहरनेकार्यं ग्रन्थनये परीचकाः।

[्] निमित्तभेदादेवास सावीय तस्य भिराते ॥—Vākyapadiya, 2, 252.

find only one word like go which is applicable to both cow-individual and Vāhīka, have their theory based on the assumption meanings.1 It must restricted or accidental be, however, remembered that a word does not simultaneously express more than one meaning.2 The other meanings, apart from what is called primary signification, seem to be quite as good by either synonyms, comprehensible context or connection with some other words.3 Bhartrhari 4 maintains that the word go which is used to denote a being possessing dewlap, hump, hoofs, etc., is also applied to Vāhīka (an inhabitant of Vāhīka—modern Punjab) on account of his proverbial similarity to an ox in point of dullness. How, then, are we to justify the division of meaning as gauna and mukhya? The first meaning, we must admit, seems to have obtained more currency than the latter, that is to say, the word go is popularly used to denote a cow and implies Vāhīka only indirectly or accidentally. The author of the Vākyapadīya 5 states clearly that it is popular and accidental usage that renders one meaning mukhya gauna. In connection with imposition (upacāra)

¹ तत्रैकशब्ददर्शने शब्दोपचार: प्रसिद्धप्रसिद्धिनिसित्तक: |-Punyarāja.

² यौगपद्मतिकास्य पर्याये व्यवतिष्ठते ।-- Vakyapadiya.

³ अर्धप्रकरणाथां वा योगाच्छच्दान्तरेण वा ।—Ibid.

^{*} यथा सासादिमान् पिण्डो गोश्रव्देनाभिधीयते। तथा स एव गोशव्दो वाहीकिऽपि व्यवस्थितः॥—Ibid.

⁵ प्रसिद्धिभेदाद्गीणल' मुख्यल' चीपपद्यते।—Ibid.

pertaining to artha, Bhartrhari speaks of two kinds of meanings, namely, $svar\bar{u}pa$ or naturally fixed by its very form and $b\bar{u}hya$ ns is indicated by imposition or $upac\bar{u}ra$. The word go denotes a class gotva by the force of $mukhy\bar{u}rtha$, and the same is transferred to $V\bar{u}h\bar{u}ka$ for the purpose of implying the same amount of stupidity and dullness on the part of a $V\bar{u}h\bar{u}ka$. Thus, wo find that the \bar{A} lamk \bar{u} rikas not only agree with the grammarians in regard to the circumstances and causes that necessitate the acceptance of $Lak_{\bar{s}}an\bar{u}$, but have made use of the same examples ($Gang\bar{u}y\bar{u}m$ $gho_{\bar{s}}ah$ and $gaurv\bar{u}h\bar{v}kah$).

The difference is, however, remarkablo so far as regards the treatment of vyañjanā in the science of Poetics. Vyañjanā, as distinct from both sakti and Lakṣaṇā, has been given a prominent place in discourses on Poetics, though an additional vṛtti like vyañjanā is not actually accepted by other schools of thought. In accordance with the view of the Alamkārikas, it is Vyañjanā or suggestiveness that gives rise to rasa in all poetical compositions. As sakti and Lakṣaṇā are not sufficient to bring out the sense of cxtreme coldness and sanctity of the Ganges, in the expression Gangāyām ghoṣaḥ, the Alamkārikas were compelled, as it were, to

Valyapadiya, 2, 256.

षर्यमञ्चल दिविष: सन्दर्भ वाहाय। तत निमित्ताच्याआर्टगाँल वाहीक-ऽप्यतुपन्यते, सन्दस्त गोलमेवाभिषत इति वाह्यावींपचार; (—Pupyarāja,

acknowledge the suggestiveness of words. The Naiyāyikas and the earlier grammarians have not recognised vyanianā as an additional meaning like the Ālamkārikas.

Jagadīśa has referred to the same example mukham vikaśitasmitam (face blooming with a smile) whereby suggestiveness has been established by Mammata and others, and discussed at length whether vyañjanā is at all worthy of recognition. There is no justification, he argues, to recognise the existence of something like suggestiveness, so far as the direct or indirect meaning of a word is concerned. The so-called suggested sense, i.e., extreme coldness and sanctity, or fragrance (i.e., the smiling face is as fragrant as flowers) is derivable by the usual mental cognition, the special beauty of the erotic sentiment (camatkāra) being a matter of mental apprehension (mānasa-bodha).

The meanings of words,⁴ says Bhartrhari, are not only determined by their very forms, but there are other instruments such as sentence, context, time, place, etc., which also help us

¹ विरतास्त्रभिधाद्यासु ययार्थी बोध्यतेऽपर:। सा वृत्तिर्व्यञ्जना नाम ग्रन्टस्यार्थोदिकस्य च॥—Sāhityadarpaṇa.

Sabdaśaktiprakāśikā, under Kār. 24.

³ यथा कथिबदुपनयवर्ग्नेन मनसैव विशिष्टधीसमावात्, मानीरिथकसुखप्रसेद-पर्यविसतं चमत्कारं प्रत्यिप शान्दस्येव मानसस्यापि बोधिवर्गेषस्य हितृताया: सुवचलात्। व्यञ्जनाख्यपदार्थान्तरस्य सक्ष्पसत्ताया अन्वयनुद्धौ तद्धौतुत्वस्य च प्रमाणिवरहिणासत्त्वाचिति संचिप: 1—Sabdasakti., under Kār. 24.

^{*} वाक्यात् प्रकरणादर्धादौचित्याद्देशकालतः । शन्दार्धाः प्रविभन्यन्ते न रूपादेव नेवलात् ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2. 316.

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in ascertaining the intended sense, specially when a word happens to have more than one meaning. When the primary signification of a word having several meanings is fixed or restricted by association, etc. (as shown by Bhartrhari), the other meanings, holds Mammata, are to be regarded as suggested (cyangya). This is called suggestion based on primary sense in the science of Poetics.

Thore is no evidence to believe that ryanjana was ever recognised by the ancient grammarians, Among the grammarians, Nages 1 has definitely supported vinaiana, and ho lays much emphasis on the desirability of acknowledging it from the standpoint of grammar.2 Nagesa has, however, tried to show that he was not the first among the grammarians to recognise vyañianā as such. In accordance with his interpretation, the grammarians, like Bhartrhari and others, have also indirectly referred to unanjana by supporting indicativeness (duotakatva) of the Nipatas and taking sphota as what is suggested by sound. With Nagesa, dyotakatva is the same as vyanjakatva. The sense of perfection in prajayati and that of measuring in pradesam vilikhati is nothing but suggested. because laksanā in such cases is not admissible

^{&#}x27; यनेकार्यस गन्दम्य वाचकले नियन्तिते।

मयोगादीरवाचार्यभीकद्याप्रविरञ्जनम् ॥—Kāvyaprakāša, 1. 10

^{*} ध्याकरणानामप्येतत्स्त्रीकार श्रावयाक: ।—Manjūțā, p. 160.

चतएव निपातानां योतकलं स्क्रीटस व्यक्त्यता च स्थादिभिरका—Ibid.

owing to the absence of primary signification on the part of Nipātas. Thus, what we call dyotakatva in connection with Nipātas and ākṣepakatva in relation to Karmapravacanīya are only different in names, but indicate the same thing, viz., suggestiveness (vyañjakatva).

The science of Poetics comes in closer touch with grammar in regard to the problem of rhetorical defects (dosa). The entire discourse on dosa is more or less grammatical in nature. The most prominent among them are as follows: cyutasamskṛti 1 (ungrammatical form) such as anunāthate for anunāthati; aprayukta sanctioned by popular usage) as daivatah; for daivatam; asamartha (incompetent) as hanti in the sense of gacchati; nirarthaka (meaningless) as hi in mama hi gauri; avācaka (not capable of expressing the sense), as the use of the word dina in the sense of 'bright'; avimṛṣṭavidheyāmśa (to place the predicate before theas nyakkāro'yameva instead \mathbf{of} nyakkāraķ, etc. It must be, however, remembered that these and similar other grammatical mistakes were committed by the poet almost unconsciously. Poets found it often difficult to abide by the rigid rules of grammar, and even the most famous of our poets had the boldness of using certain forms in direct violation of the rules of grammar. This is why Mallinātha often calls them nirankuśa (ungovernable).

³ Kāvyaprakāśa, 7.

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The beautiful poetry of the Vedas exhibits a considerable amount of rheterical excellence. Semetimes we meet with examples of beautiful similes and motaphors in the hymns. The peets of the Rk-Veda have not only poured forth ritualistic prayers and invocations to the forces of nature, but also succeeded in giving a stamp of peetical beauty to their expressions making use of some well-conceived figures of speech, mestly similes and metaphers. The sun-god 1 (riding in n chariot drawn by seven herses) running after the resplendent Dawn (usas) is compared to a mnn following n heautiful woman. How brilliant is the concoption with a touch of classical beauty 1 Again. the goddess of Vak 2 is described as unfolding her graceful person to a learned man, just us a loving wife dressed in fair garmonts shows herself to her husband. We have other instances of beautiful similes in the fellowing: 'just as one' sifts the barley corn by means of a sieve, even so the wise discriminates the cerroet words by intelligence; 'as the water of a pend is agitated by a strong wind;' and 'evercoming ' the sins just as crossing a river by means of a boat.' A wellchesen metapher conveniently used in the Upanisads to show the difference between

[ं] सूर्यों देवीसुपसं रोचमाना मध्यों न योधामधीत प्रयात्।—Pk. Veda, 1. 10.

[े] उतो लखें तन्तं विसद्ये जायेव प्रत्य चत्रती सुवासाः।—Rk-Veda, 10 €. 71. सक्तमिव तितउना पुनन्ती यद धीरा मनसा वाचमकत।—Ibid.

^{*} नावेव सिन्धं दुरितात्यप्ति: I-Ibid.

jīvātman and paramātman is as follows: 'two beautiful 1 birds related to each other by mutual friendship reside in the same tree, one of them eating the sweet fruit (pippala) and the other only witnessing without partaking of the There are other instances of beautiful upamā such as hamsāviva patatamā (falling like swans), simho na bhīmā āyudhāni bibhrat (holding dreadful as lions) and so on. weapons as Here and there we meet with brilliant poetic expressions as amrtasya putrāh (the children of the immortal); rtasya panthamanveti sadhu (following the path of righteousness): rtena rtamapihitam (truth veiled by truth); $d\bar{u}to$ devānāmasi (Agni is described as the messenger of the gods) and dyaurvah pitā pṛthivī mātā (heaven is your father and the earth is your mother). These show unmistakably that the Rsis of the Rk-Veda were acquainted with the poetical use of beautiful metaphors.

Grammar seems to have some bearing upon alamkāra or figures of speech, specially upon upamā. As one radically connected with most of the alamkāras and one that lends supreme excellence to poetry in general, upamā is placed at the head of all figures of speech. The main principle underlying upamā, viz., similarity³.

¹ यथा वात: पुष्किरिणीं सिमङ्गयित सर्वत: ।—Pk-Veda, 5. 6. 78.

[े] हा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया ससानं हचं परिषखजाते। तयोरन्य: पिप्पलं खाहत्ता-नत्रज्ञन्यो श्रभिचाकशीति।— [k-Veda, 1. 22.464.

³ साघर्यमुपमा मेदे।—Kāvyaprakāśa.

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between two different objects (samana-dharma), has been clearly explained by the rules of grammar (Pāņ., 2.1.55 and 2.1.56). Sādīsya or similarity means tadbhinnatvc sati tadqatabhūyodharmavattvam, viz., two things are said to be similar when they are materially different but possess some common properties. The particles and suffixes that often indicate similarity (vati, iva, yathā) are also clearly shown by the rules of grammar (Pan., 5.1.105). Jimutasyeva (like the cloud) occurs in the Rk-Veda and has been made use of by the grammarians as an instance where the caseending is not dropped (nitya-samāsa). The expression puruşavyāghrah (a tiger-like man) shows that the man, though different from the tiger, as belonging to two distinct species, possesses those qualities such as valour, strength, courage, etc., which are generally found in the tiger. Under the rule upamānāni sāmānyavacanaih (Pān., 2.1.55), Pataujali 1 has thoroughly dealt with the characteristics of upamāna and upameya. He says that two things are generally related to each other as upamana and upameya when they are in possession of some properties that are common to both. Quite in keeping with the Alamkārikas, Patanjali 2 has explained

[े] एवं तर्हि यत्र किंचित् सामान्य करिष विशेषस्त्रोपमानोपसीये भवतः।--Mababbatya, under the rule Pap. 2 1.85.

[ै] चन्द्रमखी देवद्विति-वह्वयन्द्रे गुणाः, या चाची प्रियद्रमनता सा गव्यते।--

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the expression candramukhī devadattā by observing that qualities in the moon such as gracefulness to the sight is transferred to the face on account of its striking similarity with the moon. The popular example under the rule Pān., 2. 1. 55, i.e., ghanaśyāmaḥ¹ (black as the cloud), where the common property is expressly mentioned, is an attribute of Kṛṣṇa, who is often compared to a cloud on account of his black complexion. The Vedic expression² mṛgo na bhīmaḥ (fierce as the beast) is a similar instance where the common property, i.e., dreadfulness is clearly pointed out.

रामाप्णमस्त

¹ स्थामलस्योभयसाधारगधर्मलात् सामान्यवचनम् ।

² Rk-Veda, 1. 21. 154.

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250 PHILOSOPHY OF SANSKRIT GRAMMAR

In accordance with the definition as suggested by the Naiyāyikas, Karana is the same as Kārana (vyāpāravat kāraņam karaņam) only with this difference that karana is closely associated with the action, i.e., cause, when it is actually in operation to bring about the accomplishment of the action, is what is called karana in grammar. Gadādhara maintains that the words vyāpārādhīnatva should be added to the definition (vyāpāravat kāraņam karaņam) so as to clearly indicate the subserviency of Karana to the agent. An accessory (as Karana), as we find, cannot accomplish the action unless and until it is set to work by the agent (kartyviniyoga). This being the actual state of things, one may possibly bring forward the argument that it is more plausible to attribute the adjunct sādhakatama to the agent itself in preference to Karana.1 Bhartrhari 2 meets this objection by saying that the primary function of the agent is to employ the accessories to operation 3 which, thus engaged, immediately accomplish the action. This is to show how Karana comes between the agent and the action, and, consequently, has greater proximity to theoperation than the agent itself.

¹ कर्तृविनियोगीत्तरकाली साधनानां प्रवृत्तेस्वदेपेचया कर्तृरेव साधकतमलं न्याध्यमिति—Helaraja.

² खातन्त्रेऽपि प्रयोक्तारसारादेवोपक्कवंते। करणेन हि सर्वेषां व्यापारी व्यवधीयते॥—Vakyapadiya, 3.98.

³ विनियोगी हि कर्तव्याणारः।

Now it is sufficiently clear why Karana is said to be sādhakatama in rolation to other accessories. Bhartrhari has again alluded to the preponderance of vivakṣā and the difference between the agent and Karana by referring to the example asiśchinatti (where the function of the agent has been attributed to the instrumental, viz., sword, with a view to indicate the instrumental dent activity or excessive power for accomplishing the action on the part of Karana). In the above example, it should be noted, the sharpness of the sword comes to be regarded as Karana when the sword itself is used as the agent.

Though apparently synonymous, hetu and Karana are, however, distinguished 2 by the grammarians, the criterion of such difference being 'the invariable association with the action' on the part of Karana. The first and foremost thing necessary for a Kāraha is to have closo relation with the action. Hetu generally gives the idea of a substance and has practically no invariable connection with the action. Bhattoji's has clearly elucidated this distinction. A substance unconnected with action is called hetu, but Karana, as a form of Kāraka, is

¹ असादीमां तु कर्यस्वे तैच्छादि करणं विदु:-- Vākyapadīya, 8. 91.

द्रव्यादिविषयी हितः कारकं नियसिक्षयम्—Ibid.

उद्यादिसाधारणं निर्योगारणाधारणं च हेतृलम् । करणलं तु क्रियामाप्रतिषयं व्यापारित्यतं च ॥—Bhalfoji under the rule Pâp. 2. 3. 23.